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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the question how best to interpret the exceptions to the 
equality in employment principle afforded in Great Britain to religious 
employers.  There is significant ambiguity surrounding the application of these 
exceptions, aggravated by a paucity of case law and a divergence in 
understanding as to the relative significance of job function, context and 
organisational ethos.  The exceptions lack any clear foundational principle and 
therefore norms to guide their interpretation are urgently needed.   
The thesis begins by seeking a modern justification for safeguarding the 
autonomy of religious groups in an era that may be characterised by a decline in 
the ‘religiosity’ of the British public and an increase in the influence of human 
rights and equality narratives.  Such a justification is located in the human 
dignity and autonomy rationale for religious freedom.   Against this background, 
I argue that, by applying a particular understanding of freedom of association to 
their interpretation, the exceptions could helpfully be regarded as permitting 
discrimination to preserve an employer’s ethos for the benefit of members of a 
religious group.  At present, the significance of employer ethos is 
underdeveloped in the jurisprudence on the exceptions.  A purposive approach 
which treats the exceptions as derogations from the equality principle, justified 
by freedom of religious association, could encourage a deeper insight of 
employers’ needs and an assessment of claims on the exceptions in the context 
of the interests protected by rights of association.  Fuller engagement with 
balancing religious association and equality rights could be achieved through 
recognising that the exceptions derive from qualified rights and through 
requiring employers to act proportionately.  Including the concept of 
‘accommodation’ in the proportionality analysis could, moreover, assist with 
fostering an environment in which due regard is given to the dignity interests 
affected by discrimination.   
My argument is informed by comparative study of the equivalent law in Canada 
and the USA.  Attention is drawn to the ambiguity in the British employment 
exceptions by consideration of the equivalent US and Canadian models.  Whereas 
in these models, church and state relations and freedom of association, 
respectively, have been recognised as significant, the introduction of the British 
iii 
employment exceptions has been influenced by a patchwork of factors.  My 
argument is further informed by a series of interviews with religious employers, 
which revealed mixed opinions on the exceptions and offered a valuable insight 
into the importance of ethos to employment practices and relationships.     
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1 Introduction   
1.1 Research aim 
Religion in the workplace is widely considered to be an interesting and 
important field of study.  This is shown in the large and growing volume of 
academic studies in the field, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.  To date, 
however, research in the UK has focused primarily on the equality rights of the 
religious employee in the secular workplace.  Questions, such as, whether 
employers should be obliged to ‘reasonably accommodate’ their employees’ 
manifestations of religion in the workplace (for example, by granting exceptions 
to dress codes) and, whether employees ought to have the right to 
‘conscientiously object’ to certain work tasks, have featured heavily in the 
academic debate and literature.1  Interest in these questions has, of course, 
been influenced by the well-publicised complaints of religious discrimination 
brought by four particular employees (Eweida, Chaplin, Ladele and McFarlane) 
against their employers.  Eweida, a British Airways worker and Chaplin, a nurse, 
wanted to wear a cross at work in breach of their employers’ policies, whilst 
Ladele, a civil registrar and MacFarlane, a relationship counsellor, refused (or 
were deemed to have refused) to provide registration and sexual counselling 
services, respectively, to same sex couples.  Their complaints of religious 
discrimination, initially heard by the domestic courts in the UK, were considered 
by the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECtHR’) in 2012.  The ECtHR’s 
judgment, issued under the name of Eweida and others v the United Kingdom,2 
continues to inspire interest in the efforts an employer should make to meet the 
                                         
1 See, for example, Mark Hill and Russell Sandberg, 'Is Nothing Sacred?  Clashing Symbols in a 
Secular World' [Aut 2007] PL 488; Andrew Hambler, 'A Private Matter?  Evolving Approaches to 
the Freedom to Manifest Religious Convictions in the Workplace' (2008) 3 Religion and Human 
Rights 111; Andrew Hambler, 'A No-Win Situation For Public Officials With Faith Convictions' 
(2010) 12 EccLJ 3; Gwyneth Pitt, 'Taking Religion Seriously' (2013) 42 ILJ 398; Matthew 
Gibson, 'The God "Dilution" Religion, Discrimination and the Case For Reasonable 
Accommodation' (2013) 72 CLJ 578; Erica Howard, 'Reasonable Accommodation of Religion 
and Other Discrimination Grounds in EU Law' (2013) 38 ELRev 360; and Veit Bader, Katayoun 
Alidadi and Floris Vermeulen, 'Religious Diversity and Reasonable Accommodation in Six 
European Countries: An Introduction' (2013) 13 IJDL 54. 
2 Eweida v the United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8. 
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religious needs of employees in the workplace and in the suitability of the legal 
protections available in the UK to this end.3 
In contrast, comparatively little attention has been given to the application of 
employment equality laws to religious workplaces in the UK.4  This is despite the 
considerable number of organisations with a religious ethos which employ a 
significant number of staff in a variety of sectors including in organised religion, 
education, welfare and leisure.  The Equality Act 2010 (the ‘EA’) contains 
exceptions to the principle of equal treatment in employment which can be 
relied on by employers with an ethos based on religion or belief, or in respect of 
employment for the purposes of an organised religion.5  These exceptions are 
supplemented by specific provisions in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (the 
‘EScA’) and the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (the ‘SSFA’), 
permitting differential treatment of teachers on religious grounds in schools with 
a religious character.6  Together, these ‘employment exceptions’ permit 
employers an element of religious autonomy in the manner in which they 
organise their employment affairs.  
When the employment exceptions which now appear in the EA were considered 
in Parliament, there was significant discussion and debate on their scope.7  
Insofar as they engage competing norms of freedom and equality, group and 
individual, and church and state, the potential for conflict and controversy in 
their application was rife.  Given this, it might have been expected that the 
employment exceptions (including those in the EScA and the SSFA), would have 
                                         
3 In a recent report which addressed the question ‘Does the law sufficiently protect employees 
wishing to manifest a religion or belief at work?’ the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
recommended that no changes were made to the current legal framework.  Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, ‘Religion or Belief: Is the Law Working?’ (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, December 2016) 30-40.   
4 Though contributions include Russell Sandberg and Norman Doe, 'Religious Exemptions in 
Discrimination Law' (2007) 66 CLJ 302; Lucy Vickers, 'Religion and Belief Discrimination and 
the Employment of Teachers in Faith Schools' (2007) 4 Religion and Human Rights 137; Julian 
Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (OUP 2010) 
122-37; Russell Sandberg, 'The Right to Discriminate' (2011) 13 EccLJ 157; Rex Ahdar and Ian 
Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 358-73; and Lucy Vickers, 
Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (OUP 2016) 174-86.    
5 Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010) sch 9, para 2 and 3. 
6 Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (E(Sc)A 1980) s 21(1); School Standards and Framework Act 
1998 (SSFA 1998) s 60(5)(a), s 60(5)(b), s 58(2), s 58(3), s 60(3), s 58(5), s 58(6) and s 60(4). 
7 See chapter 3 at 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.4. 
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engendered more academic interest since their introduction.  The low incidence 
of cases on the employment exceptions, or perhaps the lack of appellate 
authority other than decisions of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, might be 
partly responsible for the seeming lack of concern.   
It would be a mistake, however, to understate the significance of the 
employment exceptions.  As derogations from the basic equality principle that 
individuals should not be treated less favourably because of their personal 
characteristics, the employment exceptions require a weighty justification, as 
well as clarity in their application and scope.  As a consequence of the lack of 
academic literature in this area, however, fundamental questions on the 
normative rationale for protecting the religious autonomy of employers, and on 
the principles guiding the application and interpretation of the exceptions, have 
not been fully explored or answered.   
It is therefore the primary aim of this thesis to explore how best the 
employment exceptions can be understood, and interpreted.  To be clear, this 
enquiry takes the employment exceptions in their present form and seeks a 
better understanding of their rationale and a principled approach to their 
interpretation.  It does not assess the case for reform of the employment 
exceptions.8  Focusing on how best the employment exceptions can be 
understood and interpreted is especially relevant given the recommendations of 
the most recent report on religion or belief in the workplace issued by the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (the ‘EHRC’) and entitled ‘Religion or 
belief: is the law working?’9  This report was the final product in a three year 
project by the EHRC on religion or belief in the workplace and in service 
delivery, and followed a call for evidence and a review of the legal framework.10  
The EHRC specifically addresses in the report the question of whether the 
                                         
8 The predominant aim of this thesis is not to challenge the existence of the exceptions to equality 
norms or to challenge the idea of giving legal recognition to some religious groups.  In 
considering how best to understand and interpret the exceptions, the focus has been on the 
most dominant forms of religion in the UK.     
9 EHRC, ‘Religion or Belief’ (ch 1, n 3). 
10 Martin Mitchell and others, ‘Religion or Belief in the Workplace and Service Delivery: Findings 
from a Call for Evidence’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2015); Peter Edge and Lucy 
Vickers, ‘Review of Equality and Human Rights Law Relating to Religion or Belief’ (Equality and 
Human Rights Commission 2015). 
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employment exceptions are, ‘sufficient and appropriate’.11  Although the EHRC 
makes recommendations that the exceptions in the EScA and the SSFA are 
reviewed for compatibility with the European Union directive on equal 
treatment in employment, Directive 2000/78/EC (the ‘Equal Treatment 
Directive’), it reaches the conclusion that there should be no change to the 
employment exceptions in the EA.  The status quo (at least for the employment 
exceptions in the EA) looks set therefore to continue.  In light of this, it is all the 
more important that there is clarity around how best the employment 
exceptions are to be understood and interpreted. 
1.2 Methodology 
With a view to addressing the question, how best the employment exceptions 
can be understood and interpreted, I explore the models of exceptions to 
employment equality norms in the jurisdictions of the United States of America 
(the ‘USA’) and Canada and compare these to the employment exceptions in 
Great Britain, paying particular regard to the historical, constitutional and 
political influences on each jurisdiction’s approach. The benefits of a 
comparative approach in the field of religious autonomy are often attested to in 
light of the ‘shared concerns and the similarity of underlying problems’.12  
Because the jurisdictions of the USA and Canada have recognised religious 
freedom in their constitutions and religious equality in their anti-discrimination 
laws for much longer than Britain, they offer a rich collection of case law and 
body of academic comment to assist the enquiry into how the employment 
exceptions can best be understood and interpreted.  The comparative approach 
will be used to call attention to the nature and scope of the employment 
exceptions in Britain and as a source of ideas for their future development.   
                                         
11 EHRC ‘Religion of Belief’ (ch 1, n 3) ch 3.   
12 Cole Durham Jr observes that, ‘because of shared concerns and the similarity of underlying 
problems, the field of religious autonomy is one in which comparative studies are likely to yield 
fruitful results for years to come’ in W Cole Durham Jr, 'The Right to Autonomy in Religious 
Affairs: A Comparative View' in Gerrard Robbers (ed), Church Autonomy: A Comparative 
Survey (Peter Lang 2001) 711.  See also Patrick Lenta, 'Taking Diversity Seriously: Religious 
Associations and Work-Related Discrimination' (2009) 126 SALJ 827, 840 where Lenta 
comments, ‘I believe that a study of the approaches adopted in other jurisdictions can help us to 
discover arguments for or against exemptions to laws that prohibit work-related discrimination 
that might otherwise be overlooked but are worthy of consideration.’  More generally see 
Christopher McCrudden, 'A Common Law of Human Rights?  Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights' (2000) 20 OJLS 499. 
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I then undertake an empirical study of the influence of a religious or faith ethos 
on employment practices.  In order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
interaction between employment and an organisation’s religious or faith ethos, 
as well as an insight into whether and why religious autonomy in employment is 
perceived as important, I analyse  qualitative data collected from interviews 
held with employers associated with different religions and operating in a range 
of sectors in Glasgow and the surrounding areas   Full details of the empirical 
methodology and its use in this thesis are given in chapter 7.13   
1.3 Definitions and territorial scope 
The ECtHR has interpreted the freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
guaranteed by article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
‘ECHR’) as encompassing a variety of beliefs, including traditional as well as 
alternative religions, and beliefs such as humanism, which are not deemed by 
their holders to be in their nature ‘religious’ at all.  The terms ‘freedom of 
religion’ and ‘religious freedom’ will be used in this thesis to refer generally to 
the wider category of belief protected by article 9.  
The employment exceptions purport to cover, in varying guises, organised 
religion, schools with a religious character, and other organisations with an 
ethos based on religion or belief.   Except in chapter 7, the thesis will use the 
terms ‘religious employer’, ‘religious workplace’, ‘religious group’ and ‘religious 
organisation’ to refer collectively to these types of association.  Although the 
term ‘religious organisation’ can infer, to some, an association which 
proselytises religion, it is not to be interpreted so restrictively in this thesis.14  
The scope of the empirical study which is reported in chapter 7 is somewhat 
narrower, as it does not cover organisations with an ethos based on belief (as 
opposed to religion).  References are also made throughout chapter 7 to 
‘religious’ or ‘faith’ ethos organisations, in sensitivity to views expressed by 
                                         
13 See chapter 7 at 7.2 
14 The description in the EA 2010 of the bodies covered by particular provisions on religion or belief 
could be criticised for lacking in coherence.  The employment exceptions in the EA 2010, for 
example, refer to ‘organised religion’ and to employers with ‘an ethos based on religion or belief’ 
(sch 9, paras 2 and 3) whilst the exceptions to the equality principle in service provision refer to 
‘organisations relating to religion belief’ defined more precisely by reference to organisational 
purpose (sch 23, para 2).      
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some of the participants of the study as to how they wished their organisations 
to be described.   
As the employment exceptions explored in the thesis are those in the EA, the 
EScA and the SSFA, the territorial scope of the enquiry embraces Scotland, 
England and Wales.  The EA applies to Scotland, England and Wales, the EScA 
only to Scotland and SSFA only to England and Wales.  The EA does not apply to 
Northern Ireland.  Employment equality laws in Northern Ireland derive from 
separate legislation implementing the Equal Treatment Directive.15  The position 
in Northern Ireland is specifically outside of the scope of this thesis.  In light of 
the history of religious violence in Northern Ireland, its employment equality 
laws, insofar as they pertain to religious discrimination and religious schooling, 
ought to be considered separately in the context of the political environment in 
which they exist.16 
1.4 Argument and structure 
Over the next nine chapters, the question is addressed of how the employment 
exceptions can best be understood and applied.  As a prelude to considering the 
nature and extent of the employment exceptions, a sense of how the religious 
group relates to the political and social environment and to the right to religious 
freedom, is sought in the next chapter.  Chapter 2, therefore, reflects on the 
nature of the special status enjoyed by the religious group in Britain.  By 
examining the remaining incidents of establishment in Scotland and England, and 
the role of religion in the provision of education and social welfare, the 
continuing significance of the religious group in the political and social order is 
illustrated.  How the status of the religious group has been affected in recent 
years by the reported decline in ‘religiosity’ and the increasing dominance of 
equality and human rights discourses, is then explored, and I argue that if the 
religious group is to continue to have importance, a modern interpretation of its 
special status is desirable.  Against this background, justifications for the right 
                                         
15 Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, art 70 and art 71; Employment 
Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2003, reg 8. 
16 For a useful comparison of the employment exceptions in Northern Ireland, Ireland and Great 
Britain, see Mark Coen, 'Religious Ethos and Employment Equality: a Comparative Irish 
Perspective' (Sep 2008) 28 LS 452.   
1 Introduction  7 
to religious freedom are considered.  I argue here that a rationale for religious 
freedom rooted in human dignity and autonomy offers a convincing justification 
for regarding the religious group as having a special status, which is consistent 
with prevailing narratives in law and culture relating to the importance of the 
individual and individual interests.   
Having set the context for the enquiry, I explore in chapter 3 the nature and 
extent of the autonomy enjoyed by the religious group in its capacity as 
employer.  I assess the extent to which the Human Rights Act 1998 (the ‘HRA’) 
and implementation of the Equal Treatment Directive have restricted the ability 
of the religious group to organise its employment affairs autonomously.  The 
employment exceptions, which leave the religious group with a measure of 
autonomy, are examined in some detail to reveal significant ambiguity 
surrounding their application, legitimacy and scope.  I argue here that instead of 
providing clarity on the employment exceptions, relevant Parliamentary and 
related materials disclose a divergence in understanding as to how to interpret 
the employment exceptions.  Whereas some policy-makers appear to regard job 
functions as the most important determinant of when the exceptions are to be 
engaged, the context of the work and the ethos of the employer are regarded by 
others as more significant.  The ambiguity surrounding the employment 
exceptions is also exacerbated, I argue, by a paucity of relevant case law: a fact 
which, I suggest, can be explained without admitting their redundancy.  
Ambiguity in the application of the employment exceptions, aggravated by 
conflicting interpretations and a lack of case law puts the rule of law at risk. 
There is thus a strong case for uncovering the principle which underpins them. 
Before I consider the extent to which clear principle underpinned the 
introduction of the employment exceptions, chapter 4 and chapter 5 consider 
the approach taken in the USA and Canada to exceptions from equality in 
employment.  The reason for such comparative analysis at this juncture is 
twofold.  Firstly, a doctrinal analysis of the US and Canadian models highlights 
and underlines aspects of the British employment exceptions, leading to a better 
understanding of their nature and scope.  Thus, in chapter 4, the wide model of 
exemptions and exceptions to the employment equality principle in the USA 
draws attention to the relatively narrow parameters within which employers can 
rely on the employment exceptions in Britain.  The more developed nature of 
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the jurisprudence on the exemptions and exceptions in the USA, moreover, calls 
attention to the paucity of case law on the British employment exceptions.  
Whereas the exemptions and exceptions in the USA permit less scope than the 
employment exceptions in the EA for ambiguity and uncertainty in their 
interpretation and application, I argue that they fail to afford sufficient regard 
for the equality interests affected by their use.  In chapter 5, meanwhile, case 
law on the Canadian model reveals that the Canadian judiciary, when 
interpreting its exemptions and exceptions, has particular regard to the nature 
of the employer (including its purpose and mission) and to the context of the 
employment.  This, I argue, calls attention to the narrow focus on job functions 
adopted by several policy makers involved in the legislative history of the 
employment exceptions in Britain.    
There is a second benefit to considering the models adopted in the USA and in 
Canada.  The norms influential on these models will be identified, so that the 
employment exceptions in Britain can be measured against them in chapter 6.  
In this way, the comparative analysis provides a useful starting point for 
assessing whether clear principle informed the introduction of the employment 
exceptions in Britain.  I argue in chapter 4 that constitutional church and state 
relations based on the notion of positive religious freedom guide the approach 
taken in the USA.  Freedom of association, by comparison, is revealed in chapter 
5 to be the clear principle underlying the employment exceptions and 
exemptions directed at the religious group in Canada.     
Chapter 6 considers the influence, if any, of the norms prevailing in the USA and 
Canada on the introduction of the employment exceptions in Britain.  I will 
argue that church and state relations, positive religious freedom and freedom of 
association had little influence on British law and that the employment 
exceptions were introduced instead in a piecemeal fashion, shaped in many ways 
by political compromise.  As a result, I argue, the employment exceptions in 
Britain lack a clear and principled underpinning.  This, I contend, is not only 
detrimental to the rule of law, but also renders the legislature and judiciary 
susceptible to criticism for championing a secular agenda and prioritising certain 
protected characteristics, such as sex and sexual orientation, over religion.   
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In the quest for guiding principle, the views of employer stakeholders are then 
sought.  Chapter 7 reports on the findings of an empirical study investigating the 
perspective of employers on the ways in which (and reasons why) an 
organisational ethos based on religion or faith impacts on employment 
relationships and practices.  What makes a workplace with a religious or faith 
ethos different to one without?  What do employers really think of the 
employment exceptions?  The findings of the study are enlightening.  Many of 
the employer participants laid emphasis on the importance of ethos and values 
to their work and in their employment relationships.  A curious interdependency 
between an organisation’s ethos and its employees was revealed in some of the 
participants’ accounts.  Not only were employees often considered essential for 
the maintenance of the employer’s ethos, organisational ethos was often 
considered essential for the employees’ own faith journeys.  Narrowly defined 
job functions were rarely given as the reason by participants for deeming 
religion to be an occupational requirement.  Organisational purpose or ethos, 
staff relationships and worship in the workplace were cited instead as factors 
relevant to the participants’ reliance on the employment exceptions.  
In light of these findings on the associative life of a religious organisation, the 
case is made in chapter 8 for interpretation of the employment exceptions to be 
based on the principle of freedom of association.  The employment exceptions, I 
argue, ought to be understood as affording the employer autonomy to protect 
the associational interests of the ‘members’ it serves.  The relevant ‘members’ 
will vary from one organisation and context to the next, and may include, for 
example, the foundational members or trustees of the employer’s organisation, 
the community which the organisation serves, or, in certain narrow 
circumstances, the employees themselves.  I will argue, on this understanding, 
that the members are best served by retention of their associative identity and 
that the employment exceptions therefore permit discrimination, within limits, 
to safeguard the employer’s ethos.  An identity-protecting interpretation of the 
employment exceptions with roots in religious and associational freedoms is thus 
offered as a principled basis for development of the law in this area.     
In chapter 9, I argue that an identity-protecting understanding of freedom of 
association could be applied to interpretation of the exceptions in their current 
form and could explain the hierarchy of protection that the three distinct bases 
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of exceptions afford.  Unlike in Canada, however, concepts of ‘associative’ 
rights, ethos and identity are, I argue, underdeveloped in the British 
jurisprudence on the employment exceptions.   The British jurisprudence (this 
time, like its Canadian equivalent) further evidences, I argue, a lack of 
engagement with the discriminatory impacts of an exercise of the exceptions.  
Drawing on the analysis in the previous chapters, I conclude in chapter 10 that 
an approach to interpretation of the employment exceptions which regards the 
employment exceptions as derogations from the equality principle with their 
rationale in fundamental rights of religious association could improve judicial 
reasoning and lead to fair and balanced decisions.  A purposive approach to the 
employment exceptions of this kind could encourage the judiciary to take an 
internal perspective on issues relating to the needs and interests of religious 
employers and to engage fully with the interests they protect: particularly, the 
relationships among an employer’s ethos, its ‘members’ and its employees.  
Understanding the rationale for the exceptions as deriving from a qualified right 
could also encourage more active engagement with the need to balance rights of 
religious association with competing interests in equality.  Extending 
proportionality to all of the exceptions, moreover, and considering norms of 
‘accommodation’ in the proportionality analysis could, I argue, facilitate this 
engagement and assist the judiciary to balance the dignity interests on both 
sides.     
 
11 
2 The religious group: context, themes and 
justifications  
2.1 Introduction 
In any country, the relationship which the religious group enjoys with wider 
society and the state is likely to evolve in response to legal and cultural change.  
In Great Britain, certain aspects of the religious group’s historical influence in 
the political and social order remain relevant today; nonetheless, it is 
instructive to consider the importance of the religious group in light of more 
recent narratives of change in law and culture.  Strong evidence of a decline in 
the ‘religiosity’ of the British public, and the ever-greater dominance of human 
rights and equality discourses, in particular, provide a helpful context for 
examining the status of the religious group in Britain today.   
It is the aim of this chapter to consider how, if the religious group is to have a 
special standing in the contemporary order, its importance should be 
understood.  Such an enquiry is a useful preliminary to a thesis which explores 
the employment exceptions, and which is premised on the belief, contested by 
some, that there are benefits to be gained from safeguarding the existence and 
activity of the religious group.  This chapter will begin by examining three 
particular aspects of the religious group’s historical involvement in the political 
and social spheres which remain relevant today: establishment of the Church of 
England, and to a lesser extent the Church of Scotland; the role of the religious 
group in the provision of education; and the involvement of the religious group 
in social welfare projects.  Narratives which have become dominant in recent 
years, pertaining to the level of ‘religiosity’ of the British public, individual 
(human) rights and equality, will then be described and consideration given as to 
how these may have affected how the religious group fits and is perceived within 
wider society.   
If the religious group is to continue to have importance, a modern interpretation 
of its special status is, I will argue, desirable.  It is against this background that 
the justifications commonly offered for the right to religious freedom 
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (the ‘ECHR’) will be 
examined.  I will argue that there is one rationale commonly offered for 
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religious freedom which provides a particularly strong justification for the 
religious group.  According to this rationale, the religious group is instrumental 
in the protection of human dignity and autonomy.  Not only does this rationale 
for religious freedom provide weighty grounds for regarding the religious group 
today as having a special status, I will argue that it offers a justification for the 
current and future role of the religious group which is consistent with prevailing 
narratives regarding the pre-eminence of the individual and individual interests 
in law and culture. 
2.2 Religious groups in the political and social order: 
some historical and current perspectives 
 Establishment 
Since the English Reformation, the Church of England’s close relationship with 
the state could be regarded as affording it a special place in the political order.  
The effect of the Reformation statutes of the 1530s was to bring to an end the 
reign of the Pope in England.1  Under the new authority of the King of England, 
the Church of England was considered to be the established, and, for a time, the 
only lawful religion in England.2  The ‘Kingdom of England’ was, according to 
Russell Sandberg, considered then to be, ‘synonymous with the Church of 
England’.3  Although the legal disadvantages imposed, following the English 
Reformation, on adherents to other religions have, in the main, now been 
repealed,4 examples of ‘establishment’ of the Church of England survive, 
affording it a special relationship with the state.  The monarch is the Supreme 
Governor of the Church of England, and responsible for appointing all of its 
bishops and archbishops,5 26 of whom have seats in the House of Lords (and 
therefore responsibility for passing legislation).6  Each new session of the 
Church’s governing body (the General Synod) is also officially opened by the 
                                         
1 Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press 2011) 24. 
2 ibid 25-26. 
3 ibid 24.  
4 ibid 26-27 (although it is still the case that the monarch may not be a Roman Catholic (The Act of 
Settlement 1700)).  
5 Appointment of Bishops Act 1533. 
6 Manchester Bishopric Act 1847.   
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monarch,7 and whereas the Church has a role in the coronation of new 
monarchs,8 a commitment is made by the monarch in the coronation oath to 
maintain the Anglican Protestant religion.9  Unlike the laws of other religions, 
Church of England legislation, in the form of Measures, requires parliamentary 
approval, and, like Church of England Canons, royal assent.10  In addition to the 
‘secular’ courts’ jurisdiction over many aspects of Church of England law, church 
tribunals and courts determine, subject to judicial review by the High Court, 
matters relating to clergy discipline, and the licensing of works to church 
buildings, their contents and churchyards.11  The Church of England, moreover, is 
obliged to perform marriages for and permit the burials of all parishioners and is 
prevented from prohibiting parishioners from attending public worship.12  Thus, 
the close connection between the Church of England and the state can be 
observed in the Church’s relationship with the monarch, Parliament, the courts 
and the public.13   
The nature of the relationship between the Church of Scotland and the state is 
less clear.  Although the Scottish Reformation in 1560 brought the Pope’s 
authority in Scotland to an end, and marked the intention (reiterated in the 
1707 Treaty of the Union) that the Protestant religion would be established in 
Scotland,14 many continue to debate whether the Church of Scotland can really 
                                         
7 BBC, 'Church of England: An Explanation of the Church of England, Established or State Church 
in England and Part of the Worldwide Anglican Communion; its Structure, History and Current 
Issues' (BBC, Last Updated 30 June 2011) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/cofe/cofe_1.shtml> accessed 28 December 2017.  
8 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 101.  
9 The Coronation Oath Act 1688; Lucinda Maer and Oonagh Gay, ‘The Coronation Oath’ 
(SNPC0043, House of Commons Library 27 August 2008) 2.  
10 Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, s 4; Synodical Government Measure 1969, s 1. 
Commenting on this in Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 2, n 1) 29, Sandberg remarks, ‘The 
legal position of the Established Church thus continued to differ from other religious groups.’   
11 Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 2, n 1) 64-65 referring to tribunals established under the Clergy 
Discipline Measure 2003 and to courts established under the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction 
Measure 1963.   
12 Argar v Holdsworth (1758) 2 Lee 515; Burial Law Amendments Act 1880; Cole v PC [1937] 1KB 
316.  For comment on this and the relationship between the Church of England and the public 
see Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 2, n 1) 65-66.  
13 Sandberg has opined that, ‘the incidents of establishment can be understood as involving four 
interlocking constitutional relationships: between Church and Monarch, Church and Parliament, 
Church and the courts and Church and the public’ in Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 2, n 1) 60.     
14 Callum Brown, Thomas Green and Jane Mair, Religion in Scots Law: Report of an Audit at the 
University of Glasgow (Humanist Society Scotland 2016) 38. 
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be described as the or an ‘established’ church,15 with some describing it as 
having a ‘milder’16 or ‘lighter’17 form of establishment than the Church of 
England.  Unlike the Church of England, the monarch is not the Supreme 
Governor of the Church of Scotland18 and has no authority to approve 
ecclesiastical appointments.19  The Church of Scotland does not hold any seats in 
the House of Lords and its legislation does not require to be approved in 
Parliament or to receive royal assent.  Instead, the Articles Declaratory of the 
Church of Scotland, recognised by the Church of Scotland Act 1921, provide that 
the state must not interfere ‘with the proceedings or judgments of the Church 
within the sphere of its spiritual government and jurisdiction’.20  As such, Church 
of Scotland courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over spiritual affairs, without 
their determinations normally being subject to judicial review in the secular 
courts.21  Though the exact relationship between the Church of Scotland and the 
state remains unclear, there is little doubt that the Church of Scotland is treated 
specially in law.  A representative is sent by the monarch to attend meetings of 
the General Assembly22 and a vow is taken by the monarch in the Oath of 
Accession particularly to, ‘maintain and preserve the Protestant religion and 
Presbyterian Church Government’.23  Unlike other religious institutions, the 
relationship between the Church of Scotland and the state is set out in an Act of 
                                         
15 For an excellent summary and discussion of the different opinions on the question of whether the 
Church of Scotland is an ‘established’ church see ibid 37-50.     
16 Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 2, n 1) 70.   
17 Colin R Munro, 'Does Scotland Have an Established Church?' (1997) 4 EccLJ 639, 645.  
18 Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 2, n 1) 70.  
19 Ahdar and Leigh (ch 2, n 8) 100. 
20 Church of Scotland Act 1921 (COSA 1921), Articles Declaratory, art IV.  On the Articles 
Declaratory generally see, Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopedia (June 1994) vol 3, 
paras 1501-04.   Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison opined in Ballantyne v Presbytery of Wigtown 
1936 SC 625 (IH), 654 that the civil courts could not determine that matters which fell within the 
Articles were not spiritual.   
21 Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 2, n 1) 71 referring to Lockhart v Presbytery of Deer (1851) 13 D 
1296, Wight v Presbytery of Dunkeld (1870) 8 M 921 and Frank Cranmer, 'Judicial Review and 
Church Courts in the Law of Scotland' [1998] Denning Law Journal 49.  Cranmer compares the 
Court of Session’s approach in these cases with its approach to the decisions of the tribunals of 
non-conformist churches and comments on the potential impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 
on judicial review and church courts.     
22 Munro (ch 2, n 17) 644. 
23 The Church of Scotland, 'How We Are organised' (The Church of Scotland, Undated) 
<http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/about_us/how_we_are_organised> accessed 28 
December 2017.  See discussion of the legislative background to the Oath in Munro (ch 2, n 17) 
644.    
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Parliament,24 and the courts of the Church of Scotland are recognised as, ‘courts 
of the realm’.25   
It would seem, then, that the instances of establishment of the Church of 
England facilitate for it a reasonable measure of influence in the political 
sphere.  Though the same may not be said about the instances of establishment 
of the Church of Scotland, its historical, and continuing role as Scotland’s 
‘national Church’26 with a ‘distinctive call and duty to bring the ordinances of 
religion to the people in every parish of Scotland through a territorial ministry’,27 
would seem to support its continuing significance in the social, if not the 
political, order.    
 Education 
It is not, however, only the established Churches which can claim to have a 
special status in the social order.  Groups of various religious affiliations have 
had, and continue to have, significant involvement in the provision of education.  
Religious groups historically led the way in education, with all schools in England 
and Wales prior to 1902 being, ‘subject to ecclesiastical oversight’ at common 
law.28  Although state involvement in education provision began in 1833 with 
funding grants,29 there was no state-provided education until the Elementary 
Education Act of 1870.30  Although voluntary schools in England and Wales were 
subsumed within the state-maintained sector by the Education Act 1902,31 the 
framework of education legislation enacted since then has facilitated the 
continuance of schools founded by religious groups.32  Schools with a religious 
                                         
24 COSA 1921.  
25 Munro (ch 2, n 17) 645. 
26 For comment on the concept of the Church of Scotland as a ‘national’ church see Marjory 
MacLean, ‘The Church of Scotland as a National Church’ (2002) 149 Law and Justice 125.  
27 COSA 1921, Articles Declaratory, art III.  
28 Julian Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (OUP 
2010) 234 referring to Cox's Case (1700) 1 P Wms 29, 24 ER 281 (though Rivers observes this 
may not have been the case for elementary schools).   
29 ibid 236. 
30 ibid 237.   
31 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (ch 2, n 28) 238-39.   
32 The current legislative provisions are contained in the School Standards and Framework Act 
1998 (SSFA 1998). 
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character in the state-maintained sector in England and Wales are now 
considered to be, ‘voluntary aided’, ‘voluntary controlled’, or ‘foundation’.  
Voluntary aided schools are afforded more independence by the state in respect 
of membership of their governing body, the appointment of staff and in the 
delivery of religious education, but remain responsible, in the main, for the 
financial costs of maintaining the school premises.33  In 2010, schools with a 
religious character accounted for as many as 33.78% of state-maintained schools 
in England.34   
In Scotland, nationalisation of church schools did not begin until 1872,35 when 
parochial school boards took over responsibility for the church schools of the old 
‘established’ Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland.36  
Notwithstanding this and the term ‘non-denominational’ which was and is used 
to describe the schools, it has been claimed that the influence of the Protestant 
churches on these schools continued: 
Although formal legal ties between the Protestant churches and the 
nationalised non denominational schools were severed, those churches 
continued to exercise a strong degree of control over the transferred 
schools by virtue of their de facto presence on school boards, and by 
virtue of the statutory recognition of the ongoing custom of religious 
observance and instruction in such schools.37   
Nationalisation of church schools was completed in 1918,38 when the 
responsibility for schools of other denominations, mainly Roman Catholic, was 
passed to local education authorities.39  These schools were termed, 
‘denominational schools’.  In contrast to the old Church of Scotland schools, 
denominational schools were granted statutory privileges to safeguard their 
religious character.  These privileges included the right to approve staff as to 
their religious beliefs and character, as well as the right to decide the content of 
                                         
33 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (ch 2, n 28) 239-40.   
34 Department for Education, 'Maintained Faith Schools' (FOI Release, Department for Education, 
20 July 2010) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/maintained-faith-schools/maintained-faith-
schools> accessed 28 December 2017.    
35 Education (Scotland) Act 1872 
36 Brown, Green and Mair (ch 2, n 14) 138-39.   
37 Brown, Green and Mair (ch 2, n 14) 138.   
38 Education (Scotland) Act 1918 
39 Brown, Green and Mair (ch 2, n 14) 139. 
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religious education.40  In 2013, there were 370 state-funded faith schools in 
Scotland (366 Roman Catholic, 1 Jewish and 3 Episcopalian), amounting to 14.4% 
of all state-funded schools.41  In a comprehensive review of religion in Scots law 
published in 2016, the authors comment on the present-day role of religion in 
education provision in Scotland thus: 
As education has been secularising in some ways, the Church of 
Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church and other religious bodies have 
increased the legal safeguards for their former rights and privileges 
and greater explicit protection for what they have perceived as their 
place in the overall system of education.42           
So, as in England and Wales, religious groups appear to have retained significant 
influence in the provision of education in Scotland.   
 Social welfare 
In addition to its continuing role in providing education, the religious group has 
been, and continues to be, important in the field of social welfare.  The role of 
the church in social welfare provision in Britain can be traced back to the 11th 
century.43  From this time, until the Reformation of the 16th century, it has been 
reported that the churches were the main sources of care for the poor.44  Post 
Reformation, church involvement in social welfare provision continued, though 
the care became subject to more institutional control by local government with 
the introduction of the Poor Laws.45  It has been claimed that Christian social 
welfare provision in Britain reached its peak in the early 20th century46 and 
thereafter declined in part in response to falling church membership and 
resources.47  By the end of World War II, responsibility for social welfare 
                                         
40 The statutory privileges are now contained in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, s 21(1); see 
further Brown, Green and Mair (ch 2, n 14) 139.   
41 Scottish Government, 'Frequently Asked Questions' (Scottish Government, December 2013) 
<www.gov.scot/Topics/Education/Schools/FAQs> accessed 28 December 2017.   
42 Brown, Green and Mair (ch 2, n 14) 187. 
43 Rana Jawad, Religion and Faith-Based Welfare: From Wellbeing to Ways of Being (Policy Press 
2012) 35-39. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid 52 (referring to the Poor Law of 1601 in England).  
46 ibid 53. 
47 For a discussion of the factors contributing to the decline see ibid 44-52. 
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provision had been transferred to government with the emergence of the 
modern welfare state.48  Notwithstanding this shift in responsibility, religious 
groups continued to play an important role in the delivery of social welfare and 
today, groups of various religious affiliations across Britain are involved in a wide 
variety of social welfare services: social work, health, social care, poverty 
reduction and housing.49  The role of  faith-based charities in the provision of 
welfare ‘crisis’ provision has been well publicised and was highlighted in a 
report published in 2013, in which it was claimed that a fifth of local authorities 
in England had given funds to faith-based charities to provide food banks, 
healthcare and counselling.50   
The theological roots of religious group participation in social welfare provision 
are often attested to.  In a report on health care and the church’s mission, the 
Mission and Public Affairs Council of the General Synod of the Church of England, 
for example, claimed that ‘Throughout the history of the Church, healing has 
been an integral part of the proclamation and application of the Gospel.’51  The 
General Synod has further asserted that, ‘the churches’ numerous public 
contributions to the common good are an enormously effective advocacy for 
Christian faith in national life’.52  Many religious groups consider it a central part 
of their mission to help those in need.  This, in conjunction with the increasing 
pressures on the Government in the field of welfare provision renders it likely 
that religious groups will retain significant involvement in social welfare 
provision in the future.   
                                         
48 Jawad (ch 2, n 43) 53; Francis Lyall, Church and State in Scotland: Developing Law (Routledge 
2016) 214. 
49 Jawad (ch 2, n 43) chs 4-8. 
50 See Patrick Butler, 'Welfare: the State Outsources Welfare Provision to the Church' The 
Guardian (London, 7 June 2013) <www.theguardian.com/society/patrick-butler-cuts-
blog/2013/jun/07/welfare-state-outsources-welfare-provision-to-religiousgroups> accessed 28 
December 2017.   
51 Michael Bristol, Health Care and the Church's Mission: Report by the Mission and Public Affairs 
Council (GS 1857, General Synod of the Church of England, January 2012) para 1.  
52 Philip Fletcher, The Common Good - the Church and Politics Today (A Paper from the Mission 
and Public Affairs Council, GS 1956, General Synod of the Church of England, 2013) para 12. 
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2.3 Changing landscape: ‘religiosity’, human rights and 
the equality agenda 
The relationships that the religious group has with state and society through the 
Church of England and Church of Scotland, and its involvement in education and 
social welfare provision, are illustrative of the special status and importance, or 
at least influence, of the religious group in Britain.  It is instructive, however, to 
consider the continuing role of the religious group, if there is to be one, in light 
of recent narratives of change: in particular, the reported decline in ‘religiosity’ 
and the increasing dominance of human rights and equality as commonly held 
conceptions of justice.     
 ‘Religiosity’ 
The 2011 UK census for England and Wales reported that 14.1 million, or 25%, of 
the population, identified with no religion: an increase from 6.4 million, or 15%, 
since the last census was conducted in 2001.53  The 2011 census data for 
Scotland showed a similar trend, with 37% of the population reported to have no 
religion, a 9% increase from 2001.54  This UK census data was collected by asking 
the question, ‘What is your religion’, a question designed to refer to religious 
affiliation rather than actual religious practice.  Whilst the census data reported 
that 59% of the population of England and Wales and 54% of the population of 
Scotland were affiliated with Christianity, other empirical studies suggest that 
the number of the population attending church on a regular basis is much lower.  
In a report published in 2007 by Christian charity, Tearfund, it was reported that 
only 15% of the UK population attend church at least once a month.55  Even the 
number of people who consider themselves as religious may not be as high as the 
census results suggest.  In the 2013 British Social Attitudes survey, for example, 
                                         
53 ONS, 'What Does the Census Tell Us About Religion in 2011?' (The National Archives, 16 May 
2013) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cen
sus/2011-census/detailed-characteristics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/sty-
religion.html> accessed 28 December 2017.  
54 National Records of Scotland, 'Summary: Religious Group Demographics' (Scottish Government, 
Scotland Census 2001 and 2011) 
<www.gov.scot/Topics/People/Equality/Equalities/DataGrid/Religion/RelPopMig> accessed 28 
December 2017.     
55 Jacinta Ashworth and others, Churchgoing in the UK: a Research Report from Tearfund on 
Church Attendance in the UK (Tearfund, 2007) 6.  
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over half of the UK population (50.6%) identified themselves as having no 
religion.56  Statistics have been collected from countries across the globe to 
prepare a table of the top 50 countries with the largest percentage of population 
who are agnostic, atheist or who do not believe in God.  Notably, in 2007 Britain 
was ranked at number 15, followed by Canada at number 20 and the United 
States of America at number 44.57 
There is, it would seem, strong evidence to suggest that the number of 
individuals associating with a religion has declined in recent years.58  Of 
particular interest is the reported discrepancy between the number who identify 
with Christianity and the much lower number who attend church.  The phrase, 
‘believing without belonging’ has been coined by one academic to describe the 
modern day approach to religion in Britain and captures the phenomenon that 
many of those who consider themselves to be believers have no relationship with 
a religious institution.59  There are now reportedly a significant number of 
people who consider themselves as, ‘spiritual but not religious’60 and beliefs or 
belief systems, other than the traditional religions, have gained in popularity, 
leading to the emergence of newer groups such as the Humanists UK.  The 
number of Humanist wedding ceremonies conducted in Scotland, for example, 
increased from fewer than 100 in 2005 when they were first legalised, to over 
4000 ceremonies in 2016.61    Although belief, whether or not traditionally 
                                         
56 See Humanists UK, 'Religion and Belief: Some Surveys and Statistics' (Humanists UK) 
<https://humanism.org.uk/campaigns/religion-and-belief-some-surveys-and-statistics/> 
accessed 28 December 2017.   
57 Phil Zuckerman, 'Atheism: Contemporary Numbers and Patterns' in Michael Martin (ed), The 
Cambridge Companion to Atheism (University of Cambridge 2007) 56-57.  
58 Linda Woodhead, for example, has conducted a study on the growth of individuals recorded in 
surveys as having ‘no religion’ and found that they are ‘not straightforwardly secular’ with only a 
minority being ‘convinced atheists’ and a quarter partaking in some form of personal spiritual or 
religious practice in the course of a month.  Linda Woodhead, 'The Rise of 'No Religion' in 
Britain: The Emergence of a New Cultural Majority' (2016) 4 Journal of the British Academy 245, 
249-50.   
59 Grace Davie, Religion in Briain: A Persistent Paradox (2nd edn, Wiley Blackwell 2015) 78-81; see 
also Grace Davie, 'Belieiving Without Belonging: Is this the Future of Religion in Britain' (1990) 
37 Social Compass 455.    
60 Tom de Castella, 'Spiritual, But Not Religious' BBC News Magazine (3 January 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20888141> accessed 28 December 2017.  
61 Simon Usborne, 'Increasingly Popular Humanist Weddings "To Overtake Church of Scotland 
Ceremonies Within Two Years"' The Independent (London, 21 April 2013) 
<www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/increasingly-popular-humanist-weddings-to-
overtake-church-of-scotland-ceremonies-within-two-years-8581924.html> accessed 28 
December 2017; Humanists UK, 'Humanist Weddings Continue to Surge in Number, Bucking 
2 The religious group: context, themes and justifications 21 
characterised as religious, may still be important to many individuals, it would 
appear that the significance of religious groups or institutions for the exercise of 
these beliefs has declined, or at the very least, changed.62 
 Human rights discourse 
There has also been a growth in human rights discourse in the last 20 years, 
encouraged, perhaps, by the incorporation of the ECHR into the law of the UK by 
the HRA.  Although the UK has been a signatory to the ECHR since 1951, prior to 
the HRA, the rights guaranteed by the ECHR were only binding on member states 
and could not be enforced in the domestic courts.  If a person considered the UK 
had acted incompatibly with the ECHR, he had to pursue his complaint in the 
European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECtHR’).  The HRA effected a significant 
change in the UK’s legal landscape.  The UK courts could, for the first time, 
determine breaches of ECHR rights and provide remedies to affected parties.  
Not only does the HRA oblige all public authorities to comply with the ECHR, it 
compels the courts to interpret domestic legislation, so far as possible, in a 
manner which is compatible with ECHR rights.63 
Although natural persons are not the only persons who can claim to be ‘victims’ 
under the HRA (so too can non-governmental organisations and groups of 
individuals who can claim to be affected by a violation),64 the discourse on rights 
generated by the HRA often adopts an individualistic tone.  So, article 9(1) of 
the ECHR, for example, which declares the right to freedom of religion, provides 
that: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
                                         
National Trend' (Humanists UK, 28 April 2016) <https://humanism.org.uk/2016/04/28/humanist-
weddings-continue-to-surge-in-number-bucking-national-trend/> accessed 28 December 2017.   
62 In a study conducted by Linda Woodhead, findings were made that although some of those who 
recorded having ‘no religion’ may engage in some form of personal religious or spiritual 
practice, they did not join religious groups nor join in communal religious practices.  Woodhead 
(ch 2, n 58) 250. 
63 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), s 3 and s 6. 
64 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), art 34.  The Commission held in X and the 
Church of Scientology v Sweden (1979) 16 DR 68 that religious groups could be non-
governmental organisations’ under art 34 and bring art 9 claims; see Rivers, The Law of 
Organized Religions (ch 2, n 28) 54. 
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or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
Freedom of religion is also enshrined in other international instruments 
protecting human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 (the ‘UDHR’),65 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 (the ‘ICCPR’).66  The language used in all of these instruments to describe 
the right is framed from an individual perspective: all three instruments use the 
possessive pronoun ‘his’ before references to ‘religion’ and the preamble to the 
UDHR refers to, ‘a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech 
and belief’.67   
Despite this tendency of the language of fundamental rights to focus on the 
individual, freedom of religion is at least recognised as having a collective 
dimension, with each of the ECHR, the UDHR, and the ICCPR guaranteeing the 
individual the right to manifest his religion or belief, ‘either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private’.68  The question of whether this 
does or should afford religious groups a primary collective or derivative right to 
religious freedom is the subject of academic debate.69  It is also a question to 
which the ECtHR has not provided a consistent answer: at times the ECtHR 
appears to recognise that groups enjoy rights of religious freedom independently 
of their members and, at other times, groups are regarded by the ECtHR for the 
                                         
65 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR 1948), art 18 provides ‘Everyone has the 
right to freedom of thought conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, 
to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.’   
66 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1996 (ICCPR 1996), art 18 (1) provides 
‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in worship, observance, practice and teaching.’ 
67 Emphasis added. 
68 UDHR 1948, article 18; ECHR, art 9; and ICCPR 1996, art 18(1) (where the word ‘individually’ is 
substituted for the word ‘alone’).  
69 See, for example, Julian Rivers, 'Religious Liberty as a Collective Right' in Richard O'Dair and 
Andrew Lewis (eds), Law and Religion: Current Legal Issues, Vol 4 (OUP 2001); Bhikhi Parekh, 
Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (MacMillan Press Ltd 2000) 
214; and Lucy Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (OUP 
2016) 51. 
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purposes of article 9 claims as representing the interests of their individual 
members.70 
Evidence has been gathered by Julian Rivers to support his claim that in the field 
of international law there was an increasing recognition of the ‘collective’ 
aspect of freedom of religion during the 1980s and 1990s.71  Among the evidence 
offered to support this proposition was the Declaration on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 1981 
which identifies nine religious rights, most of which involve collective action, 
and some of which, Rivers argues, require religious organisations to be 
acknowledged as legal entities and rights holders.72  Principle 16 of the 
Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the 
Participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(now the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) adopted on 17 
January 1989 was also cited for setting out several rights to the advantage of 
religious groups.73  Other activity at the international level presented as 
evidence to support the claim that a more collectivist approach to religious 
freedom was being adopted during these years and into the 21st century 
included: (i) comments in the Concluding Observations to the State Reports 
issued by the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR since 1992 concerning the 
law of religious associations;74 and (ii) the holding of a seminar of the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in 2001 which had a special emphasis 
on religious communities.75   
Notwithstanding recognition in international law of the ‘collective’ aspect of 
religious freedom, it has been observed that the fundamental rights approach to 
freedom of religion emphasises the separation of the state and the individual, 
overlooking the many ‘intermediate structures’ which exist in ‘the social 
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reality’.76  This presents a risk, then, that the prevalence of an individual human 
rights discourse, may serve to marginalise the perceived status of the religious 
group in society.  Though there is a community aspect to the right to religious 
freedom, it is expressed from the perspective of the individual,77 and criticisms 
have been levelled that the collective dimension of the right to religious 
freedom is, ‘under-emphasised within any given legal system’.78 
 Equality agenda  
A second discourse which has gained prominence in recent years and which may 
impact on how the religious group fits and is perceived in society today is the 
discourse on equality. In law, many of the provisions relating to equality have 
their origins in the European Union.  The founding and subsequent treaties of the 
European Union (the ‘EU’), which the UK joined in 1973 (then, the European 
Economic Community), all contain guarantees of equality principles.  The Treaty 
on European Union provides that: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.79   
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, meanwhile, provides that, 
‘in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation’.80  These equality principles have driven EU 
directives to outlaw gender and race discrimination in goods and services,81 and 
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to prohibit discrimination in employment connected with gender, race, religion 
or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation.82  In Britain, these directives 
were implemented by various statutes and regulations, which have now all been 
consolidated in the Equality Act 2010 (the ‘EA’).  In important respects, the EA 
goes further than the current EU directives and prohibits discrimination because 
of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation in the provision of 
goods and services and education (as well as in employment).83  In addition to 
these equality protections in the areas of employment, goods and services, and 
education, marriage equality was, most recently, furthered in 2014 by 
legislation in Scotland and England (though not Northern Ireland) permitting 
same-sex marriage.84 
Although non-discrimination legislation has sought particularly to protect those 
groups which have historically suffered disadvantage (women and ethnic 
minorities, for example), recent developments in the judicial approach to 
religion or belief discrimination under the EA suggest a growing recognition by 
the judiciary of the importance of meeting the needs of the individual.  For 
example, although the judiciary has determined that a ‘belief’ must satisfy 
certain minimum criteria in order to be protected it has been held that the 
belief need not necessarily be shared by others. 85  The ECtHR, moreover, has 
upheld a complaint that a Christian employee’s article 9 right was breached by a 
uniform policy which did not have an adverse effect on Christian employees as a 
group.86  
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The rapid pace at which equality principles have been implemented in law in the 
areas of employment, goods and services, education and marriage, has not been 
met with universal support from religious groups, some of whom consider that 
the application of certain equality principles is incompatible with their religious 
doctrines.87  This conflict most often manifests itself in the context of gender 
equality, to be understood in its widest sense as including considerations of 
sexual identity, sexual orientation, marriage and sexual behaviour.88  The Church 
of England’s refusal to permit its priests to enter same-sex marriages, and the 
controversy over the requirement that Roman Catholic adoption agencies, 
provide their services to homosexual couples, have, for example, been well 
publicised.89  Gender equality (understood in its widest sense) is now a 
significant aspect of law and culture in Britain.  Although gender equality laws 
contain limited exceptions for religious groups in respect of certain aspects of 
the new protections,90 the obligation to comply with gender equality principles 
may restrict the autonomy of certain religious groups to organise their affairs in 
a manner they consider to be compatible with their religious beliefs.91  
Difficulties experienced by some religious groups with operating within the 
bounds of new gender equality principles has led to a withdrawal from the public 
sphere.  After changes to the law in 2007 requiring adoption agencies to offer 
their services to homosexual couples, for example, many Roman Catholic 
adoption agencies considered that they had to cease providing their services.92  
The impact of the recent developments in gender equality on attitudes to 
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religion and religious groups, however, has perhaps been even more profound 
and has been described thus:   
It is clearly observable in the context of international and European 
human rights that religions are now seen not primarily as beneficiaries 
of rights of protection from the state, as subjects enjoying religious 
freedom, but as potential sources of human rights breaches.  Religion 
is a problem.93  
An appreciation of the status of the religious group in society today should take 
account of this not uncommon negative perception of the religious group in the 
context of the drive to achieve gender equality.   
2.4 A modern approach to the status of the religious 
group: the right to religious freedom     
In light of these dominant narratives of change, the continuing importance of 
the religious group might appear open to question.  How, then, might a new 
understanding of the special status of the religious group be constructed, which 
takes account of the decline in ‘religiosity’ and of widely held views regarding 
the importance of human rights and equality?  An answer to this, I will argue, 
may be found in the right to religious freedom enshrined in article 9 of the 
ECHR, which provides for the manifestation of religion or belief, whether alone 
or in a group.  Various rationales have been offered for the right to religious 
freedom.  Some of these rationales are explored below, and in the context of 
each rationale, the role or significance of the religious group is afforded 
particular consideration. On the basis of this survey of alternative rationales, I 
conclude that the most compelling justification for religious freedom supports a 
particular understanding of the role of the religious group which focuses on the 
individual, and is therefore consistent with cultural and legal norms that 
promote individual interests.       
 Civil Peace 
In the past, conflict resolution and avoidance were understood to provide a 
rationale for protecting religious interests.94  In 1689, for example, Locke 
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advocated that religious intolerance was the reason for civil unrest.95 This is 
recognised today in several international human rights instruments, which 
acknowledge in their preambles that religious intolerance has been the source of 
civil conflict.  The preamble to the UDHR, for example, states:  
Disregard and infringement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, in particular of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion or whatever belief, have brought directly or 
indirectly, wars and great suffering to mankind, especially where they 
serve as a means of foreign interference in the internal affairs of 
other States and amount to kindling hatred between people and 
nations.   
This ‘civil peace’ rationale for religious freedom need not, of course, be 
understood only in the context of civil war: the social exclusion of minorities 
which can arise from a failure to protect religious interests may also lead to 
instability in society.96   
Yet, there are difficulties with accepting that tolerance of religious interests is 
always necessary for the avoidance of civil unrest.  Civil peace, after all, could 
potentially be achieved by maintaining a national religion and repressing 
opposing beliefs.97  In any event, the utility of the civil peace rationale is closely 
tied to the status of particular religious groups in the country in question.98  In a 
country where one religion dominates and minority faiths are pacifist and 
without powers, failure to tolerate the minority and accord rights is unlikely to 
lead to conflict.99  Moreover, the civil peace rationale fails to recognise religion 
as having any independent value: different religions ought to be tolerated, not 
because they are inherently good but because failure to accord them respect 
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might lead to civil unrest.100  Without any real value of its own, freedom of 
religion would seldom win in a battle of competing rights.101     
 Democracy 
Could the contribution of religion, and particularly religious groups, to 
democracy offer a stronger rationale for religious freedom? The contribution of 
religious groups to democracy is often cited as a possible justification for 
religious freedom.102  Religious groups have been claimed to act as, ‘mediating 
structures’ between the individual and the state,103 capable of providing an 
important check on state power.104  Religion may be the source of new ideas, 
values and means of reasoning105 and religious groups can aid the development of 
our understanding of, ‘what is truly beneficial and what is harmful’.106  By 
providing different perspectives and challenging existing ways of thinking, 
religious groups serve an important function in any liberal democratic society.  
The ECtHR has emphasised the essential role played by religious groups in the 
democratic process and the importance of religious group autonomy.  In Hasan v 
Bulgaria107 the applicants complained, that the state of Bulgaria had breached 
their article 9 rights by inter alia, interfering in the determination of who would 
lead the Muslim community.  Finding that article 9 was engaged and was to be 
interpreted in light of the right to freedom of association under article 11 of the 
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ECHR, the ECtHR opined that ‘the autonomous existence of religious 
communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an 
issue at the very heart of the protection which article 9 affords’.108   
What makes religious groups particularly suited to participation in the 
democratic process?  There are, after all, many other types of groups 
representing particular interests, which could add value to policy formation.  
One argument is that religions can provide an important safeguard against an 
otherwise oppressive government because, as Stephen Carter has put it, 
‘Religions are in effect independent centers of power, with bona fide claims on 
the allegiance of their members, claims that exist alongside, are not identical 
to, and will sometimes trump the claims to obedience that the state makes.’109  
Still, it is not true that all religious groups can or want to provide a check on 
state power.  Some religious groups, such as the Old Order Amish, for example, 
may have no interest in fulfilling a mediating function.110 
 Civic virtues 
A third justification commonly offered for religious freedom is the contribution 
of religion to the nurturing of civic virtues.  George Washington was of the view 
that religion was indispensable for morality, remarking when he left office:  
let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be 
maintained without religion.  Whatever may be conceded to the 
influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason 
and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can 
prevail in exclusion of religious principle.111  
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Religious groups, meanwhile, have been described as, ‘a powerful force in 
creating a climate in which civic virtue can survive’.112  Not only do religious 
groups present opportunities for individuals to think of others, they also provide 
a source of teachings on the common good.113   
Whilst there is no doubt that many religions do promote civic virtues, it is 
difficult, nonetheless, to sustain an argument that all religious beliefs, 
regardless of substance, contribute to an, ‘orderly, good and democratic 
society’.114  In support of an argument that the rule of law should be applied to 
religious groups, it has been claimed that, ‘the widespread cultural 
presupposition that religion is inherently and always good for society is 
baseless’.115  The harm caused by religious groups responsible for the sexual 
abuse and medical neglect of children and the undermining of civil rights laws 
are cited as examples in defence of this position.116  Indeed, rather than promote 
civic virtues which are valued in a democratic society, some extremist religious 
groups use their religious beliefs to defend acts of violence.  The daily news 
reports of violence by religious groups in the Middle East supports the claim that 
religion is not always ‘good’.117  Concerns have been expressed that the present 
day dominance of secularism is to blame for the association of religion with war 
in recent times: ‘distance from the surrounding culture’ is one of the things that 
‘nurtures fanaticism’.118  If this is correct, violent religious disputes will continue 
and intensify if societies are to become increasingly secular.  
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A further difficulty with the civic virtues rationale for religious freedom is that it 
fails to differentiate between religious beliefs and practices which are 
considered fair and just by the majority in society, and those that are not.  After 
all, ‘religious liberty requires protection in those circumstances in which the 
majority views religious doctrine as unimportant, unnecessary, or even 
wrongful’.119  If religious freedom were to guarantee the right to believe only 
those doctrines considered worthy by the state it would be of very little value to 
the individual: the ‘freedom’ in ‘religious freedom’ would be severely curtailed.   
A common theme in the analysis of rationales for religious freedom based on 
ideas of civil peace, democracy and civic virtues, is that none can explain why 
religious freedom is afforded universally to all, regardless of the nature of their 
religious belief or practice.  Religious freedom protects religious interests 
whether or not the religion or religious group promotes civic virtues, contributes 
effectively to the democratic process, or is capable and willing to cause civil 
unrest.  It is notable that each of the rationales focuses on the benefits which 
religion or religious groups can provide to society: in promoting civil peace, 
nurturing civic virtues and enhancing democracy.  Could a focus instead on the 
benefits of religion and religious groups to the individual provide a stronger and 
more universal justification for religious freedom?   
 Human dignity and autonomy  
The argument has been made by Lucy Vickers and others that human dignity and 
the related concepts of autonomy and equality provide the strongest rationale 
for religious freedom.120  Whilst dignity is difficult to define precisely,121 it has 
been said that it is a status which humans bestow on humans,122 ‘in 
acknowledgement of their uniquely shared capacities’,123 including their ability 
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for ‘higher-level consciousness’124 and to ‘form visions of the good life’.125  It has 
also been described in one sense as being about an individual’s feelings of self-
worth.126  Guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience and religion in 
international human rights law safeguard the autonomy of the individual to 
determine his own idea of the good life, contributing to his sense of self-
worth.127  Freedom of conscience has even been described as, ‘the most intimate 
and somehow the profoundest of all human freedoms’ and, ‘really where the 
autonomy of the human being starts’.128  Equality, meanwhile, has been said to 
require, ‘minimally, that we should acknowledge the equal dignity and worth of 
all human beings, accord them equal respect, and give equal consideration to 
their claims to the basic requirements of the good life’.129  
The human dignity and autonomy rationale for religious freedom has, however, 
not been spared from criticism.130  It has been argued, for example, that it fails 
to appreciate that religion is, ‘as much about duty as choice’.131  Whether 
religion is a belief which is chosen or one into which an individual is born is 
subject to its own literature.132  Still, the criticism can be addressed without 
taking one side of the debate or the other.  According to Vickers, the rationale 
simply requires that, ‘one remain free to live according to one’s conscience’.133  
Thus whether religious conscience is chosen by the individual or consigned to 
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him at birth, it is expected that he should be free to have and abide by the 
normative standards required by it.134   
A second criticism of the human dignity and autonomy rationale for religious 
freedom is that it fails to justify affording religion special treatment: religion 
should be treated in the same manner as the other aspects which make up an 
individual’s identity.  As Ahdar and Leigh explain:  
Religion is no longer special or distinctive but is simply lumped into a 
category along with other things important to personal identity such 
as political affiliations, racial or ethnic background, profession, 
occupation, or marital status. … If religion is not special then there is 
no need to single it out for separate mention or protection.  The 
general constitutional freedoms of conscience, expression, and 
association would seem to do the job.135 
There can, however, be limits to the aspects of identity which require 
protection on human dignity and autonomy grounds.  Vickers suggests that, ‘if 
one is to protect practices or beliefs on grounds of dignity, it is only those which 
feed into an individual’s ability to make sense of the world, and through which 
they develop a sense of the good, that require protection’.136  On this view, a 
person who is an avid supporter of his national football team cannot claim that 
this aspect of his identity requires protection on human dignity grounds.  A 
person who holds a philosophical belief in the higher purpose of public service 
broadcasting137 or in the sanctity of life and anti-fox hunting,138 on the other 
hand, could argue that his dignity and autonomy interests require that his beliefs 
are protected.  In prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of ‘religion or 
belief’,139 the EA recognises that certain beliefs which are not traditionally 
characterised as ‘religious’ can be of similar value to individual identity as more 
orthodox religious beliefs.   
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If the human dignity and autonomy rationale provides the most compelling 
justification for religious freedom, what does it imply about the significance, if 
any, of the religious group?  The ECtHR has recognised that, ‘participation in the 
life of the community’ is a ‘manifestation of one’s religion’.140  Religious groups, 
then, are of instrumental value to the individual in his exercise of religious 
freedom.  Protection of the collective dimension of religion is essential for the 
individual’s freedom of religion.  According to the ECtHR, ‘Were the 
organisational life of the community not protected by Article 9 of the 
Convention, all other aspects of the individual's freedom of religion would 
become vulnerable.’141 
Although collective religious worship is reportedly on the decline in the UK,142 
the importance of the community aspect of religion should not be understated.  
Religious practice might include individual prayer or meditation, but often it is 
communal in nature, in joint worship or in teaching, for example.143  Religious 
groups provide a supportive environment for individuals to learn, explore and 
express their beliefs.  Perhaps more significantly, humans are ‘social beings’ and 
religious groups provide the opportunity for individuals to exercise this human 
characteristic.144  Religious groups, among others, provide, ‘contexts for personal 
expression, development and fulfilment’.145  They impact on the development of 
individual personality and provide, ‘a source of loyalty and solidarity’.146  
Participation in a religious group can help an individual to develop his identity by 
supporting him as he forms, understands and develops his religious beliefs, and 
                                         
140 Hasan (ch 2, n 107) [62]. 
141 ibid.  
142 For example, see Ashworth and others (ch 2, n 55) 6.  
143 W Cole Durham Jr, 'The Right to Autonomy in Religious Affairs: A Comparative View' in Gerrard 
Robbers (ed), Church Autonomy: A Comparative Survey (Peter Lang 2001) 708. 
144 Gerry Whyte, ‘Protecting Religious Ethos in Employment Law: A Clash of Cultures’ (2005) 27 
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145 Frederick Mark Gedicks, 'Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights' 
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and Democracy in America (1st edn, Eerdmans 1984) 92 where Neuhaus remarks ‘Private 
conscience too is communal; it is shaped by the myriad communities from which we learn “to 
put the world together” in an order that is responsive to our understanding of right and wrong.’   
146 Gedicks (ch 2, n 145) 116. 
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by providing him with opportunities to practise his beliefs.147  The importance of 
the religious community to the individual believer has been described thus:   
Religious communities protect the seedbeds of religious thought and 
belief.  They provide the environment in which religious ideas and 
experience can be formed, crystallised, developed, transmitted and 
preserved.  Individual belief would lack its richness, its 
connectedness, and much of its character-building and meaning-giving 
power if it were cut off from the extended life of religious 
communities.148  
In addition to the instrumental role which religious groups play in enhancing 
individual religious freedom, it has been argued that, ‘the community dimension 
may be part of the religion or belief one has’.149  That the collective aspect may 
be of, ‘intrinsic value’ to one’s religious beliefs150 is reflected in the following 
interpretation of Christian doctrine, which describes the collective nature of 
Christian belief and practice thus: 
To be a follower of Christ has meant from the very beginning to join 
the community of disciples he draws together around himself … The 
Bible was not written for and about isolated individuals; it was written 
for and about a community of people – Israel in the Old Testament, 
the church in the New Testament.  You cannot be a Christian by 
yourself; you can only be a Christian together with other Christians 
who serve God in the world.151 
The most persuasive justification for religious freedom, then, should be its 
essential contribution to the equality and dignity inherent in each human being.  
On this understanding, the role of the religious group is to enhance the dignity 
                                         
147 Denise Reaume remarks, ‘Both identity development and formulation of a conception of the 
good are undertaken by individuals but they are undertaken in large part with and through 
relations with others.  For this reason, involvement in communities of various sizes and scopes 
can be crucial to the individual enjoyment of self-worth.  That dependency must be recognised 
by any account of what respect for the dignity of others requires.’  Denise G Reaume, 
'Discrimination and Dignity' (2003) 63 LaLR 645, 678. 
148 W Cole Durham Jr (ch 2, 143) 709. 
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151 Shirley G Guthrie, Christian doctrine (Westminster John Knox Press 1994) 15.  Citing this 
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practice is ‘undisputed’ in Brownstein (ch 2, n 114) 216, fn 41. 
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and autonomy interests of its individual members, by providing opportunities for 
them to share their religion or belief with others and, in so doing, to develop 
and mature their identities.  Understanding religious freedom as protective of 
individual interests and religious groups as instrumental in the realisation of 
these interests is, moreover, consistent with the individual rights discourses 
promoted by the HRA152 and the individual trends which have been observed in 
religious practice, and belief.153   
2.5 Conclusion  
Whereas the continuing involvement of the religious group in education and 
social welfare provision together with the remaining examples of ‘establishment’ 
of the Church of England and Church of Scotland evidence the continuing 
influence of the religious group in the political and social spheres, dominant 
narratives of cultural and legal change now form part of the context in which 
the importance of the religious group ought to be evaluated.  As traditional 
forms of organised religion ponder the challenges arising from reports of a 
decline in levels of religious affiliation and practice, beliefs and belief systems 
which are less reliant on institutional form are gaining in popularity.  Paralleling 
these cultural developments are the individual rights and equality discourses 
supported by the incorporation of the ECHR and the European equality directives 
into UK law.  The value and worth of the religious group is perhaps, in light of 
these changes, more open to question now than ever before.  I have argued here 
that the human dignity and autonomy rationale for religious freedom provides a 
modern interpretation of the importance of the religious group which regards it 
as instrumental in the individual exercise of religion or belief.  By aligning the 
raison-d’etre of the religious group with a justification for religious freedom 
which is rooted in individual values, a convincing case can be made for 
supporting the existence and continuance of the religious group in the 
contemporary social and political order.     
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3 Religious group autonomy in employment: 
nature and scope 
3.1 Introduction 
I concluded the preceding chapter by arguing that a modern interpretation of 
the special status of the religious group could be found in the human dignity and 
autonomy rationale for religious freedom.  Having made the case for 
safeguarding the existence and activity of the religious group, I explore, in this 
chapter, the autonomy it is afforded in its capacity as employer.   
I will consider, firstly, the extent to which developments in equality and human 
rights law have impacted on the autonomy of the religious employer.  The law in 
Great Britain pertaining to religious group autonomy in employment was 
transformed in the early years of this century.  The autonomy previously enjoyed 
by religious employers in their employment practices became restricted, initially 
by the Human Rights Act 1998 (the ‘HRA’) and then, by implementation in the 
UK of Council Directive 2000/78/EC which established a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation (the ‘Equal Treatment 
Directive’).  Although there are exceptions to the principle of equal treatment in 
employment which permit religious employers to retain a measure of autonomy 
in their employment affairs, I will argue that there is significant ambiguity 
surrounding their interpretation and their application.  Instead of providing 
clarity, Parliamentary debates (and related consultations, explanatory notes and 
guidance) on the exceptions, reveal divergent opinions as to how the exceptions 
ought to be interpreted. The ambiguity in the exceptions is, then, further 
exacerbated by the paucity of reported case law since they came into force, a 
phenomenon for which possible explanations will be explored. Ambiguity in the 
exceptions, aggravated by conflicting interpretations and a lack of case law, 
breeds uncertainty for religious employers in how they ought to organise their 
religious affairs.  It, further, puts the consistency in judicial decision-making, on 
which the rule of law relies, at risk.  For these reasons, a clear understanding of 
the principle underlying the provisions, I will argue, is urgently required.   
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3.2 The impact of the HRA and Equal Treatment Directive 
on religious group autonomy in employment  
 Religious autonomy in employment prior to the year 2000  
Prior to the turn of the century religious employers in Britain had a considerable 
measure of freedom to recruit employees sharing their religion and to require 
standards of behaviour from their employees (both at, and away from the 
workplace) which accorded with the teachings of their religion.  Although the 
employment decisions of religious employers were, like any other employer, 
subject to the law on unfair dismissal and to legislation prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, race and disability, the extent to which 
these laws regulated their activities was limited.  Unfair dismissal law would not 
protect an unsuccessful applicant for a job and was only available as a remedy 
for employees who satisfied a minimum qualifying service with their employer.  
Even then, dismissals would be fair if they were, for example, on ‘conduct’ 
grounds or for ‘some other substantial reason’ provided they were procedurally 
fair and did not fall outwith the ‘range of reasonable responses’ by an employer 
(making it difficult for the judiciary to substitute its own view of appropriate 
treatment in any case).1  Meanwhile, an applicant or employee who was 
adversely affected by an employment decision which was religiously motivated 
would only be able to complain of unlawful discrimination if the treatment 
inflicted on him amounted to sex, race2 or disability discrimination.  This was 
the case in O’Neill v Governors of St Thomas More Voluntary Aided Upper 
School.3  In O’Neill, a Roman Catholic school constructively dismissed a religious 
education teacher because she had become pregnant by a Roman Catholic priest 
and the relationship had become public.  Although the school was motivated by 
concerns that the teacher’s position in the Roman Catholic school as a religious 
education teacher had become untenable due to the publicity surrounding her 
relationship and pregnancy, the teacher was nevertheless successful in a sex 
                                         
1 See discussion in Lucy Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace 
(OUP 2016) 222-25 of the limited protection which the legal provisions on unfair dismissal 
provide to employees with religious interests. 
2 Sikhs and Jews were recognised as an ethnic group under the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 
1976) (Mandla v Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL)) whereas Muslims were not (Tariq v Young ET 
247738/88). 
3 O'Neill v Governors of St Thomas More Voluntary Aided Upper School [1997] ICR 33 (EAT). 
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discrimination claim against the school.  The employment appeal tribunal (the 
‘EAT’) disregarded the school’s motives, finding that the dismissal for pregnancy 
was on a ground of sex.4  Still, O’Neill is the only reported case decided at 
appellate level prior to 2000 in which a discrimination complaint against a 
religious employer arising from treatment alleged to have been on religious 
grounds has been successful.5  Discrimination by a religious employer (like any 
other employer), moreover, was permitted on sex or race grounds if the 
employer could demonstrate an occupational requirement which was 
proportionate to a legitimate aim.6     
In addition to the lack of legal constraints on religiously motivated employment 
decisions, schools with a religious character in Scotland, England and Wales in 
the state maintained sector enjoyed (and, indeed, continue to enjoy) additional 
protections against interference in their employment affairs.  In Scotland, the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (the ‘E(Sc)A’) provides that any teacher appointed 
to a post on the staff of a denominational state school must be approved as 
regards his religious belief and character by representatives of the relevant 
church or denominational body.7  The protections afforded to schools with a 
religious character in England and Wales are more complex, and vary according 
to whether the school is a foundation school, a voluntary controlled school or a 
voluntary aided school.8  Under the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 
                                         
4 ibid [25(4)]. 
5 In Board of Governors of St Matthias Church of England School v Crizzle [1993] ICR 401 (EAT) 
the EAT determined that there had been no indirect race discrimination in the requirement of an 
Anglo-Catholic school for applicants for a head teacher post to be ‘committed communicant 
Christians’.  Although the requirement had an adverse effect on the claimant’s Asian race, it 
was in pursuance of a legitimate and reasonable objective and justifiable: the head teacher was 
required to lead the school in spiritual worship and administer the sacrament to confirmed pupils 
at a weekly school mass.   
6 Exceptions for genuine occupational requirements were contained in the RRA 1976, s 4A and the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA 1975), s 7.  In addition, a further exception in respect of 
employment for the purposes of organised religion was contained in the SDA 1975, s 19.  Note 
also that s 6 of the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 (repealed in 2005 by the 
Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005) permitted the Church of England 
to discriminate against women in ordination to the office of priest and in relation to certain other 
appointments and licensing decisions.   
7 Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (E(Sc)A 1980), s 21(2).   
8 See generally Lucy Vickers, 'Religion and Belief Discrimination and the Employment of Teachers 
in Faith Schools’ (2007) 4 Religion and Human Rights 137, 151-53; Russell Sandberg, Law and 
Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 164-65. 
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(the ‘SSFA’), ‘voluntary controlled’9 and ‘foundation’10 schools with a religious 
character can, when appointing the head teacher, consider the applicant’s 
religion and ‘ability and fitness to preserve and develop the religious character 
of the school’.11  They are also entitled to reserve up to one fifth of their 
teaching staff (including the head teacher) who can be ‘selected for their fitness 
and competence’ to give religious education in accordance with the tenets of 
the school’s specified religion.12  In respect of reserved teachers, the school can 
give preference in appointment, remuneration or promotion decisions to persons 
who hold religious opinions, attend religious worship or who give (or are willing 
to give) religious education, in accordance with the tenets of the school’s 
religion.13  The school is also entitled to have regard to any failure on the part of 
a reserved teacher to comply with the tenets of the religion in taking decisions 
on termination.14  All other teachers and non-teaching staff in such schools are 
protected against disqualification from being a teacher or from being employed 
on grounds of their religious opinions, or their attending or failure to attend 
religious worship.15  There is no obligation on non-reserved staff to give religious 
education16 and the school cannot award a teacher any less remuneration or 
deprive or disqualify him from any promotion or other advantage on the grounds 
that he does or does not give religious education, or by reason of his religious 
opinions or attendance, or failure to attend religious worship.17  ‘Voluntary 
aided’18 schools which have a religious character, by contrast, can give 
preference in their appointment, remuneration or promotion decisions 
concerning any teaching post on the basis of religious opinions, attendance at 
                                         
9 In voluntary controlled schools, the land and buildings are owned by the church but the local 
education authority employs the staff, controls admissions and funds the school (Vickers, 
'Religion and Belief Discrimination' (ch 3, n 8) 150). 
10 In foundation schools, funding is provided by the local education authority, but the buildings are 
owned by the governing body, and the governing body employs the staff (ibid 150). 
11 School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (SSFA 1998), s 60(4). 
12 SSFA 1998, s 58(2) and s 58(3). 
13 ibid, s 60(3) and s 60(5)(a). 
14 Ibid, s 60(3) and s 60(5)(b). 
15 ibid, s 59(2). 
16 ibid, s 59(3).  
17 ibid, s 59(4). 
18 In voluntary aided schools, the land and buildings are owned by the church, the governing body 
employs the staff and controls admissions, but the funding for the school comes, in the main, 
from the local education authority (Vickers, 'Religion and Belief Discrimination' (ch 3, n 8) 150). 
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worship and/or whether the individual gives (or is willing to give) religious 
education.19  Importantly, conduct on the part of any teacher which is 
‘incompatible with the precepts, or with the upholding of the tenets of the 
religion’, can also be taken into account in decisions on termination.20  The 
aforementioned provisions pertaining to state maintained schools in Scotland, 
England and Wales applied prior to 2000 and continue to apply today.  They will 
hereafter be referred to collectively as, the ‘faith schools exception’. 
 The Human Rights Act 1998 
The first significant piece of legislation to change the legal landscape in which 
religious employers operated was the HRA which came into force in 2000 and 
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights (the ‘ECHR’) into UK 
law.  The ECHR provides the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion,21 prohibits discrimination on religious grounds22 and recognises that 
parents have the right to ensure the education and teaching provided to their 
children conforms to their religion and their philosophical convictions.23   
The HRA impacts on religious employers in a number of ways.  Religious 
employers can, themselves, be ‘victims’ under the HRA and claim the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion in legal proceedings against public 
authorities or bring infringement action against the state.24  In addition, religious 
organisations performing public functions are ‘public authorities’ for the 
purposes of the HRA25 and thus any failure on their part to comply with the ECHR 
in their employment practices could lead to claims being brought under the HRA 
against them by their employees.  Those religious organisations which are not 
‘public authorities’ still need to be mindful of the ECHR since the judiciary is a 
                                         
19 SSFA 1998, s 60(5)(a).  SSFA 1998, s 124A contains a similar provision for independent schools 
with a religious character.   
20 ibid, s 60(5)(b).  SSFA 1998, s 124A contains a similar provision for independent schools with a 
religious character.   
21 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), art 9. 
22 ibid, art 14. 
23 ibid, protocol 1, art 2. 
24 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), s 7.  Only those ‘persons’ who are ‘victims’ under art 34 of 
the ECHR will be able to bring a claim (HRA 1998, s 7(7)). See also chapter 22 at n 64. 
25 HL Deb 24 November 1997, vol 583, col 800 (The Lord Chancellor).     
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‘public authority’ and required by the HRA to interpret legislation, where 
possible, in a manner consistent with it.26  
When it became apparent that religious organisations were to be regarded as 
‘public authorities’ when carrying out public functions, and therefore subject to 
the HRA,27 religious organisations voiced concerns that human rights principles 
would be prioritised over ecclesiastical law and interfere with religious 
doctrine28 and that the employment practices of denominational schools would 
be affected.29  In an attempt to alleviate these concerns, section 13 was inserted 
into the HRA.30  Section 13 is triggered when the courts determine a question 
which might affect the exercise by a religious organisation of its article 9 right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  It requires the courts in these 
circumstances to have ‘particular regard’ to the importance of the 
organisation’s article 9 right.31  ‘Religious organisation’ is not defined in the HRA 
but, according to the then Home Secretary, it includes ‘organisations with 
religious objectives’,32 as well as churches.  Despite the assertion by the then 
Home Secretary, at the time the HRA was being considered in Parliament, that 
section 13 would offer ‘significant protection’ to religious believers,33 
predictions were made when the HRA came into force that section 13 would 
seldom be utilised.34  Indeed, 17 years on, only a handful of reported cases make 
any reference to section 1335 and there is only one case in which section 13 plays 
                                         
26 HRA 1998, s 3 and s 6(3)(a). 
27 See HL Deb 24 November 1997, vol 583, col 800 (The Lord Chancellor); HC Deb 20 May 1998, 
vol 312, col 1017 (The Home Secretary, Jack Straw). 
28 Peter Cumper, 'The Protection of Religious Rights under Section 13 of the Human Rights Act 
1998' [2000] PL 254, 255-57. 
29 HC Deb 20 May 1998, vol 312, col 1021 (The Home Secretary, Jack Straw). 
30 Cumper (ch 3, n 28) 255; Ahdar and Leigh in Rex Ahdar and Iain Leigh, Religious Freedom in 
the Liberal State (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 379. 
31 HRA 1998, s 13 provides, ‘If a court’s determination of any question arising under this Act might 
affect the exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the 
Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have particular regard 
to the importance of that right.’ 
32 HC Deb 20 May 1998, vol 312, col 1023 (The Home Secretary, Jack Straw).  For comment on 
the use of the term ‘religious organisation’ in the HRA see Cumper (ch 3, n 28) 260. 
33 HC Deb 20 May 1998, vol 312, col 1023 (The Home Secretary, Jack Straw). 
34 E.g. see Cumper (ch 3, n 28) 265. 
35 A search performed in Westlaw case database on 7 June 2017 using “section 13” AND “Human 
Rights Act” AND “religious organisation” as search criteria returned only 20 results.   
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a significant part in the court’s decision.36  This is perhaps unsurprising given the 
limits on the reach of section 13.  It does not require that an organisation’s 
article 9 rights are given, ‘greater weight … than they would otherwise enjoy 
under the Convention’37 and the ECHR does not permit any one article to ‘trump’ 
another.38  The effect of section 13 has been described aptly as more ‘symbolic’ 
than ‘real’,39 reminding the courts that any interference with article 9 rights 
must be with good cause and reassuring religious believers and organisations that 
the state acknowledges the importance of their beliefs.40   
 The Equal Treatment Directive 
The second piece of legislation which was to be significant for religious 
employers was the Equal Treatment Directive.  The Equal Treatment Directive 
required the member states of the European Union to prohibit discrimination in 
employment and occupation on the grounds of religion or belief, sexual 
orientation, disability and age.  It was implemented in Scotland, England and 
Wales in 2003 by the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 
(the ‘ROB Regulations’), the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003 (the ‘SO Regulations’), the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
(Amendment) Regulations 2003, and, in 2006, by the Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006.41  These Regulations were subsequently repealed and replaced 
almost in their entirety by the Equality Act 2010 (the ‘EA’), which consolidates 
these, and other pieces of non-discrimination legislation in one Act prohibiting 
unlawful discrimination on the grounds of nine protected characteristics.42  
                                         
36 H (Article 9: Freedom of Religion) also known as Mr KH v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2016] UKUT 286 (IAC), [2016] Imm AR 1111.  See comment on the lack of impact 
of s13 in Ahdar and Leigh (ch 3, n 30) 380. 
37 R (on the application of Amicus) v The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 
260 (Admin), [2007] ICR 1176 [41].  
38 HC Deb 20 May 1998, vol 312, col 1025 (The Home Secretary, Jack Straw). 
39 Cumper (ch 3, n 28) 265. 
40 ibid. 
41 Discrimination in employment on the grounds of disability was already prohibited by the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995, which was subsequently extended by the Disability Discrimination Act 
2005.   
42 The protected characteristics are age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. 
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The UK sought several amendments to the draft Equal Treatment Directive, 
some with the intention of preserving the ability of religious organisations and 
denominational schools to discriminate in employment on the grounds of religion 
or belief.43  The final draft of the Equal Treatment Directive contains two 
exceptions from the principle of equal treatment.  The first exception, which is 
contained in article 4(1), provides that different treatment based on a protected 
characteristic will not constitute unlawful discrimination by any employer, 
whether religious or secular, if ‘by reason of the nature of the particular 
occupational activities concerned or the context in which they are carried out, 
such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement, provided the objective is legitimate and the requirement is 
proportionate’.44  As Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh observe, this tightly drawn 
exception has, ‘no fewer than six qualifying terms’, which is indicative of the 
‘extreme sensitivity surrounding the exception’.45  The second exception, which 
is contained in article 4(2), is only available to churches and other organisations 
with an ethos based on religion or belief and relates only to treatment which is 
based on a person’s religion or belief and not any other protected characteristic.  
It provides that different treatment based on a person’s religion or belief will 
not constitute unlawful discrimination if, ‘by reason of the nature of the 
activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person’s religion or 
belief constitutes a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, 
having regard to the organisation’s ethos’.46   
It was expressly provided in the implementation of the Equal Treatment 
Directive, that the privileges previously afforded to denominational schools by 
the SSFA and the E(Sc)A 47 would not be prejudiced.48  Denominational schools in 
                                         
43 See Timothy Edmunds and Julia Lourie, ‘Employment Equality Regulations: Religion and Sexual 
Orientation’ (House of Commons Research Paper 03/54, 9 June 2003) 9-16.   
44  Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303 (EC Directive 2000/78), art 4(1). 
45 Ahdar and Leigh (ch 3, n 30) 370. 
46 EC Directive 2000/78, art 4(2). 
47 Discussed above at 3.2.1.   
48 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (ROB Regulations), reg 39; Equality 
Act 2010 (EA 2010), sch 22, para 4. Note that sch 22, para 4 of the EA 2010 only makes 
reference to the relevant provisions of the SSFA 1998. As the explanatory notes to the EA 2010 
at para 985 provide that para 4 of sch 22 is intended to replicate reg 39 of the ROB Regulations, 
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the state maintained sector, thereby, retain a significant measure of autonomy 
in relation to their employment decisions.  In particular, the relevant provisions 
of the SSFA and the E(Sc)A do not require schools to demonstrate that religion is 
an occupational requirement, or that discriminatory measures taken by the 
school are proportionate to any legitimate aim pursued. Lucy Vickers opines that 
the lack of any proportionality requirement in the SSFA provisions on the 
employment of staff potentially renders the provisions incompatible with article 
4(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive49 and that the far reaching exceptions to 
the principle of equal treatment which are permitted under the SSFA for 
voluntary aided schools may be too broad to be legitimate and justified under 
article 4(2).50  A formal complaint was made to the European Commission in 
2012, alleging that the SSFA provisions were incompatible with the Equal 
Treatment Directive.51  The Commission said its initial enquiry ‘raises questions’ 
about the compatibility of some of the provisions of the SSFA with the Equal 
Treatment Directive and committed to contacting the UK Government for 
further clarification.52 A similar investigation was undertaken by the Commission 
in relation to the equivalent provisions in Scotland under the E(Sc)A.53  The 
Commission closed both of its investigations in 2014, declining to uphold the 
                                         
it is assumed that the omission of reference to the relevant provisions of the E(Sc)A 1980 in 
para 4 is an error.    
49 Vickers, 'Religion and Belief Discrimination' (ch 3, n 8) 154-55. 
50 ibid 154-55.   
51 Andrew Copson on behalf of British Humanist Association, 'Complaint to the Commission of the 
European Communities Concerning Failure to Comply with European Law' (British Humanist 
Association 16 April 2010) <https://humanism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/bha-complaint-to-the-
european-commission-on-employment-in-faith-schools.pdf> accessed 28 December 2017. 
52 Letter from Andreas Stein of the European Commission to Ms Richy Thompson of the British 
Humanist Association, 'Subject: Your Complaint EU Pilot 3800/21/JUST - CHAP (2010) 1206' 
(17 July 2012) <https://humanism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/european-commission-response-
to-bha-complaint-on-employment-in-faith-schools.pdf> accessed 28 December 2017; see also 
the following comments by The Joint Committee on Human Rights of the UK Parliament in its 
first report on the Equality Bill, published in November 2009: ‘We consider that substantial 
grounds exist for doubting whether sections 58-60 of the School Standards and Framework Act 
1998 (SSFA) as currently framed are compatible with the requirements of Article 4(2) of the 
Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC. We also consider that the provisions of section 60(5) 
SSFA permit Voluntary Controlled and Voluntary Aided Schools to impose wide-ranging 
requirements upon employees to adhere to religious doctrine in their lifestyles and personal 
relationships which may go beyond what is permitted under Article 4(2).’ Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, ‘Legislative Scrutiny: Equality Bill (Twenty-Sixth Report of Session 2008-2009)’ 
(TSO 12 November 2009) 96.   
53 National Secular Society, 'European Commission to Investigate Complaints Concerning 
Employment Discrimination in “Faith” Schools' (National Secular Society 17 January 2013) 
<www.secularism.org.uk/news/2013/01/european-commission-to-investigate-complaints-
concerning-employment-discrimination-in-faith-schools> accessed 28 December 2017. 
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complaints.54  In a letter to the National Secular Society, the European 
Commission opined that the UK Government had provided it with ‘sufficient 
clarification’ on the interpretation of the relevant sections of the SSFA, which it 
said, ‘merely enables faith-based education and is limited to ensure the 
maintenance of the religious character of the school’.55  Notwithstanding this 
response, the European Commission decided to re-open its investigation in 2015 
following submissions from the British Humanist Association,56 and doubts remain 
as to the compatibility of the SSFA and E(Sc)A with the Equal Treatment 
Directive,57 with the lack of express proportionality criteria in the SSFA 
provisions attracting particular criticism.58     
3.3 Exceptions to equal treatment in employment under 
the EA  
The domestic law which implemented the Equal Treatment Directive in Britain 
was drafted to include exceptions purportedly based on articles 4(1) and 4(2) of 
the directive.  These exceptions (which do not prejudice the protections 
available to denominational schools in the SSFA and E(Sc)A) afford religious 
employers a measure of autonomy in their employment decisions.  Certain of the 
exceptions mirror those which were contained in the domestic sex and race 
discrimination legislation.  Prior to the consolidation of all non-discrimination 
legislation in the EA, the exceptions were included in various separate 
instruments.  They now appear in schedule 9 of the EA.   
                                         
54National Secular Society, 'European Commission Dismisses NSS Complaint over Employment 
Discrimination in Faith Schools' (National Secular Society 23 October 2014) 
<www.secularism.org.uk/news/2014/10/european-commission-dismisses-nss-complaint-over-
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55 ibid.  
56 Humanists UK, 'European Commission Re-opens Investigation into Whether UK “Faith” School 
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 The OR exception 
The first exception is available to all employers and provides that it is not 
unlawful for an employer to require an applicant or employee to have a 
particular characteristic if, having regard to the nature or context of the work, 
it is an occupational requirement and it is a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim.59  This exception for occupational requirements is hereafter 
referred to as the ‘OR exception’.   
In Glasgow City Council v McNab,60 a Roman Catholic school sought to rely on the 
OR exception to defend its decision to restrict applicants for the post of 
Assistant Principal of Pastoral Care to those of the Roman Catholic faith.  The 
EAT upheld the decision of the employment tribunal (the ‘ET’) to reject the 
school’s defence.  As only a small part of the role of Assistant Principal of 
Pastoral Care actually required advice to be given to pupils on matters in which 
the doctrines of the church would be relevant, and the successful applicant 
could arrange for another staff member to give the advice, the school had failed 
to demonstrate that it was an occupational requirement for applicants to belong 
to the Roman Catholic faith.   
The OR exception in the EA is not an exact mirror of the OR exception in the 
ROB and SO Regulations, both of which it replaced.  Whereas the OR exception 
in the ROB and SO Regulations provided that the particular characteristic 
required by the employer had to be both a ‘genuine’ and ‘determining’ 
occupational requirement,61 these express stipulations were not included when 
the OR exception was drafted in the EA.  Whilst there is little doubt that an 
employer must still demonstrate that its stated needs are ‘genuine’, the 
omission of the requirement that the particular characteristic is to be 
‘determining’ raises the question of whether or not the OR exception in the EA 
sets a less demanding standard.  The picture is then clouded further by the 
explanatory notes to the EA which provide that the OR exception requires the 
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particular characteristic to be ‘crucial’ to the post.62  Do stipulations that the 
particular characteristic must be a ‘determining’ occupational requirement or 
‘crucial’ to the post add anything to the condition that the particular 
characteristic must be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?  The 
answer to this may depend (at least in part) on how the courts interpret 
proportionality.  Despite European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) authority stipulating 
that indirect discrimination cannot be justified unless the discriminatory 
provision, criterion or practice deployed by the employer ‘corresponds to a real 
need’ and is ‘necessary’,63 the UK courts have in the past been reluctant when 
assessing proportionality to require employers to demonstrate that the 
discriminatory provision, criterion or practice is the least restrictive means 
available to achieve its aim.64  Instead, courts in the UK have purported to 
balance the needs of the employer against the discriminatory effects of the 
provision, criterion or practice.65  The effect of this approach to proportionality 
is that even discriminatory measures taken by employers which are not, strictly 
speaking, ‘necessary’ may be justified if the employer can demonstrate cogent 
reasons for its actions.66  Whilst this interpretation of proportionality is closer to 
the approach taken by the ECtHR to proportionality under the ECHR, criticisms 
have been levelled at the UK courts for failing to engage fully with the ECtHR 
standard.67  In particular, the UK courts are poor at considering discriminatory 
impacts as part of the balancing exercise and do not recognise the possibility 
that discriminatory impacts can outweigh a measure which is ‘necessary’.68  Thus 
the UK courts’ approach to proportionality in the past has been found to be 
inconsistent with both ECJ and ECtHR authority.  All this serves to heighten the 
ambiguity surrounding the interpretation and application of the OR exception.   
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 The ethos exception 
The second exception relies on article 4(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive and 
permits employers with ‘an ethos based on religion or belief’ to apply a 
requirement to be of a particular religion or belief where, having regard to the 
ethos and the nature or context of the work, being of a particular religion or 
belief is an occupational requirement and the application of the requirement is a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.69  This exception, which 
permits discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief and not on the 
grounds of any other protected characteristic, is hereafter referred to as the 
‘ethos exception’. 
There are several hurdles which an employer must overcome to rely successfully 
on the ethos exception.  First the employer must demonstrate that it has an 
ethos based on religion or belief.  It would seem that it is not only organisations 
proselytising religion or belief that can rely on the ethos exception, but so too 
can organisations with values rooted in or inspired by religion or belief.70  Still, 
‘ethos’ has been described as a, ‘fluid and indeterminate concept’71 and it is not 
difficult to foresee disputes over whether or not a particular employer has the 
required ethos.  A question was posed by Baroness Miller of Hendon in the House 
of Lords debate on the SO Regulations as to whether the ethos exception could 
be relied on by, ‘ordinary commercial concerns as well as religious or 
environmental charities’.72  She had in mind at the time family orientated 
businesses operated by the Brethren.  Disappointingly, no answer was provided 
to the Baroness in the debate.  The explanatory notes to the EA provide that, ‘it 
is for an employer to show that it has an ethos based on religion by reference to 
such evidence as the organisation’s founding constitution’.73  What level of 
importance, however, must religion or belief have in an organisation’s founding 
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constitution and to its ongoing internal and external activities?  Further, do 
organisations which are not affiliated with any one religion or belief but which 
instead work across a number of religions or beliefs, such as Interfaith Scotland74 
or Faith in the Community,75 have a qualifying ethos based on religion or belief?  
A denominational school might be considered the quintessential example of an 
organisation with an ethos based on religion or belief.  Yet, if the employing 
entity is the local authority (as is most often the case in Scotland), and not the 
religious organisation itself, it will not be able to demonstrate it has the 
required ethos.  In McNab (discussed above), the ET (with which the EAT 
concurred) held that the local authority that employed Mr McNab could not rely 
on the ethos exception to defend its decision: notwithstanding its role as an 
employer of teachers in a denominational school, the ET held that the local 
authority did not have a religious ethos.76 
Some consider that it is unlikely the courts will become embroiled in debates 
over whether an employer has a ‘religious ethos’ on the basis that in most, if not 
all, cases in which an employer wishes to rely on the ethos exception, the OR 
exception will also be available.77  This, of course, begs the question why 
Parliament considered it necessary to legislate for the ethos exception at all?  Its 
presence in the EA might suggest a recognition that employers with an ethos 
based on religion or belief have a particular claim to autonomy in employment 
affairs, though the precise nature of this claim is not immediately clear from the 
ethos exception itself.  Certainly, there are important features of the ethos 
exception which distinguish it from the OR exception.  Firstly, only the ethos 
exception requires regard to be had to the ‘ethos’ of the organisation in 
determining whether religion or belief is an occupational requirement and a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  In Muhammed v The Leprosy 
Mission International,78 the ethos exception was successfully deployed by a 
Christian charity which argued that being Christian was a genuine occupational 
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requirement for the position of finance administrator because employing a non-
Christian would have a significant adverse effect on the Mission’s ability to 
maintain its ethos.  In this case, the ET was satisfied that the respondent’s 
Christian beliefs were reflected in its day-to-day operations:  
It is clear to us that the Respondent’s Christian belief, and in 
particular belief in Jesus Christ and the power of Christian prayer to 
achieve its goals, is central to its work and activities.  The ethos 
based on the Christian religion permeates the Respondent’s work, and 
daily life and activities in the workplace.79 
In Sheridan v Prospects for People with Learning Difficulties, meanwhile, the 
respondent sought unsuccessfully to rely on the ethos exception to defend its 
decision to apply a blanket rule that all support worker posts of a particular 
grade in the organisation should be held by Christians.80  Of relevance to the 
decision was the ET’s finding that the organisation’s stated ethos did not, 
‘accurately reflect the actual ethos of the organisation’.81  It would seem from 
these two cases that, if the asserted ethos is reflected in the organisation’s day-
to-day operations, the employer will have a stronger claim that religion or belief 
is an occupational requirement.  Still, this does not fully explain why or in what 
way the ethos of an employer is relevant to its claim for autonomy in 
employment, and it remains uncertain whether having regard to the ethos of the 
employer makes it more or less difficult for the employer to demonstrate an 
occupational requirement.    
Vickers identifies particular difficulties with having regard to the employer’s 
ethos when there are different, ‘shades of religious opinion’ within the one 
religion.82  She gives the example of an Anglican church which does not believe 
that women should be ordained and considers whether its refusal to employ an 
Anglican applicant who is in favour of the ordination of women would be 
proportionate having regard to the ethos of the church.  As Vickers explains, on 
the one view, the appointment of a Christian is sufficient to protect the ethos of 
the employer but, on the other, it could be said that the applicant has a 
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different religious ethos to the employer.  As Vickers observes, ‘Which approach 
is taken will depend on how many shades of religious opinion tribunals are 
prepared to recognise.’83  A further ambiguity arises in relation to the obligation 
to regard the ‘nature’ of the work and the ‘context’ in which the work is carried 
out.  Can the ‘nature’ of the work be easily separated from the ‘context’ in 
which it is carried out?  Further, what counts as ‘context’, and how does it differ 
from the ‘ethos’ of the workplace?    
The second difference between the OR exception and the ethos exception is 
that, unlike the OR exception, there is no similar stipulation in the explanatory 
notes to the EA in respect of the ethos exception that the requirement 
pertaining to religion or belief must be ‘crucial’ to the post.   Might this render 
the ethos exception somewhat wider than the OR exception?  Unlike the OR 
exception, the ethos exception has never stipulated that the occupational 
requirement must be ‘determining’.  In its guidance on the ROB Regulations the 
then Department for Trade and Industry commented that this made the ethos 
exception ‘slightly broader’ than the OR exception.84  Yet when the word 
‘determining’ was removed from the OR exception when it was included in the 
EA there were no similar assertions that its scope had been broadened.  Of 
course, the ethos exception is also subject to the same issues of uncertainty 
with the proportionality assessment as the OR exception: must, for example, the 
requirement that the applicant or employee be of a particular religion or belief 
be the least restrictive means of achieving the employer’s legitimate aim, or is 
it sufficient that the benefits to the employer outweigh the disadvantage 
suffered by the applicant or employee?85   
A further ambiguity in the ethos exception is the extent to which it permits an 
employer to require its employees to abide by standards of behaviour which 
accord with the tenets of its religion.  It would certainly appear from the terms 
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of article 4(2) that the ethos exception will not be engaged when detrimental 
treatment implicates a ground of discrimination other than religion or belief  
(sexual orientation or sex, for example): the religious motives for the treatment 
will likely be considered irrelevant.86  It is less clear, however, whether the 
ethos exception could permit employers to take action on the basis of an 
employee’s behaviour when it is contrary to religious tenets but does not 
implicate another protected characteristic, such as the dismissal of an employee 
because he has engaged in non-marital sexual relations contrary to the tenets of 
the employer’s religion, for example.  In its second consultation on the ROB 
Regulations, the Government stated that, ‘where an employee of a religious 
organisation conducted him or herself in a manner that was inconsistent with the 
organisation’s ethos, disciplinary action against the employee might be 
appropriate where it was clear that the conduct would undermine the ethos’.87  
Yet, when the ethos exception was considered by the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights in 2009, the committee reached a different conclusion: 
We consider that substantial grounds exist for doubting whether the 
“religious ethos” exception provided for in Schedule 9(3) permits 
organisations with a religious ethos to impose wide-ranging 
requirements on employees to adhere to religious doctrine in their 
lifestyles and personal relationships, by for example requiring 
employees to manifest their religious beliefs by refraining from 
homosexual acts. We agree with the Government that it is “very 
difficult to see how in practice beliefs in lifestyles or personal 
relationships could constitute a religious belief which is a requirement 
for a job, other than ministers of religion” (which is covered by a 
different exception). This should put beyond doubt the position that 
the exemption in Schedule 9(3) cannot be used to discriminate on the 
basis of sexual conduct linked to sexual orientation.88   
Although the committee contextualises its comments with reference to 
treatment on the basis of sexual conduct linked to sexual orientation, on a wider 
reading, its comments could be taken to rule out the imposition of any 
requirements relating to lifestyle and personal relationships, contrary to the 
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view expressed by the Government in its first consultation on the ROB 
Regulations in 2002.   
 The organised religion exception 
The third exception in the EA to the principle of equal treatment is only 
available when the employment is, ‘for the purposes of an organised religion’.89  
If employment is for the purposes of an organised religion, and two additional 
criteria are satisfied, employers may apply a requirement in relation to 
employment: (i) to be of a particular sex; (ii) not to be a transsexual person; (iii) 
not to be married or a civil partner; (iv) relating to the circumstances in which a 
marriage or civil partnership came to an end; (v) not to be married to, or the 
civil partner of, a person who has a living former spouse or civil partner; or (vi) 
related to sexual orientation.90  The two additional criteria which require to be 
satisfied refer to the reason for imposing the requirement.  The reason must be 
either: (i) so as to comply with the doctrines of the religion (the ‘compliance 
principle’); or (ii) because of the nature or context of the employment, to avoid 
conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of 
the religion’s followers (the ‘no-conflict principle’).91  This exception will 
hereafter be referred to as the ‘organised religion exception’.  The origins of the 
organised religion exception can be traced to the original Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 (the ‘SDA’), which provided that employment for the purposes of an 
organised religion could be limited to one sex to comply with the doctrines of 
the religion or to avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant 
number of its followers.92  The exception in the SDA was later extended to 
permit certain discrimination on grounds of gender reassignment, marriage and 
civil partnership.  Following lobbying by church representatives, including the 
Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England, a similar provision was included 
in the SO Regulations to permit sexual orientation discrimination.93     
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Before the organised religion exception will apply, it must be established that 
employment is, ‘for the purposes of an organised religion’ and that the 
‘compliance’ and ‘no conflict’ principles are satisfied.  As Russell Sandberg has 
observed, there is a significant measure of uncertainty surrounding the 
application of these conditions.94 
It would seem the condition requiring that employment is ‘for the purposes of an 
organised religion’ is to be interpreted narrowly, though there remains some 
ambiguity over its exact reach.95  The term ‘organised religion’ is neither 
defined in the EA, nor used in the Equal Treatment Directive.  During the House 
of Lords debate on the SO Regulations, the then Minister of State, Lord Sainsbury 
of Turville, expressed the view that in drafting the exception, they, ‘had in mind 
a very narrow range of employment: ministers of religion, plus a small number of 
posts outside the clergy, including those who exist to promote and represent 
religion’.96  Lord Sainsbury further emphasised the narrow scope of the exception 
by drawing a distinction between ‘organised religion’ and ‘religious organisation’ 
thus:  
A religious organisation could be any organisation with an ethos based 
on religion or belief.  However, employment for the purposes of an 
organised religion clearly means a job, such as a minister of religion, 
involving work for a church, synagogue or mosque.97   
According to Lord Sainsbury, demonstrating that employment is for the purposes 
of an organised religion is a ‘significant hurdle’98 and would not be satisfied by 
                                         
sexual orientation but would not permit the employer to insist on requirements relating to sexual 
behaviour. The Secretary General of the General Synod and the Archbishops’ Council 
commented, ‘The difficulty is that regulation 7(2) applies only where being of a particular sexual 
orientation is a genuine and determining occupational requirement. As explained above, we 
have no posts or offices where there is a requirement to be heterosexual (or indeed 
homosexual). Our requirements are in relation to behaviour, not sexuality itself. That is why the 
new regulations 7(3) and 16(3) refer to a ‘requirement related to sexual orientation’ Letter from 
the Secretary General of the General Synod and the Archbishops' Council to the Clerk of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments dated 9 June 2003 at para 13, referred 
to in Amicus (ch 3, n 37) [92]. 
94 Russell Sandberg, 'The Right to Discriminate' (2011) 13 EccLJ 157, 173-77; Sandberg Law and 
Religion (ch 3, n 8) 119-22.   
95 Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (ch 3, n 94) 174-76.  
96 HL Deb 17 June 2003, vol 649, col 779 (Lord Sainsbury of Turville).   
97 ibid. 
98 ibid.  
3 Religious group autonomy in employment: nature and scope 57 
teachers in faith schools or nurses in care homes run by religious foundations, 
whose employment is more properly characterised as being for the purposes of 
education and health care.99 
In R (on the application of Amicus) v The Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry100 a number of trade unions unsuccessfully sought an annulment of the 
organised religion exception as it applied in employment to a requirement 
relating to sexual orientation on grounds that it was incompatible with the Equal 
Treatment Directive and with articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.  Finding against the 
trade unions, Richards J described the requirement that employment is ‘for the 
purposes of an organised religion’ as an ‘important initial limitation’.101  
Agreeing with Lord Sainsbury, he opined that employment ‘for the purposes of 
an organised religion’ is narrower than employment ‘for purposes of a religious 
organisation’ or the expression ‘where an employer has an ethos based on 
religion or belief’ and that it is unlikely to include employment in a faith 
school.102 
Notwithstanding the clarification provided by Richards J in Amicus, the exact 
scope of ‘employment for the purposes of an organised religion’ still generated 
considerable discussion during the debates on the Equality Bill 2010,103 
suggesting there remained (at that time) a measure of uncertainty surrounding 
exactly which posts it entailed.  Whilst most appear to be comfortable 
distinguishing an ‘organised religion’ from a ‘religious organisation’, the former 
including churches, mosques and temples, and the latter including religious 
charities and schools, the main ambiguity appears to surround the question of 
when employment will be ‘for the purposes of’ an organised religion.   
An amendment to the exception which would have clarified that it was to apply 
to employment which, ‘wholly or mainly involves leading or assisting in the 
observation of liturgical or ritualistic practices of the religion, or promoting or 
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expanding the doctrine of the religion’ was proposed by Government and 
modified after concerns were expressed that it would require jobs to be 
analysed in terms of percentage time spent on particular tasks and might not 
permit the exception to apply to those whose role it is to represent the 
religion.104  Ultimately even a modified amendment which would have defined 
employment for the purposes of an organised religion as ‘employment as a 
minister of religion or employment in another post that exists (or, where the 
post has not previously been filled, that would exist) to promote or represent 
the religion or to explain the doctrines of the religion (whether to followers of 
the religion or to others)’ was rejected when the Equality Bill was considered in 
the House of Lords.105  No definition was included in the final draft of the Bill 
and the explanatory notes to the EA repeat the comments made by Lord 
Sainsbury during the debate in the House of Lords on the SO Regulations, 
providing that, ‘the exception … is intended to cover a very narrow range of 
employment: ministers of religion and a small number of lay posts, including 
those that exist to promote and represent religion’.106  As Sandberg observes, 
whilst the rejection of the Government’s proposed amendment might suggest 
that the exception is not to be read in its restrictive terms, Government 
members maintained that the amendment had only sought to clarify the existing 
position.107  It remains unclear whether the wording of the proposed amendment 
ought to be ‘read in’ to the exception.108   
In the only two widely reported cases on the organised religion exception, the 
ET and EAT has had to grapple with the definition of employment for the 
purposes of an organised religion.  In the first of these cases, Reaney v Hereford 
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Diocesan Board of Finance,109 the ET held that employment as a Diocesan youth 
worker was for the purposes of an organised religion.  The ET judge directed 
himself to the relevant Parliamentary material on the organised religion 
exception and to the comments of Richards J in Amicus,110 before analysing the 
role of the Diocesan Youth Officer.  In holding that the employment of Diocesan 
Youth Officer was for the purposes of an organised religion, the ET judge was 
greatly influenced by his findings that the primary purpose of the role was to 
represent the Diocese in the field of youth work and that it was, ‘one of a small 
number of jobs closely associated with the promotion of the Church’.111  Insofar 
as the ET judge made findings of fact that the role existed to ‘promote’ and 
‘represent’ the church, the decision that the employment was for the purposes 
of an organised religion is consistent with the guidance given by Lord Sainsbury, 
and reflected in the explanatory notes to the EA. 
Pemberton v Inwood112 was the second case to consider the organised religion 
exception.  The Reverend Pemberton entered into a same sex marriage against 
the wishes of his church.  The church accordingly revoked his ‘Permission to 
Officiate’ and refused to grant him an Extra Parochial Ministry Licence (‘EPML’) 
which he required for employment as chaplain to an NHS Trust.  The ET (with 
which the EAT agreed) held that, although the refusal to award Reverend 
Pemberton the EPML fell within the terms of the prohibition against 
discrimination by qualifications bodies in the EA,113 the organised religion 
exception applied to excuse the church’s actions.  The EAT acknowledged there 
was a ‘certain attraction’ to the argument that employment as chaplain to an 
NHS Trust was not ‘employment for the purposes of an organised religion’.114  
After all, the NHS Trust’s appointment of a chaplain was not part of the Church 
of England’s ‘holistic provision of healthcare’.115  The Church of England further 
had no input into the job description or selection of candidates.116  Still, the EAT 
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concluded fairly quickly that the organised religion exception was not restricted 
to those jobs ‘within’ the organised religion: what mattered was the ‘purpose’ 
of the employment, not the ‘nature’ of the organisation.117  As an ‘essential 
requirement’ of the chaplain role was to minister as a Church of England priest, 
and this was the purpose of the EPML which Pemberton sought,118 the EAT 
reached the somewhat convoluted conclusion that, ‘The purpose of the EPML 
was thus for the purpose of employment for the purpose of an organised religion 
(here, the Church of England), albeit carried out whilst employed by a secular 
body.’119  Lord Sainsbury’s assertions on the narrow scope of the organised 
religion exception must now be considered in light of the EAT’s wider 
interpretation, which focuses on the purpose of the employment and not on the 
nature of the employing entity.    
The compliance and no-conflict principles are a further source of ambiguity.120  
When considering them in the context of the challenge to the exception brought 
by the trade unions in Amicus, Richards J opined that the compliance and no-
conflict principles created, ‘very real additional limitations’121 and that their 
tests were to be objectively applied.122  Noting that the no conflict principle only 
required that a ‘significant number’ of ‘the religion’s followers’ strongly held 
views’ are affected, and not a ‘majority’, and that this could permit the 
exception to apply when a significant minority of followers’ beliefs were 
affected, Richards J opined this was nevertheless appropriate as it recognised 
that there are sometimes different opinions held within the one religion and it 
avoided the need to apply a statistical analysis.123   
Yet practical difficulties with both the compliance and the no conflict principles 
have been identified: the application of the no conflict principle is hindered by 
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the absence in some religions of any definition of membership,124 making it 
difficult to determine whether a significant number of followers may be 
adversely affected and the application of the compliance principle is hindered 
by the variety of views as to the content and interpretation of doctrine125 and, as 
Sandberg points out, the courts’ disinclination to determine matters of 
doctrine.126 
It is also notable that only the no conflict principle expressly requires that 
regard is to be had to the nature of the work or the context in which it is carried 
out.  Although the compliance principle contains no similar requirement, the 
Minister for Employment Relations, Competition and Consumers indicated in the 
House of Commons committee debate on the ROB and SO Regulations that 
considerations of the nature and context of the role were implied, asserting, 
‘When the religious doctrine requires a post to be filled by persons of a 
particular orientation, it does so because of the nature of the post and the 
context in which it is to be carried out.’127   
When the organised religion exception was considered during the House of 
Commons and committee stages of the Equality Bill, it was proposed that the 
compliance and no conflict principles should be qualified by an express 
requirement on the employer to act proportionately.  This is somewhat 
surprising given the observations of Richards J in Amicus that in drafting the 
organised religion exception, the legislature had already struck the balance 
between competing rights.  Richards J opined, ‘It was done deliberately in this 
way so as to reduce the issues that would have to be determined by courts or 
tribunals in such a sensitive field.’128  As Sandberg observes, those in favour of 
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the insertion of a proportionality qualification when the Equality Bill was being 
considered argued that they were not changing the exception, but merely 
clarifying its scope, arguing that proportionality had always been implied in the 
exception.129 Those who opposed the proportionality qualification, meanwhile, 
voiced concerns that it was an additional hurdle which made the exception more 
restrictive.130  In the end, the proportionality qualification was removed when 
the Bill reached the House of Lords131 and does not appear in the final wording of 
the EA.  Nonetheless, reference is made to it in the explanatory notes to the EA 
which stipulate that the exception will apply when appointing or employing a 
person who meets the requirement is a proportionate way of complying with the 
doctrines of the religion or avoiding conflict with a significant number of the 
religion’s followers’ strongly held religious convictions.132  It remains unclear, 
therefore, whether the reference to proportionality in the explanatory notes is 
an administrative error or whether proportionality should be read into the two 
principles.133  The observations of Richards J were quoted with approval by the 
EAT in Pemberton.134  No proportionality assessment was carried out in that case 
and the EAT opined that there was no proportionality test in the organised 
religion exception.135   
In addition to these ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the 
exceptions, concerns continue to be expressed that the organised religion 
exception may be incompatible with the Equal Treatment Directive and the 
ECHR.  When the organised religion exception was initially debated in Parliament 
in the context of the SO Regulations, the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
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questioned whether the exception was intra vires with regard to the Equal 
Treatment Directive.136  The Government maintained at the time that the 
exception was compatible with the Equal Treatment Directive and subsequently 
successfully defended a challenge on this ground (and on the ground of 
incompatibility with the ECHR) in Amicus.  Richards J examined the exception 
and drew support for a narrow interpretation from the fact it derogated from 
the principle of equal treatment and needed to be construed purposively in 
accordance with the Equal Treatment Directive.137  The issue was raised again, 
however, when the European Commission wrote to the UK Government in 2009, 
apparently to advise that the exception was overly broad and therefore 
incompatible with the Equal Treatment Directive.138  Notwithstanding this, the 
exception was included in the EA without amendment, and it is understood the 
European Commission closed its investigation into the UK’s transposition of the 
Equal Treatment Directive on 21 June 2012.139  Yet doubts as to compatibility 
with the Equal Treatment Directive remain.  Sandberg, for example, opines, to 
the extent the exception as drafted in the EA may not insist that the 
requirement is ‘a proportionate way of meeting the criteria’, it could be too 
broad to be compatible with the Equal Treatment Directive.140  Questions have 
also been raised as to the rationale for the decision to apply the exception only 
to employment ‘for the purposes of an organised religion’ and particularly 
whether this might breach section 13 of the HRA which recognises the 
importance of article 9 rights to the wider category of ‘religious organisation’.141  
 The exceptions and perceived characteristics 
Each of the three exceptions in the EA is engaged not only in circumstances 
where the persons, to whom the otherwise discriminatory treatment is applied, 
do not meet the requirement but also where the employer is not reasonably 
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satisfied that they meet the requirement.  An argument by the trade unions in 
Amicus (in relation to the OR exception in the SO Regulations) that the Equal 
Treatment Directive does not permit this extended coverage was unsuccessful.  
Richards J opined it had a, ‘sensible rationale’, avoiding the employer having to 
take what it is told ‘at face value’ whilst limiting ‘the risk of unduly intrusive 
inquiry’.142  According to Richards J, article 4(1) of the Equal Treatment 
Directive refers to treatment ‘based on a characteristic related to …’ and 
therefore encompasses perceived characteristics in its scope.143  The same 
argument, however, cannot apply to the ethos exception, which is based on 
article 4(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive.  Article 4(2) refers to ‘a difference 
in treatment based on a person’s religion or belief’.  It would seem there is no 
scope in article 4(2) for a difference in treatment based on a perceived 
characteristic.  Notwithstanding this, the ethos exception in the EA applies both 
where the person does not meet the requirement to be of a particular religion or 
belief and where the employer has reasonable grounds for not being satisfied 
that the person meets it.  It is likely that if this aspect of the provision were to 
be tested in the courts, a challenge would be made that it was incompatible 
with the Equal Treatment Directive.              
 Ambiguity and uncertainty  
There is, I would argue, thus a considerable measure of uncertainty surrounding 
the interpretation and application of the three exceptions to equal treatment in 
employment in the EA.  When the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments 
considered the SO Regulations in 2003 it reported its concerns about the 
uncertainty surrounding the application of the OR exception and the organised 
religion exception.144  Similar concerns were voiced in the House of Commons 
committee debate on the SO and ROB Regulations in respect of the ethos 
exception.145  Almost 15 years on, little clarity has been provided.  Questions 
remain unanswered in relation to whether the OR exception requires the 
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occupational requirement to be ‘determining’, whilst difficulties arise in relation 
to identifying and verifying an employer’s religious ethos for the purposes of the 
ethos exception and predicting how ‘regard’ for a particular ethos, as well as 
the nature and context of work, should impact on decisions.  It is also ambiguous 
whether the ethos exception could ever be used to defend a requirement 
pertaining to lifestyle or personal relationships and how proportionality in both 
the OR and ethos exceptions should be assessed.  The greatest degree of 
uncertainty, however, surrounds the organised religion exception, with doubts 
over which jobs will be considered as ‘employment for the purposes of an 
organised religion’, and ambiguity over the evidence required to satisfy the 
compliance and no conflict principles (including whether application of the 
criteria should be proportionate).  There are question marks over the 
compatibility of the organised religion exception with the HRA.  There are also 
doubts whether the organised religion exception and the faith schools exception 
are compatible with the Equal Treatment Directive and an argument that the 
Equal Treatment Directive does not permit the ethos exception to apply where 
treatment is based on the employer’s perception of the person’s religion or 
belief.   
3.4 Parliamentary material and conflicting interpretations  
Instead of providing clarity in respect of the points of ambiguity identified 
above, Parliamentary debates on the ROB Regulations, the SO Regulations and 
the Equality Bill (together with related consultations, explanatory notes and 
guidance) disclose a divergence in approach to interpretation of the employment 
exceptions in the EA directed at the religious group (the ethos exception and the 
organised religion exception).  Two different and conflicting attitudes to 
construing the exceptions are apparent.  The first interpretation considers the 
nature of the work performed in any post to be the key determinant in whether 
religion or another protected characteristic is an occupational requirement.  
Understood thus, the functions of each post assume particular importance.  The 
second interpretation, by contrast, places more emphasis on the context in 
which the work is performed than the nature of the work itself.  On this 
interpretation, the post is not reduced to its particular functions.  Instead, all 
aspects of the post assume relevance in the determination of whether there is 
an occupational requirement.   
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Significantly it is those who spoke in Parliament in support of the Government’s 
proposals on the drafting of these exceptions who appear in the main to adopt 
the first approach to interpretation, focusing primarily on the nature of the work 
in any post, and particularly the job functions.  Several of those who expressed 
concerns in relation to the Government’s proposals, as well as certain religious 
representatives, meanwhile, emphasised instead the importance of the context 
in which work is performed in determining whether the exceptions should apply 
in any given factual scenario.   
So, in presenting the ethos exception in the ROB Regulations to the fourth 
standing committee on delegated legislation, the then Minister for Employment 
Relations, Competition and Consumers, Mr Gerry Sutcliffe, explained the 
Government’s decision not to prescribe particular posts to which the 
occupational requirement will apply by stating that, ‘it makes more sense for 
employers to consider whether the post’s functions require someone to have a 
particular faith’.146  Notwithstanding his acknowledgment that, ‘the ethos and 
the nature of the job’ were both relevant to the exception,147 by making specific 
reference to the ‘functions’ of the post, the Minister could be criticised for 
prioritising the nature of the work over the context in which it is performed.  A 
similar approach to the ethos exception is taken by Lord Sainsbury of Turville 
who presented the Government’s proposals in the House of Lords debate on the 
ROB Regulations.  Echoing Mr Sutcliffe, Lord Sainsbury emphasised that the onus 
is on employers to decide whether the ‘functions’ of the post require its holders 
to be of a particular religion or belief.148  Whilst there is recognition from the 
Government in the relevant materials that the ethos of the employer is 
important in determining whether there is an occupational requirement,149 rarely 
does it discuss or explain its implications.  Certainly job functions are an 
important and a more tangible consideration than the requirements of an 
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employer’s ethos or the wider context in which the work is performed, but the 
lack of any detailed explanation from the Government in the materials as to how 
ethos and context are relevant undermines their significance.   
The relevance of the context in which work is carried out to the application of 
the organised religion exception (and particularly the engagement of the no 
conflict principle) is also downplayed by some supporters of the Government’s 
proposals on this exception in Parliament.150  In answer to whether a gardener, 
secretary or cleaner might fall within the organised religion exception, Lord 
Sainsbury of Turville in the House of Lords debate on the SO Regulations advised 
that, ‘Only in very limited circumstances would a requirement imposed on 
someone whose job does not involve participation in religious activities be 
justified under Regulation 7(3)’.151  Contributions to the same debate by Lord 
Lester of Herne Hill, who also supported the Government’s proposals, further 
emphasise the importance placed by the Government on the nature of the work, 
and particularly job functions.  Lord Lester asserted that the organised religion 
exception should not be applied to, ‘a person in an administrative or ancillary 
role’ and that requiring a church cleaner to be heterosexual, ‘has absolutely 
nothing to do with whether he or she can wield a mop and bucket’.152  
This tendency to characterise the jobs which engage the relevant exceptions by 
virtue of the nature of the work they involve rather than the context in which 
they are performed was similarly evident when the Equality Bill was considered 
in the House of Lords and the House of Commons.  In the House of Lords debate 
on the Equality Bill, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster identified with 
apparent ease administrative staff, accountants, caretakers, cleaners, 
bookkeepers, and most staff working in press or communications offices as roles 
to which the organised religion exception would not apply. 153  Harriet Harman 
MP, meanwhile, asserted confidently in the House of Commons that, ‘there is an 
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exemption for religious jobs but not for non-religious jobs’.154  Of course 
Harman’s distinction is only easy to make if the functions of the job are the only 
determining criteria as to when a job is ‘religious’ or ‘non-religious’: once the 
context in which the work is performed is taken into account, the picture 
becomes much more complex.  It is perhaps the belief that the organised 
religion exception exists, at least in part, to safeguard religious doctrine from 
interference by the secular courts which has led to the focus on job titles and 
functions: as Lord Sainsbury said in relation to the posts of cleaner, gardener or 
secretary, ‘Religious doctrine rarely has much to say about posts such as 
those.’155   
The narrow focus on the nature of the work is ultimately reflected in the 
explanatory notes to the EA.  In the examples given on when the ethos exception 
might be engaged, the absence of any recognition that the context of the work 
might be relevant is noteworthy.  The explanatory notes suggest that a religious 
organisation might be permitted to require that the head of their organisation 
shares their faith because he needs to have an ‘in-depth understanding of the 
religion’s doctrines’ but that other posts which do not require the same ‘in-
depth understanding such as administrative posts’ should not be restricted to co-
religionists.156  Interestingly this contrasts somewhat with the position put 
forward by the Government in its first consultation on the ROB and SO 
Regulations that, ‘a religious organisation may be able to demonstrate that it is 
a genuine requirement that all staff – not just senior staff or people with a 
proselytising function – should belong to the religion concerned so as to ensure 
the preservation of the organisation’s particular ethos’.157  A similar focus on the 
nature of the work over the context in which it is carried out is evident in the 
explanatory notes on the organised religion exception which state that the 
exception will not apply to a church accountant or to a youth worker who 
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primarily organises sporting activities but may apply to a youth worker who 
mainly teaches Bible classes.158    
By contrast, it was often maintained in the contributions to the debates from 
those who raised concerns with the Government’s proposals on the exceptions 
and in contributions from religious stakeholders that the nature of the work 
activities could not be separated from the context in which they were carried 
out.  Commenting in a Memorandum submitted to the Public Bill Committee 
considering the Equality Bill, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and 
Wales asserted that the Government’s proposal to limit the organised religion 
exception to those jobs that wholly or mainly involved leading or assisting in the 
observation of liturgical or ritualistic practices of the religion, or promoting or 
expanding the doctrine of the religion, ‘fails to understand the nature of 
religious life’.159  According to the Bishops’ Conference, ‘The ethos of the 
Catholic Church should permeate every aspect of its activities: religion is about 
the whole of life and the whole person; it is not limited to formal worship and 
instruction.’160 A similar sentiment is echoed by the Archbishop of York in the 
House of Lords debate on the Equality Bill when he said that, ‘churches and 
other religious organisations cannot draw the same clear cut distinction between 
who we are and what we do; between what we believe and how we conduct 
ourselves; between work life and private life’.161  In the House of Commons’ 
Public Bill Committee debate on the Equality Bill, Richard Kornicki, 
Parliamentary Co-ordinator for the Catholic Bishops Conference, complained 
that the Government’s proposed definition of employment for the purposes of an 
organised religion, ‘represents a misunderstanding of how religion works’.  He 
explained, ‘It is not simply an activity that takes place once a week in a 
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particular place; it is about the whole of life.  Important functions will be 
carried out that will be relevant to religious activity that might be more than, or 
different from simply leading liturgical worship.’162   
Those who had concerns about the Government’s proposals on the exceptions 
also often cited the need to maintain the character or ethos of the employer as 
the reason for the exceptions.  John Mason MP explained his view that: 
There is something fundamental about working for an organisation 
with a strong ethos.  This could apply to any of the protected 
characteristics, whether it is age, disability, LGBT status or anything 
else.  There is an expectation that all staff should be signed up to and 
enthusiastic about an organisation’s direction.  That affects the mood 
when staff come to work in the morning, how they chat in the staff 
room and so on.163  
Although content with the Government’s proposals, certain religious 
stakeholders emphasised the importance of the exceptions for the maintenance 
of an employer’s ethos.  William Fittal, Secretary-General of the General Synod 
of the Church of England, claimed in a committee debate that the state needed 
to permit faith schools to, ‘preserve their ethos’.164  The Bishop of Blackburn 
meanwhile asserted in the House of Lords debate on the SO Regulations that the 
Equal Treatment Directive, ‘recognises that Churches and faith communities 
need to maintain their character and identity and sometimes to be able to set 
requirements which should not arise in the case of a secular employer’.165  
Although not all of the Government’s proposals on the exceptions were 
ultimately accepted it is nonetheless significant that they triggered a divergence 
in approach to interpretation.  Whereas several of those in support of the 
Government’s proposals appeared to adopt a narrow focus on job function in 
their interpretation, many with reservations and certain religious stakeholders 
seemed to place a much greater emphasis on the context in which work is 
performed, including the ethos of the employer.  The different approaches can 
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be described in another way.  By prioritising the nature of the work over the 
context in which it is carried out, it could be said that several in support of the 
Government’s proposals approached the exceptions from an ‘instrumental’ 
perspective whereas others advocated a more ‘organic’ approach which allowed 
the context in which the work is carried out to be taken into account.  The 
distinction between an ‘instrumental’ and ‘organic’ approach to employment 
was devised by Alvin Esau in the context of his research on the exceptions to the 
principle of equality in employment in Canada.  Esau explains: 
The instrumental view of employment is that the person is given a 
defined task to do and the duty of the employee is to do that task and 
no more. … But under the organic view of employment the employee 
is expected to participate in the mission of the organization as a 
whole, and is expected to join the whole community, the whole body, 
in a way that transcends any narrowly defined job description. 166   
Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive, which the exceptions 
purport to implement, quite clearly stipulate that both the nature of the work or 
the context in which it is performed are relevant to determining whether 
religion, or another protected characteristic, is an occupational requirement.  
This is reiterated in the wording of the ethos exception and in the organised 
religion exception (expressly in the no conflict principle, and arguably implicitly 
in the compliance principle).  Concentrating on the nature of the work as the 
main determinant for when the exceptions will be engaged, and side-lining the 
context in which the work is carried out, is not only contrary to the expressed 
interests of key stakeholders but also to the express terms of the Equal 
Treatment Directive and the exceptions.  All of this, of course, only serves to 
aggravate the uncertainty which surrounds the application of the exceptions.  
3.5 Paucity of case law 
Commenting on the Government’s proposed definition of ‘employment for the 
purposes of an organised religion’ in the House of Lords debate on the Equality 
Bill, the Archbishop of York remarked, ‘When I heard the Leader of the House 
describing what may be exempt, I said to myself, “My gosh, here comes a 
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barrage of endless tribunals”.’167  Sandberg meanwhile, in a comment on the 
exceptions in the EA for religious groups including employers, predicted in 2011 
that ‘The likelihood of further litigation and rebukes from the European 
Commission means that the current text of the Equality Act 2010 is unlikely to 
be the last word on the matter.’168 
Despite these predictions, there have only been two cases on the organised 
religion exception169 and only three cases on the ethos exception,170 which have 
been widely publicised.  Further, there is no readily available evidence of 
employment discrimination cases in which an employer has sought to rely on the 
privileges for denominational schools contained in the SSFA and the E(Sc)A.  Of 
the five widely publicised cases on the exceptions, only two were heard by the 
EAT, and none were considered by a higher appellate court.  It is possible that 
there have been other cases on the exceptions (including cases which invoke the 
statutory protections for denominational schools) which have been decided by 
the ET but which have not been widely publicised.  The searchable database of 
ET decisions was only introduced in 2017 and it does not include many 
judgments of cases decided prior to its introduction.  Still, even allowing for 
this, the number of cases on the exceptions can be described as low.  The 
apparent lack of judicial consideration of the exceptions, particularly at 
appellate level, is surely to be a factor in the continued ambiguity which 
surrounds their scope and application.  Why is it that the provisions, many of 
which provoked heated debate in Parliament and criticism from a number of 
academics on account of their ambiguity171 appear to have been very rarely 
tested in the courts?   
One possible explanation is that the exceptions are never, or rarely, required by 
religious employers.  There are various possible reasons for this.  First of all, the 
number of applications received by religious employers from applicants who do 
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not meet their preferred criteria may be low.  It is likely that religious 
organisations will, in the main, attract job applicants who are affiliated with the 
religion and who may consider it a religious ‘calling’ to deploy their skills 
working for a religious organisation.  Job seekers, further, might be deterred 
from applying for a job in a religious organisation, perhaps because they are 
uncomfortable working in an environment with overt displays of religious 
symbols, or for an employer that incorporates religious practices, such as 
prayers, into daily workplace routines.172   
A second reason why religious employers might not seek to rely on the 
exceptions is the difficulty they may experience in recruiting individuals who are 
appropriately qualified and who meet the desired belief criteria.173  In one of the 
few ET cases on the ethos exception the difficulties experienced with recruiting 
Christian staff was given as part explanation for why the support workers in the 
organisation were not predominantly of the Christian faith.174  A Church of 
England report on teaching needs in its schools, moreover, has reportedly 
recorded that the national shortage of school leaders was, ‘… felt even more 
acutely by the Church of England’s network in education’.175  Some employers 
might feel compelled to recruit the best qualified candidates for posts 
notwithstanding they may not meet the desired religious criteria in order that 
they can continue to provide efficient and effective services to their clients or 
customers.   
Alternatively, excluding an individual on the basis of a personal characteristic 
might be contrary to the teachings of the religion of some employers, or at least 
contrary to the beliefs of the person responsible for making the recruitment 
                                         
172 Greg Walsh, 'The Right to Equality and the Employment Decisions of Religious Schools' (2014) 
16 The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 107, 122.  
173 ibid 123.   
174  Sheridan (ch 3, n 70) [2.10]-[2.11], [2.34].    
175 The Church of England Education Division, Training and Development Partnerships Project: 
Needs Analysis Report’ referred to in Accord Coalition, 'Religious Discrimination in Teacher 
Employment Questioned as More Church of England Schools Operate Without a Christian 
Head Teacher' (Accord Coalition, 28 September 2015) 
<http://accordcoalition.org.uk/2015/09/28/religious-discrimination-in-teacher-employment-
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decisions.176  It has been claimed that empirical evidence gathered from a study 
of the employment practices in religious schools in Australia supports these 
contentions.177  Some of the schools interviewed in the study, for example, 
explained that because they supported diversity, they would not necessarily 
seek to rely on the exceptions to equality norms which were available to 
them.178   
Another reason why religious employers might be deterred from using the 
exceptions is a belief that the exceptions are simply too narrow to be of any real 
benefit.  Sandberg predicted that persistent emphasis on the ‘narrowness’ of the 
exceptions in the EA would in time cause the exceptions to ‘narrow to the 
extent that they cease to exist’.179  Indeed, the perception that the exceptions 
in the EA are too narrow in scope is evidenced in the findings of a study by the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (the ‘EHRC’), published in 2015, that 
there were Christian employers across the sectors who considered the current 
model of exceptions to be ‘overly restrictive’.180   
There are, thus, reasonable grounds to argue that religious employers do not 
readily rely on the exceptions and that this is the reason for the lack of reported 
case law.  As tempting as this conclusion is, however, there are several cogent 
reasons why it should not be accepted.  For one, the volume of representations 
made by religious organisations to the consultations on the ROB and SO 
Regulations is suggestive of a belief by religious organisations that exceptions to 
equality norms are necessary to meet their needs as employers.  In a 
consultation on the ROB Regulations, as many as 263 religious organisations 
commented on the religious ethos exception, with 67% supporting the approach 
proposed.181  This positive response to the current framework of exceptions is 
reflected in a study of stakeholders commissioned by the EHRC in 2012, which 
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reported that, ‘Most interviewees representing religion or belief groups were 
broadly happy with the exceptions model, even if they regretted the lack of 
clarity surrounding the text of the exceptions.’182  This support for the current 
model of exceptions in the EA appears at odds with a finding that religious 
employers consider the exceptions are not required.  
Further, evidence of the use of the exceptions can be found by perusing the job 
advertisements posted online for religious organisations.  Many, for example, 
stipulate that it is an occupational requirement pursuant to the EA for the post-
holder to be of a particular religion.183  News reports and personal testimonies 
have, moreover, been collected attesting to ‘exclusive practices’ in 
denominational schools.184  These indicate that religious motivations influence 
the employment practices of schools at various stages of the employment 
relationship.   
If, as I have argued, religious employers do need the exceptions, it is prudent to 
consider why there has apparently been so little case law on their use.  As 
litigation is more likely to arise when employers are, or are at least perceived to 
be, acting outside of the terms of the exceptions, the lack of reported case law 
might indicate that religious employers are exercising the exceptions in a legally 
compliant manner.  Yet, in a 2012 study commissioned by the EHRC, there were 
interviewees who considered that the exceptions in the EA were being 
interpreted too widely in practice.185  The study records Stonewall (a lobbying 
group for lesbians, gay men and bisexuals) as commenting that the employment 
exception in the EA has been, ‘flagrantly abused by some organisations that have 
used it to unfairly discriminate against gay employees in a way which was 
                                         
182 Alice Donald and others, ‘Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 84: 
Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights in England and Wales’ (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, Summer 2012) 97. 
183 For example, in an advertisement placed on 24 June 2014 for a Christian worker to develop a 
Youth Ministry it is stipulated that the post holder must be ‘a practising Christian who lives its 
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certainly not envisaged when it was introduced’186 though, as the study 
acknowledges, Stonewall’s views cannot be verified because of the lack of 
empirical evidence.  The more recent EHRC study published in 2015 also found 
evidence of potential unlawful conduct by some religious employers.187   
Why is there a reluctance to litigate these matters in the tribunals?  The EHRC 
study published in 2015 contains findings that one of the reasons employees 
were deterred from raising complaints of discrimination was because they did 
not know what the legal requirements were or how to pursue complaints.188  The 
lack of certainty surrounding the practical application of the exceptions may 
further deter individuals from raising claims with no certain prospects of 
success, particularly in the period during which fees were charged for claimants 
bringing claims in the ET.  One participant in the EHRC study published in 2012 
commented that some (but not all) equality and diversity forum members 
consider that religious organisations are applying the exceptions in the EA too 
widely in practice and that those affected are not always litigating because they 
do not know their legal rights, or do not have the resources.189  The financial 
costs of litigation will not be the only deterrent: pursuing tribunal or court cases 
can be a lengthy and involved process, with emotionally draining effects for 
some.  In addition, many employees might be unwilling to litigate against an 
employer or former employer out of concern that it will adversely affect their 
future employment prospects.190     
An alternative reason for the apparent lack of case law might be a preference of 
religious employers for resolving any disputes which arise internally within the 
organisation. In the UK, the Accord Coalition has reported difficulties in 
obtaining information on the treatment of teachers.  It believes that, ‘staffing 
matters are generally dealt with behind closed doors’ and makes reference to 
the use of ‘confidentiality agreements’ in some cases.191   The aforementioned 
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study on the impact of Australia’s anti-discrimination laws on religious schools 
also supports the proposition that disputes in religious organisations are often 
dealt with internally.192  The study considered what would happen if a staff 
member left his religion.  In those schools where staff were required to belong 
to a particular religion, the study found evidence that the schools would try to 
persuade the staff members to return to their religion.  If this failed, ‘there was 
an informal discussion during which the person in question was either asked to 
leave or concluded that it would be in their best interests to leave’.  It was 
reported that, ‘These cases were dealt with informally by agreement between 
the principal and staff member and did not lead to litigation or contention.’193  
The Australian study did not explore further the reason why disputes were dealt 
with internally without recourse to the courts but it could be because the 
individuals concerned did not wish to subject aspects of their private life to the 
scrutiny of the secular courts or their religious community.  Alternatively, it 
could even be because some religious beliefs or cultures dictate that disputes 
should be resolved internally.  Research by Alvin Esau on the Hutterites (a part 
of the Anabaptist Christian sect) has found evidence of community rules which 
provide that individual members can be forced to leave the community should 
they bring legal action against it.194  Indeed, in the United States Supreme Court 
case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission et al.,195 an Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School and member of the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod sought to justify 
its decision to dismiss an employee on the ground that she had indicated her 
intention to assert her legal rights in a discrimination complaint contrary to the 
Synod’s belief that Christians should seek an internal resolution to their 
disputes. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
It is, I have argued, unconvincing to maintain that the lack of case law on the 
exceptions is evidence of their redundancy.  There are, rather, several credible 
reasons why reliance on the exceptions is not being litigated in the courts.  If, as 
I have argued here, the exceptions are both needed and used by religious 
employers, the paucity of reported case law considering their interpretation and 
application is a problem.  The scope of the exceptions in the EA is ambiguous 
and related Parliamentary material highlights that several supporters of the 
Government’s proposals on the ethos and organised religion exceptions adopt an 
approach to their interpretation which is at odds with the stated interests of 
certain religious representatives as well as the terms of the exceptions in the EA 
and the Equal Treatment Directive.  The question of whether the faith schools 
exception is compatible with the Equal Treatment Directive, meanwhile, 
remains unanswered.  Without judicial clarification, religious employers and 
their advisers will be unable to determine with reasonable certainty whether or 
not desired employment practices are lawful.  Potential litigants, meanwhile, 
may be deterred by the ambiguities from testing their employers’ decisions in 
the tribunals or courts.   The lack of precedent for the judiciary tasked in the 
future with determining cases on the exceptions may also lead to inconsistent 
results.  The implications of all of this for the rule of law hardly need to be 
explained.  In the absence of more available case law at this time, a clear 
understanding of the principle underlying particularly those employment 
exceptions directed at the religious group, is urgently required to guide those 
tasked in the future with their interpretation.     
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4 Religious group autonomy in employment: 
United States of America  
4.1 Introduction 
I concluded the preceding chapter by observing that there was an urgent need to 
identify the principles underlying or informing the employment exceptions so as 
to aid their interpretation. I now turn to consider the exemptions and exceptions 
to equality in employment in the USA to gain a greater insight into the nature 
and scope of the employment exceptions in Great Britain and to assist in the 
search for the principles underlying the British model.   
Such a comparative approach, highlights, for example, the relatively narrow 
parameters within which religious employers in Britain can exercise autonomy in 
their employment affairs, and the underdeveloped nature of the British 
jurisprudence.  The exemptions and exceptions in the USA, I observe, afford less 
scope than their British equivalents for the judiciary to exercise its judgment in 
their interpretation.  Although the scope for ambiguity and uncertainty in the 
application of the exemptions and exceptions in the USA is thereby reduced, I 
argue that this has a detrimental impact on fairness and equality.   
Of particular interest to the search for underlying principle in the British case 
are the principles which have underpinned the development and interpretation 
of the exemption and exception model in the USA.  The constitutional church 
and state divide and the long history of positive religious freedom on which the 
divide is predicated have had significant influence and, I will argue, afford clear 
principles to guide future development of the law in this area.  By uncovering 
these principles, a point of departure is identified for examining, in chapter 6, 
the underlying basis of the employment exceptions in Britain.  
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4.2 Federal model of exemptions to equality in 
employment for religious employers  
 Overview of the legislative framework 
In the USA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 19641 (‘Title VII’) prohibits 
discrimination (including harassment) in employment by employers with 15 or 
more employees on the grounds of race, colour, religion, sex and national 
origin.2  Also prohibited is victimisation of an employee or applicant who 
complains of discrimination or participates in an investigation by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (the ‘EEOC’).3  Employers, moreover, have 
a duty to reasonably accommodate an applicant or employee’s sincerely held 
religious beliefs or practices unless to do so would cause undue hardship to the 
conduct of the business.4 
In addition to a general exception from the prohibition of discrimination in 
employment for bona fide occupational qualifications (the ‘BFOQ exception’),5 
Title VII contains two further exemptions: one which can be relied on by 
religious corporations, associations, educational institutions and societies (the 
‘religious entity exemption’);6 and, the other, which can only be relied on by 
religious schools, colleges, universities, educational institutions or institutions of 
learning (the ‘religious education exemption’).7  A judicial exception, moreover, 
has been created which applies to the employment of members of the clergy and 
other lay employees performing a similar role (the ‘ministerial exception’).  The 
                                         
1 The Civil Rights Act 1964, 42 USC (CRA 1964) § 2000e – 2000e-17.  Title VII is federal 
legislation.  Most US states additionally have state legislation prohibiting discrimination in 
employment on various grounds, including religion.   
2 ibid § 2000e-2 (section 703(a)).  Age and disability discrimination are also prohibited by federal 
law under, respectively, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 29 U.S.C. §621 and 
1990 42 U.S.C.S. §12101 et seq. 
3 CRA 1964 § 2000e-3(a) (section 704(a)). 
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Rawlinson 433 US 321, 334 (1877)). 
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religious entity exemption, the religious education exemption and the 
ministerial exception will each be discussed in turn below. 
 Religious entity exemption  
The religious entity exemption permits qualifying employers to exercise 
preferences in their employment practices on the basis of the applicant’s or 
employee’s religion.  It is expressly provided in Title VII that the prohibition of 
discrimination in employment does not apply to: 
a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society 
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion 
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution or society of its activities.8 
The religious entity exemption does not permit discrimination on any ground 
other than religion.  Thus, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v 
Fremont Christian School,9  a religious school was unable to rely on the religious 
entity exemption to escape liability in a complaint of sex discrimination for 
providing health insurance benefits to married male employees but not to 
married female employees.  The school was a member of the Assembly of God 
Church which believed that the husband is the head of the household in a 
marriage and should provide for that household.   
Whereas there is a reasonable element of doubt over which organisations will 
qualify for the ethos exception in the EA,10 jurisprudence of the courts in the 
USA provides some guidance on which organisations may rely on the religious 
entity exemption.  According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Townley Engineering and 
Manufacturing Company,11 the religious entity exemption applies to those 
institutions with a ‘purpose and character’ that is ‘primarily religious’ and to 
determine this, ‘all significant religious and secular characteristics must be 
                                         
8 ibid § 2000e-1(a) (section 702(a)). 
9 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Fremont Christian School 781 F2d 1362 (9th Cir 
1986).   
10 On the ethos exception, see chapter 3 at 3.3.2. 
11 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Townley Engineering and Manufacturing 
Company 859 F2d 610 (9th Cir 1988) (Townley). 
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weighed’.12  A multi-factored approach was later also endorsed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in LeBoon v Lancaster Jewish Community Center 
Association.13  The court in LeBoon identified the particular characteristics which 
courts in the past had considered relevant to determining whether the purpose 
and character of an organisation was primarily religious, as: 
(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it produces a 
secular product, (3) whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or 
other pertinent documents state a religious purpose, (4) whether it is 
owned, affiliated with or financially supported by a formally religious 
entity such as a church or synagogue, (5) whether a formally religious 
entity participates in the management, for instance by having 
representatives on the board of trustees, (6) whether the entity holds 
itself out to the public as secular or sectarian, (7) whether the entity 
regularly includes prayer or other forms of worship in its activities, (8) 
whether it includes religious instruction in its curriculum, to the 
extent it is an educational institution, and (9) whether its membership 
is made up by coreligionists.14 
According to the court in LeBoon, the weight to be given to each characteristic 
will vary depending on the particular facts of the case and not all characteristics 
will be relevant in every case.15  Still, the guidance issued by the courts in 
Townley and LeBoon is nonetheless instructive to employers and advisers tasked 
with determining whether the exemption is engaged.  Applying it to the case 
before it, the court in LeBoon accepted that the Lancaster Jewish Community 
Center Association (the ‘LJCC’) qualified for the religious entity exemption.  
There were a number of factors relevant to its finding that the purpose and 
character of the LJCC was ‘primarily religious’: the LJCC considered itself to be, 
‘a center for the local Jewish community’; it had a mezuzah at its door; it 
received finances from co-religionists; it provided, ‘instructional programs with 
a Jewish content’; its activities were timed in accordance with the Jewish 
religious calendar; the three rabbis from the area were consulted on 
                                         
12 ibid 618.  
13 LeBoon v Lancaster Jewish Community Center Association 503 F3d 217 (3rd Cir 2007); see also 
comment by Evans and Hood that LeBoon ‘represented a further widening in the scope of 
protection’ because it applied the exemption to an institution which was not owned by or 
affiliated to a religious entity, in Carolyn Evans and Anna Hood, 'Religious Autonomy and 
Labour Law: A Comparison of Jurisprudence of the United States and the European Court of 
Human Rights' (2012) 1 OJLR 81, 86-87.       
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15 ibid 227.  
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management decisions; and the Board of Trustees who were, ‘acutely conscious 
of the Jewish character of the organization’ included Biblical readings at their 
meetings.16  The court was not dissuaded in its finding by the secular nature of 
some of the LJCC’s activities (in particular, allowing non-kosher food on its 
premises, recruiting personnel who were not Jewish and permitting Hindu groups 
to use its premises), nor by the fact the LJCC was not affiliated to any 
synagogue.17 
The multi-factored approach to interpretation of the religious entity exemption, 
however, has been the subject of some judicial criticism.  In Spencer v World 
Vision Inc18 all three judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit considered it was, ‘inherently too indeterminate and subjective’.19  Each 
judge in Spencer sought to formulate an alternative test for determining 
whether an organisation could rely on the religious entity exemption.  Judge 
O’Scanlainn advocated that the organisation needed to be non-profit and 
establish that it: 
1) is organised for a self-identified religious purpose (as evidenced by 
Articles of Incorporation or similar foundational documents), 2) is 
engaged in activity consistent with, and in furtherance of, those 
religious purposes, and 3) holds itself out to the public as religious.20 
Critical of the ‘inclusive’21 nature of this test, Judge Kleinfield advocated a 
modified version, which removed the requirement that the organisation should 
be non-profit, and added a stipulation that the institution must not ‘engage 
primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond 
nominal amounts’.22  Judge Berzon, meanwhile, formulated a much narrower 
test, arguing that, ‘Congress used the terms religious corporation, association … 
or society … to describe a church or other group organised for worship, religious 
                                         
16 ibid 229. 
17 ibid 229-230.  
18 Spencer v World Vision inc 633 F3d 723 (9th Cir 2010). 
19 ibid 741. 
20 ibid 734. 
21 ibid 742. 
22 ibid 748. 
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study, or the dissemination of religious doctrine.’23  Applying their own tests in 
Spencer, Judges O’Scannlain and Kleinfield considered that World Vision, a 
Christian humanitarian organisation which received substantial government 
funding, was entitled to rely on the exemption, whilst Judge Berzon dissented.   
Notwithstanding the criticisms advanced in Spencer, the EEOC compliance 
manual continues to advocate a multi-factored test to determine whether a 
particular organisation qualifies for the religious entity exemption.24  Though this 
approach is admittedly ‘indeterminate’ to an extent, it nevertheless provides a 
useful checklist of pertinent considerations for employers and advisers tasked 
with determining whether the exemption is engaged.  Although the 
jurisprudence has not clarified every ambiguity in the scope of the exemption (it 
remains unclear, for example, the extent to which Government funding might 
disqualify an organisation),25 its value in providing relevant precedent can be 
contrasted with the absence of judicial guidance on which organisations qualify 
for the ethos exception in the EA.   
Once an organisation has demonstrated that its purpose or character is primarily 
religious, it is permitted by the religious entity exemption to discriminate on 
grounds of religion in respect of all posts in its organisation.26  There is, unlike 
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24 US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Compliance Manual Section on Religious 
Discrimination (C(1)) <https://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html> accessed 28 December 2017 
notes that the following factors are relevant in determining whether an entity is ‘religious’: 
whether the articles of incorporation state a religious purpose; whether the day-to-day 
operations are religious; whether it is not-for-profit; and whether it is affiliated with, or supported 
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619. 
25 In Spencer v World Vision Inc the Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit did not, in its original 
judgment (19 F3d 1109 (9th Cir 2010) explore the significance or otherwise of the substantial 
government funding received by World Vision.  Dissatisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs 
requested that the Court of Appeals clarify its ruling and reserve the question of whether the US 
Constitution permits organisations which are funded by Government to rely on the religious 
entity exemption.  The Court of Appeals subsequently issued its amended decision (633 F3d 
723 (9th Cir 2011)), but did not within that decision consider the relevance of Government 
funding to the question of whether a religious institution qualifies for the exception or expressly 
reserve the question.  See comment in Kerry O'Halloran, Religion, Charity and Human Rights 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 319–320. 
26 For example see, Feldstein v Christian Science Monitor 555 FSupp 974 (DMass 1983) in which 
the District Court of Massachusetts upheld a religious affiliation requirement on the news 
reporting staff of a newspaper associated with the Christian Science Church and Killinger v 
Samford University 113 F3d 196 (11th Cir 1993) in which the Court of Appeals for the 11th circuit 
held that the religious entity exemption applied to the decision of a University to remove a 
teacher from a post in its Divinity School because his religious beliefs conflicted with those of 
the School’s Dean.     
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the ethos exception in the EA, no requirement on the organisation to 
demonstrate that being of a particular religion is an occupational requirement 
which is reasonably necessary.  When the religious entity exemption was first 
included in Title VII, it only applied to excuse discrimination in respect of post-
holders carrying out the ‘religious’ activities of the organisation.  It was 
unlawful, therefore, to advance religious preferences in posts which involved 
activities deemed to be ‘secular’ in nature.  The scope of the exemption was 
extended by the United States Congress in 1972 to apply to any of an 
organisation’s activities.  Dismissing a challenge to this extension in Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop v Amos,27 the United States Supreme Court observed that it was 
difficult to separate the secular activities of a religious organisation from its 
religious activities and that the extension to the scope of the religious entity 
exemption was therefore necessary to minimise governmental interference with 
the exercise of religion.  Per Justice White of the Supreme Court: 
it is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on 
pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular 
court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an 
organization might understandably be concerned that a judge would 
not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.  Fear of 
potential liability might affect the way an organization carried out 
what it understood to be its religious mission.28 
Justice White was clearly concerned about the impact on religious organisations 
of a legal provision which only excepted discrimination in respect of activities 
interpreted as ‘religious’ by the judiciary.  Similar concerns were expressed by 
Justice Brennan who warned that such a provision was in ‘danger of chilling 
religious activity’ because of the risk that religious organisations would only 
classify as religious those activities which they believed a court would consider 
to be religious. 29   Although there is not the same distinction between ‘religious’ 
                                         
27 Corp of the Presiding Bishop v Amos 483 US 327 (1987) (Amos).  Amos argued that applying 
the religious entity exemption to non-religious jobs would breach the establishment clause of the 
first amendment to the United States constitution which provides that ‘Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion’.   
28 ibid 336.    
29 Per Justice Brennan in Amos (ch 4, n 27), ‘What makes the application of a religious-secular 
distinction difficult is that the character of an activity is not self-evident. As a result, determining 
whether an activity is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case analysis. This 
results in considerable ongoing government entanglement in religious affairs. … Furthermore, 
this prospect of government intrusion raises concern that a religious organization may be chilled 
in its free exercise activity. While a church may regard the conduct of certain functions as 
integral to its mission, a court may disagree. A religious organization therefore would have an 
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and ‘non-religious’ activities in the employment exceptions contained in the EA, 
the judiciary is still required in its interpretation of the exceptions to determine 
whether religion, or (in the case of the OR exception)30 another protected 
characteristic, is an occupational requirement having regard to the nature or 
context of the work.  In arriving at their determinations, the judiciary will likely 
become involved (if not explicitly then implicitly), in distinguishing ‘religious’ 
from ‘secular’ activities, which is what Justices Brennan and White were so keen 
to avoid, primarily for fear of its impact on the self-definition of religious 
organisations.31   
Further, whereas there is significant doubt as to whether the ethos exception 
would ever permit an employer to impose personal lifestyle requirements on its 
employees,32 the United States judiciary has held that the religious entity 
exemption can be relied on by employers who subject employees to standards of 
conduct that are consistent with their religions’ teachings.  In Little v Wuerl,33 
for example, the court held that a Catholic school could rely on the religious 
entity exemption to refuse a renewal of a teacher’s employment contract 
because the teacher (who was not Catholic) had remarried without first 
obtaining an annulment of her first marriage, contrary to the religious principles 
of the Catholic church.  It has been claimed, moreover, that the courts readily 
accept a religious organisation’s view of the conduct that is mandated and 
prohibited by its religious doctrine.34   
                                         
incentive to characterize as religious only those activities about which there likely would be no 
dispute, even if it genuinely believed that religious commitment was important in performing 
other tasks as well. As a result, the community's process of self-definition would be shaped in 
part by the prospects of litigation. A case-by-case analysis for all activities therefore would both 
produce excessive government entanglement with religion and create the danger of chilling 
religious activity.’ 
30 On the OR exception see chapter 3 at 3.3.1. 
31 Ahdar and Leigh remark that the comments by Justice White and Justice Brennan ‘are pertinent 
to fears expressed in the United Kingdom about the risk and inherent cost to religious 
organizations when faced with complainants backed by well-funded state equality and human 
rights commissions with an interest in sponsoring test legislation’ in Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, 
Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 364.     
32 See chapter 3 at 3.3.2. 
33 Little v Wuerl 929 F2d 944 (3rd Cir 1991).   
34 Evans and Hood (ch 4, n 13) 85-86, referring to Ganzy v Allen Christian School 995 FSupp 340 
(District ED New York 1998) 348. 
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The religious entity exemption certainly affords religious employers significant 
opportunity to discriminate in employment on the basis of religion.35  It is wider 
in scope than the ethos exception in the EA, permitting discrimination in respect 
of any post in a religious organisation, regardless of the nature of the work or 
the context in which work is undertaken, and regardless of the adverse impacts 
of the discrimination.  Not only does this make the religious entity exemption 
wider in scope than the ethos exception, it also makes its practical application 
by the courts much easier to predict.  Unlike the ethos exception, the religious 
entity exemption does not require judicial inquiry into the secular or religious 
nature of the employment.  Nor does it ask the judiciary to engage in any 
attempt to balance the needs of the religious employer with the interests of the 
individual subjected to the discriminatory treatment. 
 Religious education exemption  
The second exemption in Title VII which is specifically directed at religious 
employers provides that: 
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, 
university, or educational institution or institution of learning to hire 
and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, 
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, 
in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or 
managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious 
corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such 
school, college, university, or other educational institution or 
institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a 
particular religion. 36 
Insofar as this exemption permits religious preference in the hiring and 
employment of any posts in any religious educational establishment, whether in 
teaching or support, its scope is significantly wider than the employment 
exceptions contained in the E(Sc)A and the SSFA. 
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 Ministerial exception   
The exception to the principle of equality which provides religious employers in 
the USA with the most latitude to apply employment criteria of their choosing is 
the so-called, ‘ministerial exception’.  The ministerial exception is not laid down 
in legislation but is, rather, a judicial creation.  Its historical roots are in early 
cases concerning church property disputes, including Watson v Jones37 in which 
the United States Supreme Court held that the separation of church and state 
required by the first amendment to the United States constitution prevented it 
from interfering in the decisions of church bodies on, ‘questions of discipline or 
of faith or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law’.38  This doctrine of ‘church 
autonomy’ inherent in the first amendment was later held by the courts to apply 
to the appointment of clergy39 and to other personnel choices,40 thus rendering 
decisions pertaining to such appointments immune from court scrutiny.  It was 
subsequently applied in McClure v Salvation Army,41 a case concerning alleged 
sex discrimination in employment.  Mrs McClure was a minister in the Salvation 
Army who claimed she was dismissed from employment because she made a 
complaint about being remunerated on a less favourable basis than her male 
colleagues.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to hear her 
complaint on the basis that the separation of church and state arising from first 
amendment principles precluded it from applying the non-discrimination 
provisions in Title VII to the employment relationship between a church and its 
minister.  According to the court, determination of Mrs McClure’s complaint 
would require it to consider a minister’s salary, duties and assignment which 
were ‘matters of church administration and government and thus, purely of 
ecclesiastical cognizance’.42  It was feared that if ecclesiastical matters became 
the domain of the state, the church would lose the ability to deal with matters 
                                         
37 Watson v Jones 80 US (13 Wall) 679 (1871). 
38 ibid 727.  For comment on the historical roots of the ministerial exception see Jerold Waltman, 
'Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission: Defining the Ministerial Exception in US Employment Law' (2012) 169 Law and 
Justice: Christian Law Review 210, 211-15; Nicholas Hatzis, 'The Church-Clergy Relationship 
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39 Kedroff v St Nicholas Cathedral 344 US 94 (1952). 
40 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevech 426 US 696 (1976). 
41 McClure v Salvation Army 460 F2d 553 (5th Cir 1972).  
42 ibid 560.  
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of church government and administration itself and the ‘wall of separation’ 
between church and state required by the first amendment would be violated.43  
The principle established in McClure that courts cannot determine discrimination 
complaints under Title VII which are brought by ministers against their churches 
has become known as the ministerial exception.  Its rationale is not based on an 
assumption that religion, sex or other protected characteristic is or may be an 
occupational requirement of the ministerial role, but rather on the belief that 
autonomy in employment relations with ministers is essential to the 
constitutionally protected operation of churches.  In the decades following 
McClure, the ministerial exception was applied by the District Courts and the 
Courts of Appeal to bar discrimination complaints, not only under Title VII, but 
also brought pursuant to legislation outlawing age and disability discrimination.44  
It was successfully used to rebut complaints brought by clergy as well as by lay 
persons whose positions were, ‘important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of 
the church’.45  Thus, the ministerial exception was held, for example, to apply 
to the employment of an Associate in Pastoral Care internship in the 
administrative body of the Seventh-day Adventist church,46 a faculty member of 
the Catholic University of America,47 and a Hispanic communications manager for 
the Catholic Diocese of Chicago.48     
It was not, however, until 2012, that the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the use of the ministerial exception in Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.49  In this 
significant decision, the United States Supreme Court had to consider whether 
an Evangelical Lutheran church and school could rely on the ministerial 
exception to defend a disability discrimination complaint brought by an 
employee who held the title, ‘called’ teacher.  The teacher had been absent 
                                         
43 ibid.  
44 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq; Americans with 
Disabilities Act 1990 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. 
45 Rayburn v General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists 772 F2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir 1985).  
46 ibid. 
47 EEOC v Catholic University of America 83 F3d 455 (DC Cir 1996). 
48 Alicia-Hernandez v The Catholic Bishop of Chicago 320 F3d 698 (7th Cir 2002). 
49 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 132 SCt 694 (2012). 
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from work for a period due to suffering from narcolepsy, and when she refused, 
on the school’s request, to resign from her position, her employment was 
terminated.  The Supreme Court confirmed that it was prevented by the first 
amendment to the United States constitution from adjudicating on a religious 
group’s decision to dismiss one of its ministers.   On the facts before it, the 
teacher was found to be a minister for the purposes of the exception and 
therefore the Supreme Court refused to consider her complaint.  Delivering the 
leading opinion, Chief Justice Roberts said: 
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or 
punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a 
mere employment decision.  Such action interferes with the internal 
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the 
selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an 
unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, 
which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and 
mission through its appointments.  According the state the power to 
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates 
the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in 
such ecclesiastical decisions.50 
Chief Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court declined to put forward a ‘rigid 
formula’ for determining which personnel would be covered by the exception.51  
Of particular importance in the case before it was the title of ‘called’ teacher 
assigned to the employee, including her own use of the title and the religious 
training and formal process of commissioning that it entailed.  Although it was 
relevant that lay teachers (who, unlike called teachers, were not required to be 
Lutheran) performed the same job functions, this was insufficient to persuade 
the Supreme Court that the ministerial exception did not apply.  The proportion 
of the teacher’s working hours allocated to secular duties (being the majority, 
aside from 45 minutes of each working day which was allocated to religious 
duties) was also relevant but was to be considered in the mix with all of the 
other facts, the religious functions of the post and that the teacher had a role 
in, ‘conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission’.52   
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The Supreme Court’s judgment has been assessed as providing ‘only limited 
guidance’ on how the courts should determine in future which employees are 
covered by the exception.53  Whilst Justice Thomas considered that a religious 
group’s ‘good faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister’ should 
prevail,54 Justices Alito and Kagan suggested the functions of the person in 
question should be the key focus and that the ministerial exception should be 
triggered when the employee, ‘leads a religious organization, conducts worship 
services or important religious ceremonies or rituals or serves as a messenger or 
teacher of its faith’.55  What is clear is that whichever Justice’s approach is 
followed, the ministerial exception will apply to a much wider range of 
employment positions than the organised religion exception in the EA.56  
Whereas the explanatory notes to the EA provide that the organised religion 
exception ‘will cover a very narrow range of employment: ministers of religion 
and a small number of lay posts, including those that exist to promote and 
represent religion’,57 the ministerial exception has been applied by the courts to 
prevent discrimination complaints being brought by clergy and a wide variety of 
lay employees undertaking similar roles against both churches and other 
religious organisations, such as universities.   
It is not only the range of personnel covered by the ministerial exception which 
renders its scope wider than the organised religion exception.  The organised 
religion exception, it will be recalled, permits discrimination on only a few 
prescribed grounds, and only where it is necessary for compliance with religious 
doctrine or to avoid conflict with a significant number of the religion’s 
followers.  The effect of the ministerial exception, by contrast, is to permit 
discrimination on any ground whether or not required by religious doctrine or 
the religion’s membership.  Indeed, in Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the ministerial exception would apply even in circumstances 
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where no religious basis for the employer’s actions is evidenced.58  The absence 
of any qualifying conditions for application of the ministerial exception (other 
than that the employee is deemed to be a ‘minister’) not only renders its scope 
wide, but reduces the uncertainty surrounding its application in the courts.  
Once it has been established that the claim of discrimination is by a minister, no 
further enquiry by the court is permissible.  
 Certainty at the expense of fairness and equality?   
There is little doubt that consideration of the religious entity exemption, 
religious education exemption and ministerial exception in the USA highlights 
the relatively narrow parameters of the employment exceptions in the EA, the 
E(Sc)A and the SSFA.59  Of more significance for this thesis, however, is the 
attention called by the analysis of the model in the USA to the ambiguity which 
surrounds the application and interpretation of the employment exceptions 
which are contained in the EA.  The greater certainty in the scope and 
application of the Title VII exemptions and the ministerial exception can be 
attributed in part to the larger and more developed jurisprudence of the US 
courts in this area.  However, it is also derived in significant measure from the 
nature of the Title VII exemptions and the ministerial exception, which does not 
involve the judiciary in the same ‘searching case-by-case analysis’60 as the EA 
equivalents which ask the courts to determine questions of occupational need, 
proportionality, doctrinal compliance and/or membership conflict.   
Esau, who has written on the Canadian approach to religious autonomy in 
employment, is an advocate for the USA model, which he considers to be more 
protective of religious freedom than an approach which asks whether religion or 
                                         
58 Per Chief Justice Roberts in Hosanna-Tabor (ch 4, n 49) 709, ‘The purpose of the exception is 
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another protected characteristic is a bona fide occupational requirement.  He is 
particularly critical of the use in some of Canada’s provinces of exceptions for 
bona fide occupational requirements and argues that the scope they allow for 
the judiciary’s own values to influence its determinations is unacceptably wide.61  
Gillian Demeyere provides a convincing rebuttal to Esau’s claim and argues in 
favour of exceptions to equality in employment which require the employer to 
demonstrate that any discriminatory criterion amounts to an occupational 
requirement that is reasonably necessary.62  Demeyere argues persuasively that 
exceptions of this kind do not require the judiciary to make a value judgment as 
to whether equality or freedom of religion should prevail in any case.  Nor do 
they allow the judiciary discretion as to whether to apply an ‘organic’ or 
instrumental’ interpretation of the employer’s needs.  Instead, they ask simply 
that the judiciary considers ‘the requirements of the contract of employment’.  63  
The judiciary will, moreover, be led to an ‘organic’ rather than ‘instrumental’ 
interpretation of these requirements, if it can demonstrate that this is 
necessitated by the contract of employment.64     
Demeyere’s view is to be preferred.  Although it is true that the model of 
exemptions and exceptions in the USA affords employers and advisers a greater 
level of certainty, this, I argue, comes at far too great a sacrifice.  The Title VII 
exemptions and the ministerial exception fail to ensure sufficient regard for the 
individual interest in not suffering discrimination on grounds of personal 
characteristics.  They excuse discrimination whether or not religion (or another 
personal characteristic) is an occupational requirement.  No recognition, 
meanwhile, is given to the harm caused by discrimination, and no attempt is 
made to balance this with the needs of the religious employer.  This affords 
insufficient regard for the competing equality interests affected by any exercise 
of an exemption or exception to the principle of equality in employment and for 
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the significant harm which discrimination on grounds of a personal characteristic 
can inflict.65  Clarity is (and should not be) at the expense of fairness and 
equality.  To an extent, some ambiguity and uncertainty in the exceptions to 
equality must be accepted as inevitable to accommodate the interplay of 
competing interests in the myriad of factual scenarios in which religious 
autonomy issues arise.  Still, the level of uncertainty can be managed to 
tolerable levels if there is a shared and clear understanding of the principle 
which underlies any exceptions.  It is only then, that employers and advisers will 
be able to more easily predict judicial outcomes.  To assist in the quest for 
uncovering principles to underpin the exceptions in the EA, the E(Sc)A and the 
SSFA, I will now examine the principled basis for the approach taken in the USA 
to provide a basis for comparison.   
4.3 Principle underpinning the USA model  
 Church - state relations and positive religious freedom  
It was intended, since at least the end of the 18th century, that the 
constitutional relationship between church and state in the USA would entail a 
separation between the two institutions.  An early proponent of the concept of 
separation, James Madison, was initially influential in securing laws in Virginia in 
the late 18th century which sought to guarantee religious freedom and forbid its 
establishment in the state.66  Madison’s subsequent efforts to achieve the 
separation of church and state nationwide were thereafter manifested in the 
first amendment to the federal constitution of 1787 which came into effect in 
1791.  Providing inter alia that, ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’, the religion 
clauses of the first amendment have famously been described by Thomas 
                                         
65 See chapter 10 at 10.3.1.   
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Jefferson as, ‘building a wall of separation between Church & State’.67  The last 
state in the USA to disestablish its state church was Massachusetts in 1833, 
although it was not until almost a hundred years later (in 1940 and 1947) that 
individual states became bound by the first amendment, through the doctrine of 
incorporation.68  Until then, the application of the first amendment was 
restricted to federal government.     
It has been claimed that a historical perspective is required to determine the 
original meaning of the religion clauses.69  A commonly held view is that Madison 
was influenced by his experiences in Virginia70 where he disagreed with the 
historical practice of taxing individuals’ income to pay for the churches.  One 
view is that the religion clauses were intended to improve individual religious 
freedom and that their purpose was to create an equal playing field where 
individuals were not obstructed from pursuing their chosen religion and to 
prevent religious conflict.71  The first amendment has been described as marking 
the end of a period of religious tolerance in the USA and the beginning of a 
period of positive religious freedom:  
Between article VI and the religion clauses, the national government 
put the capstone on the movement that had become more and more 
evident on this side of the Atlantic. This movement began with the 
religious intolerance that clearly marked the beginnings of 
government in New England, continued with the consistently 
expanding religious tolerance for nonmajority sects that marked later 
colonial and state governments, and culminated in the right to 
religious freedom embodied in the first amendment.72 
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Remarkably, such a turning point did not, as Russell Sandberg claims, occur in 
the UK until over two hundred years later.73  Positive religious freedom in the 
USA, at least as an ideal recognised by law, therefore, could be said to date at 
least from the date the first amendment to the United States constitution in 
1791 came into effect.  Even prior to this, most states in the USA provided for 
religious freedom in some form in their bills of rights, albeit often with 
discriminatory coverage: some only providing the benefit to Protestants, for 
example, whilst others excluded certain religious groups, such as the Quakers.74   
 Impact of the religion clauses on the Title VII exemptions 
and the ministerial exception 
The religion clauses consist of ‘establishment’ and ‘free exercise’ principles.  
The establishment principle (‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion’) has frequently been interpreted more widely than 
conveying only a prohibition on the existence of an ‘established’ or ‘state’ 
church.  Instead the courts have interpreted the establishment clause as a 
safeguard against excessive ‘entanglement’ by the state in the affairs of 
religion.75  Modern interpretations of the establishment principle capture the 
idea that the state must remain neutral towards religion:76 it must not promote 
one religion over another or indeed any religion over none.77  Broadly, the free 
exercise principle (‘Congress shall make no law respecting … religion or the free 
exercise thereof’) was initially deemed to protect individuals against actions by 
the state which impacted negatively on their ability to follow their religious 
conscience.  More recent jurisprudence has interpreted the clause somewhat 
more tightly as expressing a duty on the state not to discriminate on grounds of 
religion.78   
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There is compelling evidence that the approach in the USA to religious autonomy 
in employment has been heavily influenced by the constitutional norm of 
‘separation’ between church and state, which, at least historically, prevailed in 
the USA.  Firstly, the ministerial exception, which prevents the courts from 
adjudicating on discrimination complaints brought by ministers, is frequently 
cited by the courts and academics as necessitated by the first amendment.79  In 
McClure, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit grounded its decision that 
Title VII did not apply to the employment relationship between the Salvation 
Army and one of its ministers in the notion of church autonomy and the 
requirements of the first amendment.  Delivering the judgment, Circuit Judge 
Coleman opined: 
Moreover, in addition to injecting the State into substantive 
ecclesiastical matters, an investigation and review of such matters of 
church administration and government as a minister's salary, his place 
of assignment and his duty, which involve a person at the heart of any 
religious organization, could only produce by its coercive effect the 
very opposite of that separation of church and State contemplated by 
the First Amendment. …  
We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the 
employment relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs 
McClure, a church and its minister would result in an encroachment by 
the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to 
enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment.80 
Since McClure, the courts have continued in the most part to cite the religion 
clauses (or one or other of them) to justify the application of the ministerial 
exception to the employment relationship between ministers and their 
employers.81  In Hosanna-Tabor, the first and only case on the ministerial 
exception to reach the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts 
asserted that the ministerial exception was required by the free exercise and 
establishment principles:  
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By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free 
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its 
own faith and mission through its appointments.   
According the state the power to determine which individuals will 
minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.82 
The first amendment was also influential in the crafting of the religious entity 
exemption.  In Little the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had to determine 
whether a Protestant teacher could be dismissed by her Catholic employer for 
conduct which did not accord to the teachings of the Catholic church.  The court 
surveyed the legislative history of the religious entity exemption and recorded 
that congress had, ‘recognized that religious groups have a constitutionally 
protected interest in applying religious criteria to at least some of their 
employees’.83  In other words, the legislative intention behind the religious 
entity exemption was to recognise the rights of religious organisations which 
were guaranteed by the religion clauses.84  The court further assessed that 
applying Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion to the 
employer in the case before it would, ‘be constitutionally suspect because it 
would arguably violate both the free exercise clause and the establishment 
clause of the first amendment’.85  Similar sentiments have been expressed by the 
judiciary in other cases which have considered the Title VII religious exemptions.  
In its decision in Amos, the United States Supreme Court held that permitting 
religious preference in appointments for roles consisting solely of secular 
activities was not a violation of the establishment clause.  According to the 
court, rather than involving an excessive entanglement of church and state, the 
religious entity exemption, ‘effects a more complete separation of the two’.86   
It is difficult to dispute that in creating and interpreting the religious entity 
exemption and the ministerial exception, Congress and the judiciary have been 
heavily influenced by the constitutional relationship between church and state in 
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the USA as manifested in the religion clauses of the first amendment, and the 
ideal of religious freedom on which they are based.87  That said, not everyone 
agrees that the ministerial exception remains justified by modern 
interpretations of the free exercise and establishment principles.88    
In the first significant cases on the free exercise principle, it was accepted that 
a ‘compelling state interest’ was required to impose a burden on the exercise of 
religion.89  There was held to be no such interest in requiring Amish children to 
attend school once they had completed ‘8th grade’, or in preventing a Seventh-
day Adventist, who was dismissed from her employment for refusing to work a 
Saturday, from accessing unemployment benefits.  The free exercise clause of 
the first amendment was therefore deemed in the absence of a ‘compelling 
state reason’ to burden religion, to place a positive duty on the state to grant 
religious exceptions to rules of otherwise general applicability.  Since 
Employment Division v Smith,90 however, more recent jurisprudence on the free 
exercise clause has held that there should be no presumption that laws which 
are neutral in application breach the free exercise clause on account of their 
having an adverse effect on religious exercise.91  Given that the free exercise 
principle is no longer interpreted by the courts as entailing any positive duty to 
exempt religious individuals or organisations from laws of general applicability92 
and instead only protects religion against laws which are discriminatory,93 it has 
been argued that it cannot be a convincing account of the ministerial 
exception.94     
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92 In Zoller (ch 4, n 66) 585 Zoller remarks, ‘The Constitution does not obligate the state or its 
subdivisions either to grant these dispensations or religious exemptions from its laws or to 
establish accommodations to facilitate religious exercise.’     
93 See Corbin (ch 4, n 78) 1995. 
94 ibid 1998-2004.   
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The establishment principle has also been criticised for providing a weak basis 
for the ministerial exception.  Commonly the ministerial exception was justified 
by the establishment principle because it avoided excessive entanglement by the 
state in the doctrinal and spiritual affairs of religious organisations.  Yet doubts 
have been expressed as to whether such entanglement would actually ensue 
were courts to adjudicate in the discrimination complaints of ministers.95  In the 
case of Rosati v Toledo, Ohio Catholic Diocese96 a nun was unable to pursue a 
disability discrimination complaint after she was dismissed from her religious 
order following a diagnosis of breast cancer.  The religious order argued 
successfully that the dismissal concerned the selection or rejection of ministerial 
personnel and that the first amendment prevented the courts from hearing the 
nun’s complaint.  Unsurprisingly, this case has attracted some criticism97 and it 
is difficult to see what ‘entanglement’ in doctrinal and spiritual matters would 
have ensued had the court investigated whether the nun’s ill health influenced 
the religious order’s decision to dismiss.  If it had carried out such an 
investigation and found in the affirmative, then it would still have been open to 
the religious order to assert that its doctrinal or spiritual teachings prevented it 
from continuing to engage a nun in ill-health.  It is surely only if the courts were 
then to question or dispute such teachings, that a question of ‘excessive 
entanglement’ would arise.   
The reluctance of the courts to consider, in the application of the ministerial 
exception, whether there is a religious basis for the discrimination could also be 
criticised for being inconsistent with a proper interpretation of the religion 
clauses.  If an employer’s decision is not made on religious grounds, it is difficult 
to fathom how judicial scrutiny of the decision can jeopardise the free exercise 
and establishment principles.  Even the early church autonomy cases recognised 
the limits of a first amendment argument to shield the decisions of church 
bodies from court scrutiny, acknowledging that it was only effective where the 
                                         
95 ibid 2004-26.  
96 Rosati v Toledo, Ohio Catholic Diocese 233 FSupp 2d 917 (District ND Ohio 2002). 
97 See, for example, Raymond F Gregory, Encountering Religion in the Workplace: The Legal 
Rights and Responsibilities of Workers and Employers (Cornell University Press 2011) 170-76.    
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subject matter of the dispute was, ‘strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its 
character’.98   
Persuasive arguments have also been made that the jurisprudence of the first 
amendment no longer reflects a strict concept of ‘separation-ism’ where the 
church and state operate in separate spheres without one intruding on the 
other.  In the last few decades a shift in the jurisprudence of the first 
amendment towards ‘neutrality’ and the idea that the state should treat all 
religions equally and on an equal basis with non-religion has been detected.99  
This shift is reflected in the more limited interpretation applied to the free 
exercise clause by Smith, as well as in decisions which relax the prohibitions of 
state aid to religious organisations.100  It has been argued that the ministerial 
exception, particularly, cannot be sustained in current form in this age of 
neutrality.101 
Although convincing arguments have been made by academics that present 
interpretations of the free exercise and establishment principles no longer 
support the ministerial exception in the USA, it must be remembered that the 
religion clauses of the first amendment were instrumental in the crafting of the 
ministerial exception as well as the Title VII exemptions and continue to be used 
by the courts and some academics to justify their application in employment 
cases.  The church and state relationship, as it is expressed in the first 
amendment, and the notion of positive religious freedom which the first 
amendment embodies, have historically been prominent driving forces in the law 
relating to religious autonomy in employment.  Though disagreement among 
academics, on whether a modern interpretation of the first amendment provides 
sufficient justification for its approach to religious autonomy in employment, is 
likely to continue, the relationship between church and state, as it evolves and 
is re-interpreted in the USA, can, I argue, nevertheless provide the legislature 
                                         
98 Watson (ch 4, n 37) 733. 
99 Corbin (ch 4, n 78) 1990-2004.  
100 See ibid 1992-94.  See also comment in Ravitch (ch 4, n 66) 163-64 on the shift in approach to 
state aid based on principles of formal neutrality.   
101 Corbin (ch 4, n 78) 1998-2001 and 2004-28. 
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and judiciary with a strong basis for the future principled development of the 
law in this area.       
4.4 Conclusion  
The Title VII exemptions and the ministerial exception offer religious employers 
considerably more latitude to discriminate in their employment practices than 
the British employment exceptions contained in the EA, the E(Sc)A and the SSFA.  
The lack of judicial authority on these latter exceptions, moreover, is 
highlighted by the more developed US jurisprudence in this area.  Whereas the 
Title VII exemptions and the ministerial exception permit less scope than the 
employment exceptions in the EA for ambiguity and uncertainty in their 
interpretation and application, I argued in this chapter that they fail to afford 
sufficient regard for the equality interests affected by their exercise and the 
harm inflicted by discrimination on grounds of a personal characteristic.  If the 
competing interests which are affected by an exercise of the employment 
exceptions are to be accommodated, some measure of ambiguity or uncertainty 
in their application is, I argued, desirable.  Still, the judgment exercised by 
decision-makers can and should be applied in accordance with clear principles.  
Church and state relations, as well as positive religious freedom in the USA 
inspired the introduction of the Title VII exemptions and ministerial exception 
and offer, I argued, relatively clear principles to guide their future 
development.  The extent to which constitutional church and state relations and 
positive religious freedom influenced the introduction of the employment 
exceptions in the EA, the E(Sc)A and the SSFA, will be considered in chapter 6.  
Before this, consideration will be given in chapter 5 to the model of exemptions 
and exceptions to equality in employment adopted by the Canadian provinces 
and territories.   
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5 Religious group autonomy in employment: 
Canada  
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider the Canadian approach to religious autonomy in 
employment because it underlines and highlights important aspects pertaining to 
the nature and scope of the employment exceptions in Great Britain and assists 
with the search for underlying principle in the British case.   
Despite different approaches being taken by the Canadian provinces and 
territories, I argue that there is, still, commonality.  In determining cases under 
each approach, the judiciary has, in the past, considered the nature of the 
organisation (including its purpose and mission) and/or the context in which the 
employment is carried out, to be significant.  This, I argue, calls particular 
attention to the functional approach advanced by certain policy makers to 
interpretation of the employment exceptions in the EA.1 
I examine in the final section of this chapter, the historical and constitutional 
influences in Canada on religious autonomy in employment.  The influence of 
church and state relations and positive religious freedom, I argue, has been less 
pronounced in Canada than in the USA.  Freedom of association, I suggest, has 
been more influential, and offers a principled basis for future development of 
the law in this area.  The extent to which freedom of association influenced the 
introduction of the British employment exceptions will be considered in the next 
chapter. 
5.2 Canadian models of exceptions / exemptions to 
equality in employment for religious employers 
 Overview of the legislative framework  
All employers in Canada are prohibited from unlawful discrimination in 
employment but the precise scope of the prohibition and any exception or 
exemption from it varies depending on the type of employer and/or the 
                                         
1 See chapter 3 at 3.4.   
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jurisdiction.  Federal government, first nations governments and employers 
regulated by federal Government (banks, for example), are required to comply 
with the provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act, passed by Parliament in 
1977.2  The employment equality protections available in all other workplaces 
are governed by the human rights legislation of the province or territory in which 
the workplace is situated.  There are, therefore, as many as fourteen human 
rights acts or codes prohibiting discrimination in employment in Canada: one 
federal statute, together with one human rights statute for each of Canada’s ten 
provinces and three territories.   
Given that religious employers in Canada are unlikely to be federally regulated, 
an examination of the provincial and territorial legislation is crucial to an 
understanding of the nature and scope of religious autonomy in Canada.  All of 
the provincial and territorial legislation provides that it is unlawful to 
discriminate in employment on prohibited grounds, which in each case includes 
religion (and/or religious beliefs, creed), as well as sex and sexual orientation.  
There is, however, variance in the nature and extent of exceptions or 
exemptions to this rule of general applicability for religious employers. 
Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify three different approaches taken by 
the provinces and territories.3  In the first approach, adopted by three of the 
provinces (Alberta, New Brunswick and Manitoba) and by the federal legislation, 
there is no special exception to the principle of equality in employment for 
religious employers: if religious employers want to discriminate in their 
employment practices they must rely instead on the general exception from the 
prohibition of discrimination for bona fide occupational requirements, available 
to all employers.  The second approach, which is adopted by five of the 
provinces (Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and 
Ontario), is to have a tailored exception for certain (including religious) 
organisations permitting discrimination when there is a bona fide occupational 
requirement.  The third approach is taken by the remaining two provinces and 
                                         
2 Canadian Human Rights Act RSC, 1985, c H-6. 
3 This tripartite classification is also adopted by Alvin Esau in Alvin Esau, '"Islands of Exclusivity": 
Religious Organisations and Employment Discrimination' (1999-2000) 33 UBC LawRev 719 and 
by Gillian Demeyere in Gillian Demeyere, 'Discrimination in Employment by Religious 
Organizations: Exemptions, Defences, and the Lockean Conception of Toleration' (2009-2010) 
15 CanLab&EmpLJ 435.      
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the three territories.  Religious organisations (as defined in the relevant 
legislation) are exempted from the ambit of discrimination legislation, either in 
their entirety (as in Yukon), or more narrowly in circumstances where 
discrimination is solely related to the special objects of the organisation (as in 
Northwest Territories, Nunavut), justified by the nature of the organisation (as 
in Quebec), or restricted to preferring employees of the same group as those 
whose interests and welfare the organisation exists to promote (as in British 
Columbia).  Each of these three approaches will be examined in more detail 
below.  
 General exception: Federal, Alberta, New Brunswick, 
Manitoba  
Section 14(1) of the Manitoba Human Rights Code4 is typical of the provisions 
contained in the federal legislation5 and in the human rights legislation of New 
Brunswick6 and Alberta.7  It provides that: 
No person shall discriminate with respect to any aspect of an 
employment or occupation, unless the discrimination is based upon 
bona fide and reasonable requirements or qualifications for the 
employment or occupation. 
In the case of Schroen v Steinbach Bible College,8 a Manitoba Board of 
Adjudication considered the extent to which this provision permitted a 
Mennonite Bible College to withdraw an offer of employment on grounds that 
                                         
4 The Human Rights Code CCSM c H175. 
5 Canadian Human Rights Act RSC, 1985, c H-6, s 15(1)(a)  ‘It is not a discriminatory practice if (a) 
any refusal, exclusion, expulsion, suspension, limitation, specification or preference in relation 
to any employment is established by an employer to be based on a bona fide occupational 
requirement.’   
6 Human Rights Act, RSNB 1973, c H-11, s 4(5) ‘Despite subsections (1), (2) (3) and (4), a 
limitation, specification or preference on the basis of race, colour, religion, national origin, 
ancestry, place of origin, age, physical disability, mental disability, marital status, sexual 
orientation, sex, social condition or political belief or activity shall be permitted if the limitation, 
specification or preference is based on a bona fide occupational qualification as determined by 
the Commission.’    
7 Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, section 7(3) ‘Subsection (1) does not apply with respect 
to a refusal, limitation, specification or preference based on a bona fide occupational 
requirement.’  In addition, s11 provides that, ‘A contravention of this Act shall be deemed not to 
have occurred if the person who is alleged to have contravened the Act shows that the alleged 
contravention was reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.’       
8 Schroen v Steinbach Bible College 1999 MHRBAD No2, 1999 Carswell Man 634 (WL Intl) (cited 
to CarswellMan). 
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the successful applicant was, unbeknown to the employer at the time the offer 
was made, a Mormon.  The complainant in that case, Esther Schroen, was of 
Mennonite ancestry and formerly of Mennonite faith but had converted to the 
Mormon faith by the time she was offered the position of accounting clerk for 
the college.  She did not disclose her faith at interview, and signed her 
agreement on request to the college’s ‘Statement of Faith’ notwithstanding its 
content contradicted her Mormon faith and beliefs.  The college subsequently 
discovered that Ms Schroen was affiliated to the Mormon faith and withdrew its 
offer of employment.  Ms Schroen complained that this constituted 
discrimination on the grounds of religion, contrary to Manitoba’s Human Rights 
Code.  Finding in the affirmative, the Board of Adjudication then considered 
whether the discrimination was based on a bona fide and reasonable 
requirement or qualification for the employment.  The Board of Adjudication 
stated that this involved two considerations: firstly, whether there was a bona 
fide requirement and, secondly, whether the discrimination was based on 
reasonable requirements or qualifications for the employment.   
As to the first consideration, reference was made by the Board of Adjudication 
to the statement of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario Human Rights 
Commission v Etobicoke:9 
To be a bona fide occupational qualification and requirement a 
limitation … must be imposed honestly, in good faith, and in the 
sincerely held belief that such limitation is imposed in the interests of 
the adequate performance of the work involved with all reasonable 
dispatch, safety and economy, and not for ulterior or extraneous 
reasons aimed at objectives which could defeat the Purpose of The 
Code.10 
Classifying this part of the test as the subjective element, the Board of 
Adjudication found it was met11 and turned its attention to the second part of 
the test which, on the authority of Etobicoke, it described as objective.  Noting 
                                         
9 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Etobicoke [1982] 1 SCR 202 (CanLII), (1982) 132 DLR (3d) 
14 (Etobicoke cited to SCR) 
10 ibid [208]. 
11 Schroen (ch 5, n 8) [50].   
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that the ‘nature of the employment’ needed to be considered, the Board 
observed that: 
The nature of the employment concerned in this case has to be 
considered not only with the specific job duties, but also 
consideration must be given to allow a religious group to achieve its 
religious objectives. … How the job or employment relates to the 
overall functioning of the institution where the job is performed must 
be considered.  This does not mean that one religious faith is right or 
wrong.  However, is it’s goals and objectives of such a paramount 
consideration that discrimination is necessary to fulfil these goals and 
objectives?  As well, is the discrimination a bona fide and reasonable 
requirement for the employment or Occupation?  12 
It is clear that the Board of Adjudication in this case was, in Esau’s terms, 
advocating an ‘organic’ interpretation of the job requirement, rather than an 
‘instrumental’ one.13  The functions to be performed in the accounting clerk post 
were not to be separated from the context in which they were carried out, 
which included the culture of the employing college and its religious objectives.  
Although the accounting clerk’s job duties were to include ‘technical’ functions, 
such as payroll, receipting and maintaining office supplies, it was understood 
that all employees, including support staff, ‘share in a faithful way with students 
espousing the Christian faith’.14  In the words of the Board of Adjudication: 
I find the mechanical, technical and simplistically described job 
function duties of the accounting clerk at SBC could not be separated 
from the religious environment and the atmosphere of the Christian 
understanding and rationale and feeling that lies at the very heart and 
root of all the functions, activities and programs at SBC.15   
The Board therefore concluded that the requirement for the accounting clerk to 
be of the Mennonite faith was a bona fide and reasonable requirement or 
qualification.  
                                         
12 ibid [53]. 
13 Esau observes that ‘The adjudicator in this case recognized the organic nature of the workplace 
as context, but another adjudicator might have come to a different conclusion by separating the 
job itself into secular cores and religious peripherals.’  Esau, '”Islands of Exclusivity”’ (ch 5, n 3) 
775.     
14 Schroen (ch 5, n 8) [54]. 
15 ibid [55]. 
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Although Manitoba’s Human Rights Code does not contain a specific exception 
for religious employers, it is apparent from the decision in Schroen that the 
religious ethos of the employer and the religious context in which work is 
performed is nonetheless significant in the determination of whether religion is a 
bona fide occupational requirement for the purposes of the general exception 
which is available to all employers.   
 Religious exception: Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, Ontario 
Five of Canada’s provinces include in their human rights legislation tailored 
exceptions on which certain organisations, including religious organisations, can 
rely.16  Although there are important variations among these exceptions in both 
the type of religious organisation to which they apply and the extent of the 
discrimination permitted, all of the provinces require that discrimination is 
justified by reference to the nature of the employment.   
The Human Rights Code of Newfoundland and Labrador contains the widest 
exception, providing that the provisions prohibiting discrimination in 
employment will not apply to organisations that are, ‘exclusively religious’ and 
‘not operated for private profit’, where it is, ‘a reasonable and genuine 
qualification because of the nature of the employment’.17  Thus the exception 
applies regardless of the particular objectives of the religious organisation 
(provided these are not-for-profit), and permits discrimination on grounds of any 
protected characteristic. 
Prince Edward Island (“PEI”) and Nova Scotia also permit discrimination by 
exclusively not-for-profit religious organisations where the protected 
characteristic is, ‘a reasonable occupational qualification’.18  To rely on the 
exceptions, however, the organisation must be, ‘operated primarily to foster the 
welfare of a religious … group with respect to persons of the same religion’.19  
                                         
16 In each of these provinces there is also a general exception for bona fide occupational 
requirements, on which any employer may rely. 
17 Human Rights Act, SNL 2010, c H-13.1, s 14(8)(a). 
18 Human Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12, s 6(4)(c); Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989, c 214, s 
6(c)(ii). 
19 ibid.  
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Nova Scotia also provides an exception permitting discrimination on grounds of 
any protected characteristic in respect of employees engaged by an exclusively 
religious organisation to perform religious duties.20 
A narrower approach is taken in Ontario and Saskatchewan.  As in PEI and Nova 
Scotia, the exceptions in these provinces permit exclusively religious not-for-
profit organisations, which are, ‘primarily engaged in serving the interests of 
persons identified by their religion’, to give preference to persons ‘similarly 
identified’ when it is a reasonable and bona fide qualification because of the 
nature of the employment. 21 Whilst this provision will permit discrimination 
because of religion, it can also be relied on to defend discrimination on other 
grounds.   
In the 2010 case of Ontario Human Rights Commission v Christian Horizons 
(referred to hereafter as Heintz),22 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was 
asked to consider the exception for religious organisations in Ontario’s Human 
Rights Code.  The case concerned an appeal against a finding of Ontario’s Human 
Rights Tribunal that Christian Horizons had discriminated against one of its 
employees, Connie Heintz, on grounds of sexual orientation after it discovered 
she was in a same sex relationship, contrary to the lifestyle and morality 
statement which it required its employees to affirm as part of their contracts of 
employment.  Christian Horizons, an Evangelical Christian organisation, 
ministered to individuals with developmental disabilities, through the operation 
of residential homes, as well as camping and day programmes in Ontario.  
Christian Horizons argued before the court that the tribunal had been wrong to 
find that the special exception in Ontario’s Human Rights Code for religious 
organisations was not available to it.  The tribunal had determined that Christian 
Horizons could not rely on the exception because it offered its services to all 
regardless of their religion or religious background, and was not therefore, 
‘primarily engaged in serving the interests of persons identified by their 
                                         
20 Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989, c 214, s 6(c)(iii). 
21 Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-19, s 24(1)(a); Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, RSS 
1979 c S-24.1, s 16(10). 
22 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Christian Horizons 2010 ONSC 2015 (CanLII), (2010) 102 
OR (3d) 267 (Heintz cited to ONSC). 
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religion’.   23  In any event, the tribunal found that Christian Horizons had not 
demonstrated that conformance with the lifestyle and morality statement by not 
participating in same sex relationships was a bona fide occupational 
requirement.24   
The court allowed the appeal in part, overturning the tribunal’s finding that 
Christian Horizons was not, ‘primarily engaged in serving the interests of persons 
identified by their religion’ but agreeing, ultimately, that Christian Horizons had 
not demonstrated that refraining from same sex relationships was a bona fide 
occupational requirement.  In its judgment, the court gave helpful guidance on 
the interpretation of the exception for religious organisations in the Code, 
identifying both subjective and objective elements to the test.   
In delivering its judgment the court made reference to two Supreme Court 
decisions on the religious exemptions contained in British Columbia’s and 
Quebec’s human rights legislation.25  In both of these decisions, the Supreme 
Court had ruled that the purpose of these provisions – and similar provisions in 
the Ontario Human Rights Code - was to protect the right to associate and to 
promote certain types of association, including religion.26  The court also 
referred to the values in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 
(the ‘Charter’), which forms part of Canada’s constitution, as an aid to 
interpretation: freedom of religion was guaranteed by taking into consideration 
the primary purpose of the organisation, whereas equality rights were 
guaranteed by the inclusion of the obligation to demonstrate a bona fide 
occupational requirement.27  The court concluded that in finding that Christian 
Horizons was not, ‘primarily engaged in serving the interests of persons 
identified by their religion’ the tribunal did not, ‘respect the religious character 
of Christian Horizons’ activities and the purpose of s 24(1)(a) as to protect group 
                                         
23 Heintz v Christian Horizons 2008 HRTO 22 (WL Intl), 2008 CLLC 230-017 (Ont HRT) (cited to 
HRTO). 
24 ibid [161]-[202].    
25 Brossard (Town) v Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne) [1988] 2 SCR 279 (CanLII), 
(1988) 53 DLR (4th) 609 (cited to SCR); Caldwell v Stuart [1984] 2 SCR 603 (CanLII), (1985) 15 
DLR (4th) 1 (cited to SCR) discussed in Heintz (ch 5, n 22) [57]-[63]. 
26 Brossard (ch 5, n 25) [100]; Caldwell (ch 5, n 25) 626. 
27 Heintz (ch 5, n 22) [68]-[71]. 
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rights of association’.28  The Tribunal had erred in applying an objective analysis 
to the question of whose interests Christian Horizons served.  In determining 
whether an organisation is of a type which can rely on the exception, the 
purpose of the organisation should be assessed from a subjective perspective.29   
Serving all those in need regardless of their faith background was, for Christian 
Horizons, ‘part of its religious mandate’30 and, as such, it was primarily engaged 
in serving the interests of persons identified by its religion. 
Notwithstanding this, the court agreed with the tribunal’s determination that 
Christian Horizons had failed to demonstrate that conformance with the lifestyle 
and morality statement by not having a same sex relationship was a bona fide 
occupational requirement.  The court identified the two-part test in Etobicoke 
as being relevant for determination of this question and referred to commentary 
by the Supreme Court, ‘that bona fide occupational qualification exceptions in 
human rights legislation should, in principle, be interpreted restrictively since 
they take away rights which otherwise benefit from a liberal interpretation’.31  
Although the subjective element of the Etobicoke case was satisfied, the 
objective element was not: Christian Horizons had not shown that the religious 
conformance requirement was reasonably necessary with reference to the job 
tasks of the employee who was not required actively to promote an evangelical 
lifestyle.32  
A common feature in the general and religious exceptions described above, is 
the stipulation, whether express or implied, that discrimination will only be 
permitted when the protected characteristic is an occupational requirement by 
reference to the nature of the particular employment.  In this regard the first 
two approaches may be likened to the OR and ethos exceptions in the EA. 33 
                                         
28 ibid [73]. 
29 ibid [73]. 
30 ibid [72].   
31 Brossard (ch 5, n 25) [56].   
32 Heintz (ch 5, n 22) [105]-[06]. 
33 For details of the ethos exception and OR exception see ch 3 at 3.3.2 and 3.3.1. 
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 Religious exemption: British Columbia, Quebec, Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, Yukon 
The provinces of British Columbia and Quebec and the three territories provide 
religious groups with the greatest autonomy in employment decisions.  Yukon’s 
human rights legislation offers religious organisations the widest exemption, 
providing that the prohibitions of discrimination do not apply, ‘to the 
employment of a person in any exclusively religious … organisation’.34  Northwest 
Territories and Nunavut permit religious, not-for-profit organisations which 
foster the welfare of a religious group as their main purpose, to give preference 
in employment if it, ‘is solely related to the special objects in respect of which 
the organisation … was established’.35  Quebec similarly permits discrimination if 
it is, ‘justified by the … religious … nature of a non-profit institution’.36  
Meanwhile, British Columbia permits religious, not-for-profit organisations 
which, ‘promote the interests and welfare of an identifiable group or class of 
persons characterised by … religion’ as their main purpose, to grant preference 
to members of the group.37  The Supreme Court was asked to decide what was 
meant by the ‘granting of a preference to members of the group’ in Caldwell v 
Stuart,38 a case about a Catholic school’s decision not to renew the teaching 
contract of one of its Catholic teachers because, contrary to the teachings of the 
Catholic church, she married a divorced man in a civil ceremony.  The Supreme 
Court agreed with the Board of Adjudication that the school had not unlawfully 
discriminated against the teacher on grounds of religion or marital status, 
finding that religious conformance was a bona fide occupational requirement but 
that, in any event, the school could rely on the special exemption contained in 
British Columbia’s Human Rights Code for religious organisations.  The 
exemption permitted the school to prefer, ‘Catholic teachers who accept and 
practice the teachings of the Church’.39  Thus the exemption in British Columbia 
                                         
34 Human Rights Act RSY 2002, c 116, s 11(3). 
35 Human Rights Act SNWT 2002, c 18, s 7(5); Human Rights Act, SNu 2003, c 12, s 9(6).  
36 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, RSQ c C-12, s 20.   
37 Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 41.  
38 Caldwell (ch 5, n 25). 
39 ibid 628. 
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can operate to permit discrimination on grounds other than religion, such as 
marital status, as it did in this case.   
In each of these two provinces and three territories, discrimination by religious 
organisations is justified either explicitly or implicitly by the nature of the 
organisation itself, rather than the nature of the particular employment at issue.  
In this regard, the approach resembles more closely the model adopted in the 
USA.  The religious entity exemption in Title VI permits religious discrimination if 
the purpose or character of the institution is ‘primarily religious’.40  The 
rationale for the ministerial exception, meanwhile, derives from the 
constitutionally protected nature of the ‘church’ employer.41       
 Separate denominational schools 
Not unlike the religious exemption approach described above, Canada’s 
treatment of employment in certain denominational schools is linked to their 
special nature or status.  In the negotiations leading to Canadian confederation 
in 1867, concerns were expressed over the educational rights of religious 
minorities.42  To allay these concerns, the Constitution Act 1867 afforded 
denominational schools special protection by providing, inter alia, at section 
93(1) that the provinces must not make any laws relating to education which 
infringed any right or privilege applying to denominational schools at the time of 
confederation.43  Denominational schools which are constitutionally protected by 
the Constitution Act 1867 are termed ‘separate schools’ and exist today in three 
provinces, Ontario, Alberta and Saskatchewan.44  Their constitutional protection 
                                         
40 See chapter 4 at 4.2.2. 
41 See chapter 4 at 4.2.4. 
42 Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont) [1987] 1 SCR 1148 (CanLII) [27]-
[29]; (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 18. 
43 Constitution Act 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3 s 93 provides, ‘In and for each Province the 
Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education, subject and according to the 
following Provisions … (1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or 
Privilege with respect to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in 
the Province at the Union.’   
44 The Constitution Act 1867 does not apply to the three territories which are governed instead by 
federal statutes (the Northwest Territories Act, the Yukon Act and the Nunavut Act).  These 
statutes protect the right of religious minorities to establish separate schools in the territories.    
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is further reinforced in the Charter.45  Section 29 of the Charter provides that 
‘Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or privileges 
guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of denominational, 
separate or dissentient schools.’   
The effect of section 29 of the Charter has been described as prioritising the 
constitutional rights of denominational schools over individual Charter rights.46  
Several cases, meanwhile, have confirmed that the constitutional right is not 
restricted to the establishment of separate schools, but extends to the 
maintenance of their denominational character and the right to dismiss teachers 
for denominational cause.47  It has been held that there is denominational cause 
to dismiss teachers in Catholic schools who have acted contrary to Catholic 
doctrine, by, for example, entering into civil marriages48 or engaging in pre-
marital sexual intercourse.49  In Re Essex County R.C. Sep. Sch. Bd. and Porter, 
Zuber J.A. opined that, ‘Serious departures from denominational standards by a 
teacher cannot be isolated from his or her teaching duties, since within the 
denominational school, religious instruction, influence and example form an 
important part of the education process.’50   
These constitutional rights do not, however, provide unfettered discretion to 
employers of separate schools to discriminate at will.  Rights and privileges will 
only be protected if they relate to maintaining the denominational character of 
the school and education.  In O.E.C.T.A v the Dufferin-Peel Roman Catholic 
Separate School Board,51 the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered that the 
                                         
45 Constitution Act 1982 (UK) (enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK)) c 11 (the 
Charter). 
46  Casagrande v Hinton Roman Catholic Separate School District No 155 (1987) 79 AR 241, 
(1987) DLR (4th) 382, 1987 CarswellAlta 89, [26] (WL Intl) (AltaQB) (cited to CarswellAlta). 
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Sch Bd and Porter (1978) 21 OR (2d) 25, (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 445, 1978 CarswellOnt 1271 (WL 
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48 Re Essex (ch 5, n 47). 
49 Casagrande (ch 5, n 46). 
50 Re Essex (ch 5, n 47) [7]. 
51 The Branch Affiliates (Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association and L'Association des 
Enseignants Franco-Ontariens) Incorporating Secondary Teachers v The Dufferein-Peel Roman 
Catholic Separate School Board, Gail Brent, Roy Filion and Doug Knott (1999) 172 DLR (4th) 
260; 1999 OJ No 1382; 1999 CarswellOnt 1086 (WL Intl) (Ont CA) (OECTA cited to 
CarswellOnt). 
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religious exception in Ontario’s Human Rights Code, which incorporates a bona 
fide occupational requirement defence was consistent with section 93(1) of the 
Constitution Act 1867, providing, ‘an objective means by which to measure the 
extent to which the policy … is necessary to maintain the denominational 
aspect’.52   
The condition that any right or privilege enjoyed by these schools at 
confederation will only be maintained insofar as it is required to safeguard the 
denominational character of the schools is significant.  Although the exceptions 
in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (E(Sc)A) and the School Standards and 
Framework Act 1998 (SSFA) were likely introduced to protect the denominational 
character of certain schools in Britain, there is no stipulation in either piece of 
legislation (whether express or implied) that the exceptions must be exercised 
for this purpose.  The E(Sc)A provides that teachers must be approved as regards 
their religious beliefs and character.  It is doubtful that it is necessary to 
approve of the beliefs and character of all teachers in a school for the 
maintenance of its religious aspect.  Even if it was, the exception in the E(Sc)A 
does not fetter the discretion of the relevant religious body to disapprove of an 
applicant’s beliefs and character for reasons that have no bearing on the 
school’s denominational character.  In the SSFA, meanwhile, preference can be 
given to those teachers who hold religious opinions, attend worship, and give 
religious education and schools can take religious conformance into account in 
decisions on dismissal whether or not it is necessary to do so having regard to 
the school’s religious ethos.53   
 Purpose, ethos and context in Canada’s case law: an 
example to follow?   
It is possible to identify at least one common theme among the approaches 
taken by the Canadian provinces and territories.  There is evidence from some of 
the decided cases that the purpose or objectives of the employer, and/or the 
context or environment in which the work is carried out, are relevant to the 
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judicial determination of whether an exception or exemption should apply in any 
particular case.54   
Thus, in Schroen, a case decided under the general exception approach, the 
Board of Adjudication refused to focus solely on what it described as, ‘the 
mechanical, technical and simplistically described job function duties of the 
accounting clerk’,55 preferring instead to lend significant weight to, ‘the 
religious environment and the atmosphere of the Christian understanding and 
rationale and feeling’ which was seen as being at the ‘heart’ of all that the 
employer did.56     
The importance of acknowledging the true purpose or mission of an employer 
with a religious ethos was also recognised in Heintz, in the court’s finding that 
the primary purpose of the organisation was to be determined from the 
subjective perspective of the employer.57  Ultimately, a bona fide occupational 
requirement was not established in Heintz: there was no requirement in the 
employee’s job function to preach to those in her care on their lifestyle from an 
evangelical Christian perspective and this proved fatal to establishing that 
refraining from same sex relationships was a bona fide occupational 
requirement.58  Whilst it could be argued that the court in Heintz focused on, 
what the Board of Adjudication in Schroen described as, ‘the mechanical, 
technical and simplistically described job function duties’,59 it is relevant that 
                                         
54 Although Iain Benson, who argues for a ‘permeated ethos’ approach to religious employer 
exemptions, argues referring to Gore v The Ottowa Roman Catholic Separate School Board 
(Unreported 7 Dec, 1971) and Heintz (ch 5, n 22) that the judiciary in Canada does not always 
pay sufficient regard to the employer’s ethos.  Iain T Benson 'An Associational Framework for 
the Reconciliation of Competing Rights Claims Involving the Freedom of Religion' 145-57 (DPhil 
thesis, University of the Witwatersrand 2013) available at 
<http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/jspui/handle/10539/14004?mode=full> accessed 28 December 
2017. 
55 Schroen (ch 5, n 8) [55].     
56 ibid [5].  Vickers refers to Schroen in support of her claim that the Canadian courts have been 
willing to recognise an ‘organic’ view of the workplace (Lucy Vickers, Religious Freedom, 
Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (OUP 2016) 205).   
57 Heintz (ch 5, n 22) [72]-[73]. 
58 ibid [105]-[106]. 
59 Schroen (ch 5, n 8) [55].  For example, Alvin Esau is critical of the decision of the human rights 
tribunal in Heintz (ch 5, n 23) (affirmed by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice) that religious 
conformance was not a BFOR.  Esau is of the view that the BFOR leads decision makers to 
take an instrumental view of the workplace.  Alvin Esau, ‘Islands of Exclusivity Revisited: 
Religious Organizations, Employment Discrimination, and Heintz v Christian Horizons’ (2009-
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the religious conformance requirement had no bearing on the employee’s ability 
to perform her role, nor, importantly, on her ability to contribute to the 
religious ethos of her workplace.  Indeed, the court observed in its decision that 
although the employee had a same sex relationship, she contributed to the 
‘Christian environment’60 through participation in prayer, hymn singing and Bible 
reading and was a, ‘follower of Christian Horizons’ ethos in every other way’.61   
Finally, in Caldwell,62 a case under the exemption approach, the ‘special nature’ 
of the denominational school, and the need for teachers to lead by example if 
the school’s objectives were to be met, were central to the court’s decision that 
the discrimination on religious and marital grounds was lawful.  Delivering the 
judgment, McIntyre J explained:    
As has been pointed out, the Catholic school is different from the 
public school.  In additional to the ordinary academic program, a 
religious element which determines the true nature and character of 
the institution is present in the Catholic school.  To carry out the 
purposes of the school, full effect must be given to this aspect of its 
nature and teachers are required to observe and comply with the 
religious standards and to be examples in the manner of their 
behaviour in the school so that students see in practice the 
application of the principles of the Church on a daily basis and 
thereby receive what is called a Catholic education.63    
Factors which are not personal to the employee’s post, such as the employer’s 
purpose or mission, or the character or ethos of the workplace, are also evident 
in the model of exemptions adopted in the USA: it is the religious purpose of the 
employer which engages the religious entity exemption in Title VII, and it is the 
constitutionally protected ‘church’ nature of the employer which is the rationale 
for the ministerial exception.64   
If the mission or purpose of the employer and the culture, environment or ethos 
of the workplace are to be relevant considerations in exceptions to non-
                                         
2010) 15 CanLab&EmpLJ 389, 406-18.  See also criticisms of the appeal court’s decision in 
Heintz (ch 5, n 22) by Iain Benson in Benson (ch 5, n 54) 148-50.    
60 Heintz (ch 5, n 22) [101].  
61 ibid [104].   
62 Caldwell (ch 5, n 25) 
63 ibid 618. 
64 See chapter 4 at 4.2.2 and 4.2.4.   
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discrimination norms, then determining whether the exceptions are engaged in 
any case will be a much more complex and involved task than Harriet Harman 
anticipated when she declared that there would be exceptions in the EA for 
‘religious jobs’ but not for ‘non-religious’ jobs.65  Yet it is a task which, I would 
argue, the British judiciary must undertake.  Consideration of the judiciary’s 
approach in the Canadian cases discussed above calls particular attention to the 
concerns I expressed in chapter 3 that the explanatory notes to the EA and 
several British policy makers advocate a construction of the exceptions in the 
EA, which focuses on the job functions of employees to the exclusion of the 
context in which work is performed.66  As I argued in chapter 3, not only is this 
at odds with the perspective of employment described by certain religious 
stakeholders,67 it is at odds with the statutory wording of the exceptions in the 
EA and the Equal Treatment Directive.  The relevant statutory language in fact 
invites the British judiciary to take the same holistic interpretation of the 
exceptions as has been evidenced in this chapter by the Canadian judiciary.  The 
requirements to have regard for the religious ethos of the employer and the 
context in which work is undertaken cannot be met by focusing solely on 
technical job functions: the real needs of an employer should, rather, also be 
assessed in light of its mission and purpose and the ethos of its workplace.   
Given the lack of clear guidance from policy makers on the manner in which the 
exceptions in the EA ought to be interpreted, there is considerable risk of 
inconsistency in judicial determinations.  I argued in chapter 3 that a better 
understanding of the principle underpinning the exceptions was needed to aid in 
their interpretation.68  In the next part of this chapter, the principles underlying 
the Canadian approach will be explored to offer a basis for examining, in the 
next chapter, the foundational principles (if any) of the British model.     
                                         
65 HC Deb 4 February 2010, vol 505, col 468; see chapter 3 at 3.4.   
66 See chapter 3 at 3.4.   
67 For example, see chapter 3 at 3.4.   
68 See chapter 3 at 3.6. 
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5.3 Principles underpinning the Canadian models 
 Church-state relations and positive religious freedom 
The right to freedom of conscience and religion and the right to be free from 
discrimination on grounds of religion are contained in the Charter69 and are 
stated to be subject, ‘only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.70  Whereas it has been 
shown that the establishment clause (together with the free exercise clause) of 
the United States constitution lies at the heart of its church and state relations,  
the Canadian constitution, by contrast, contains no equivalent clause expressly 
prohibiting the Canadian Parliament from establishing a religion.  That said, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd71 has interpreted the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion in a manner which embodies free 
exercise and establishment ideals, with Chief Justice Dickson opining that, 
‘Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of coercion and 
constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices.’72  Indeed, arguments 
have been made that Canada’s approach to church and state relations is not 
dissimilar to that of the USA.73  Case law from both jurisdictions on 
establishment issues in Sunday closing laws, religious education in public 
schools, prayers at legislative assemblies and church property disputes has been 
reviewed, and striking similarities have been identified.74  It has also been 
claimed that central to the Canadian jurisprudence on freedom of religion is the 
                                         
69 The Charter (ch 5, n 45).  The right to freedom of conscience and religion is referred to in section 
2(a) of the Charter, whereas the right to be free from discrimination on grounds of religion is 
referred to in section 15(1).   
70 ibid, s 1. 
71 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 SCR 295 (CanLII), (1985) 60 AR 161 (Big M Drug Mart cited 
to SCR). 
72 Ibid [95].  See discussion in Lorne Sossin, 'God at Work: Religion in the Workplace and the 
Limits of Pluralism in Canada' (2008-2009) 30 Comparative Labour Law and Policy 485.  Sossin 
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73 Patrick (ch 5, n 72).  
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Zeisberg, 'Religious Freedom in Canada and the United States' (2006) 4 IJCL 244, 254-67.     
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notion of ‘neutrality’ which, it will be recalled from the last chapter, guides 
modern establishment clause jurisprudence in the USA.75 
Though some similarities have been identified between constitutional church 
and state relations in Canada and in the USA, the Canadian experience has been 
described as embodying concepts of ‘co-operation’76 and ‘accommodation’77 
rather than, separation.  That ‘separation’ is not an accurate description of 
church and state relations in Canada is supported by the inclusion of the phrase, 
‘supremacy of God’ in the preamble to the Charter and, more strongly, by the 
protections afforded by the constitution to denominational schooling.  Each of 
these will be considered in turn.   
The Charter, which guarantees the right to freedom of religion and prohibits 
discrimination on religious grounds, contains the following preamble, ‘Whereas 
Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the 
rule of law’.  Though this reference to ‘God’s supremacy’ in a charter which sets 
out fundamental freedoms might suggest the establishment of a theistic 
religion,78 consideration of its use as an aid to interpretation since, militates 
against overstating its significance. Since the Charter came in to effect in 1982, 
the judiciary has made remarkably little use of the reference to ‘supremacy of 
God’ when interpreting the Charter values, with one academic observing that, 
‘the preamble has been all but ignored by the Supreme Court’.79     
Whilst the importance of the inclusion of a reference to the ‘supremacy of God’ 
in the preamble should not be exaggerated, it is interesting to reflect that its 
presence in the United States constitution would be unthinkable.  Christopher 
Eisgruber and Mariah Zeisberg refer to debates on whether the United States 
Pledge of Allegiance should contain the phrase, ‘under God’ and comment that, 
                                         
75 Patrick (ch 5, n 72) 43-48. 
76 Kerry O'Halloran, Religion, Charity and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2014) 329. 
77 Alvin Esau, 'Living by Different Law: Legal Pluralism, Freedom of Religion, and Illiberal Religious 
Groups' in Richard Moon (ed), Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (UBC Press 2009) 111.  
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and Freedoms' (2003) 52 UNBLJ 227, 232.  See review of judicial commentary on the preamble 
in ibid 232-35.     
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unlike in Canada, where the preamble to the constitution has seemingly not 
been polemic, were the USA to make reference to ‘God’ in their constitution it, 
‘would be a continuing source of controversy and agitation’.80  It would seem 
that, ‘separation’, as an ideology for church and state relations, is more 
entrenched in the USA.  
A more striking difference between church and state relations in the USA and 
Canada than the reference to ‘God’ in the Charter is constituted by the funding 
arrangements in each country for denominational schooling.  The ‘close 
relationship between government and church leaders, with direct funding 
arrangements’, has been cited as an example of Canadian church and state 
relations typifying ideals of ‘cooperation’.81  The protections secured at 
confederation and contained in the Constitution Act 1867 for religious groups in 
education ensure that the rights which denominational schools enjoyed before 
confederation would continue.82  These rights included, for example, 
government funding in Ontario for Roman Catholic separate and public schools, 
but not for any private religious schools.83  When the Charter was enacted, it was 
expressly provided that rights under the Charter could not interfere with the 
protections for religious schools under the constitution.84  Government funding of 
religious schools in Canada differs by province: state operated religious schools 
and state funded private religious schools exist, with many provinces giving 
preferential treatment to certain denominations over others.85  Commenting on 
this, Eisgruber and Zeisberg have remarked that, ‘it would be difficult to 
overstate how odd Canada’s arrangements appear to someone steeped in the 
modern U.S. constitutional tradition’.86  The USA has a long history of forbidding 
state support for religious education, although this has been relaxed somewhat 
in recent years.87  The different approaches to funding of religious education are 
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stronger indicators than the presence or absence of a reference to ‘God’ in their 
constitutions, of an approach based on separation being adopted in the USA, and 
an approach based more on ‘co-operation’ being adopted in Canada.88   
Having argued that ideals of separation do not hold the same influence in 
Canada as in the USA, it is necessary to ask whether constitutional philosophies 
based on accommodation or cooperation drive the approach in Canada to 
religious autonomy in employment.  The approach by the Canadian courts to 
disputes with ministers is, according to Esau, illustrative of freedom of religion 
in Canada being, ‘tied up with state law accommodation, not with state law 
recognition of an independent jurisdictional sphere’.89  Whereas in the USA the 
ministerial exception is applied to strictly limit judicial interference in 
employment disputes between ministers and their employers, the Canadian 
courts appear by contrast to be significantly more willing to intervene.90  The 
judicial review of the employment decisions of church bodies has, for example, 
led to damages being awarded to a minister who has been disciplined and to a 
dismissed minister being reinstated to his post.91  Esau, who advocates for a less 
intrusive approach by the state in the affairs of religious organisations, has 
commented that this approach by the judiciary ‘threatens the ability of the 
church to live by its own norms’92 and ‘is a significant danger to freedom of 
religion in Canada’.93   
It cannot be said that philosophies of accommodation and cooperation present in 
Canadian church and state relations have had the same level of influence on the 
direction of the law pertaining to religious autonomy in employment, as 
separation ideals have had in the USA.  On the one hand, it could be said that 
                                         
88 Although note the remark by Jeremy Patrick in Patrick (ch 5, n 72) 49 that, ‘The continued 
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principles of cooperation and accommodation underpin the general and religious 
exception approach used by the majority of provinces and by federal law to 
permit religious employers to discriminate lawfully in employment: employers 
are accommodated to the extent that their actions are necessitated by 
occupational requirements which are reasonably necessary.  Yet, it could also be 
said that principles of accommodation and cooperation justify the wider 
exemptions from the prohibition of discrimination which are available to 
employers in British Columbia, Quebec and the three territories.94  The difficulty 
with relying on such indeterminate concepts as accommodation and co-operation 
as guiding principles for the development of the law on religious autonomy in 
employment, is their susceptibility to different interpretations and thus 
different outcomes.  Cooperation at what level?  Accommodation at what cost?  
A stronger value is required to underpin and guide development of the law on a 
principled basis.  Such a strong value in the USA is found in religious freedom, 
and its manifestation in the first amendment.  There is evidence, however, that 
the influence of religious freedom on Canada’s laws, relating to religious 
autonomy in employment, is somewhat less pronounced.   
In Canada, rights to religious freedom did not start to gain prominence until the 
post-war period.95  Before this time, it has been said that Canadian public law, 
‘overwhelmingly reinforced assimilation or exclusion’, primarily because of its 
historic approach to aboriginal people as well as to francophone communities 
outside of Quebec and its discriminatory treatment of other ‘racialized and 
historically disadvantaged groups’.96  Human rights legislation started to emerge 
at federal and provincial level in the 1960s and 1970s, prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of religion and, in 1982 constitutional status was given to the right to 
religious freedom as one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
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95 Colleen Shepherd remarks that, ‘the emergency of more robust legal protections for human 
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Charter.97  Whilst one academic scholar acknowledges the modern day 
‘celebration of religious, ethnic, and cultural pluralism in Canada’ he argues 
that this narrative of ‘pluralism’ competes with a narrative of ‘exceptionalism’ 
which sees Canada as still being, ‘a conservative English Protestant society that 
tolerated, but never considered as equal, all other minority religious 
communities’.98  Despite its constitutional status, it is contended that the right 
to religious freedom has not had the same influence on the law relating to 
religious autonomy in employment as it has had in the USA.  The constitutional 
protection of certain denominational schools to the exclusion of others supports 
this contention.  It is difficult, after all, to make a strong argument that 
affording constitutional protection for the discriminatory employment practices 
of some, but not all, denominational schools is justified by freedom of religion 
principles.  It is easier to explain the special employment protection which some 
denominational schools enjoy as the product of political compromise.99   
 Freedom of association 
Of more significance to the development of the law relating to religious 
autonomy in employment, it is argued, is another civil liberty: the right to 
freedom of association.  In 1984, and 1988 respectively, the exemptions for 
certain types of employer (including religious employers) from human rights 
legislation in Quebec and British Columbia were considered by the Supreme 
Court in Caldwell100 and Brossard.101  In Caldwell, it will be recalled, the court 
was asked to determine whether a Catholic school could rely on an exemption in 
British Columbia’s Human Rights Code to discriminate on marital and religious 
grounds in refusing to re-hire a teacher who had, contrary to Catholic teachings, 
married a divorced man in a civil ceremony.102  In Brossard, the employer sought 
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to argue that it was a not-for-profit institution of a political nature and could 
therefore rely on an exemption in Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms to defend a claim of discrimination on grounds of civil status which 
arose on the application of its anti-nepotism policy.103  In both cases the 
Supreme Court asserted that the purpose of the exemptions was to protect the 
right to associate and promote certain types of association.  In considering the 
exemption in British Columbia’s Human Rights Code, McIntyre J of the Supreme 
Court in Caldwell quoted these words of Seaton J.A. in the Court of Appeal with 
whom he agreed:104 
This is the only section in the Act that specifically preserves the right 
to associate.  Without it the denominational schools that have always 
been accepted as a right of each denomination in a free society, 
would be eliminated.  In a negative sense s22 is a limitation on the 
rights referred to in other parts of the Code. But in another sense it is 
a protection of the right to associate.  Other sections ban religious 
discrimination; this section permits the promotion of the religion.105        
Beetz J in Brossard expressed a similar view on the exemption in Quebec’s 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms: 
In my view, this branch of s. 20 was designed to promote the 
fundamental right of individuals to freely associate in groups for the 
purpose of expressing particular views or engaging in particular 
pursuits.  Its effect is to establish the primacy of the rights of the 
group over the rights of the individual in specified circumstances.106 
In Brossard, Beetz J acknowledged that other provinces in Canada included 
similar excepting provisions for groups in their human rights legislation and that 
although the precise wording of each differed they all shared the common 
purpose of protecting the fundamental freedom of individuals to associate in a 
                                         
contravening this Act because it is granting a preference to members of the identifiable group or 
class of persons.’   
103 The exemption in s 20 of Quebec’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms then read, ‘A 
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group or organisation for specified purposes.107  It is likely that Beetz J was 
referring to the religious exceptions referred to at 5.2.3 above and to the 
religious exemptions referred to at 5.2.4 above.  His dicta has been cited with 
approval in several subsequent cases108 and it was critical to the decision of the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice to allow in part the appeal by Christian 
Horizons against the decision of the human rights tribunal in the complaint 
brought by Connie Heintz, discussed above.109     In that case, it will be recalled, 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice criticised the human rights tribunal for 
failing to recognise that freedom of association was the underlying policy reason 
for the exception in Ontario’s Human Rights Code.   
The argument that freedom of association is the principle underpinning the 
exceptions and exemptions described in sections 5.2.3 - 5.2.4 above is 
strengthened by an examination of their scope.  This is because none of the 
provinces or territories restrict reliance on the exceptions or exemptions to 
religious employers.  Whereas the exemption in British Columbia’s Human Rights 
Code extends to, ‘charitable, philanthropic, educational, fraternal, religious or 
social’ institutions,110 ‘political,’111 ‘cultural’,112 ‘athletic’,113 ‘racial’,114 
‘sororal’115 and ‘ethnic’116 institutions are among the types of institution included 
in the exceptions or exemptions of other provinces and territories.  Notably, it is 
not any group which can rely on the exceptions or exemptions.  According to 
Beetz J in Brossard, it was the ‘group vocation’ of non-profit institutions and 
institutions dedicated to the well-being of ethnic groups which made them, 
                                         
107 Brossard (ch 5, n 25) [131]-[132]. 
108 See, for example, Parks v Christian Horizons (1991) 16 CHRR D/40, 1991 Carswell Ont 6678, 
[39] (WL Intl) (Ont Bd of Inquiry) and Kostiuk v Toronto Community Housing Corp. 2012 HRTO 
388, [43] (CanLII). 
109 At 5.2.3 above. 
110 Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 41.   
111 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, RSQ c C-12 (Quebec). 
112 Human Rights Act RSY 2002, c 116 (Yukon); Human Rights Act, SNu 2003, c 12 (Nunavut); 
Human Rights Act SNWT 2002, c 18 (Northwest Territories).  
113 Human Rights Act RSY 2002, c 116 (Yukon); Human Rights Act, SNu 2003, c 12 (Nunavut); 
Human Rights Act SNWT 2002, c 18 (Northwest Territories).   
114 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, RSS 1979 c S-24.1(Saskatchewan). 
115 Human Rights Act, SNL 2010, c.H-13.1 (Newfoundland). 
116 Human Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12 (Prince Edward Island); Human Rights Act, RSNS 
1989, c 214 (Nova Scotia). 
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‘deserving of protection’ by Quebec’s exemption.117  When determining which 
‘views’ or ‘pursuits’ are to be safeguarded, Beetz J was of the view that the 
express condition in British Columbia’s Human Rights Code, that the organisation 
must have, ‘as a primary purpose the promotion of the interests and welfare of 
an identifiable group or class of persons characterised by a common race, 
religion, age sex, marital status, political belief, colour, ancestry or place of 
origin’, ought to be implicitly read into the exemption in the Quebec Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.118  In other words, discrimination will not be considered 
acceptable unless it protects the free association of members of an identifiable 
group.  Associational principles further guide Beetz J in carving out the 
boundaries of Quebec’s exemption when he says that the exemption should only 
be available to, ‘groups for which the mere fact of associating results in 
discrimination’.119  According to Beetz J, therefore, there needs to be a, 
‘connection between the brand of discrimination practised and the nature of the 
institution’.120  Here it is of significance that Beetz J advocates that principles of 
freedom of association are utilised to determine both the precise scope and 
application of the exemption.  Freedom of association is both the policy reason 
behind, and the principled basis for interpretation of, the religious exceptions 
and exemptions in Canada.    
As a final observation, although both Caldwell121 and Heintz122 were decided 
after the Charter came into force, and both concerned employers seeking to 
discriminate to protect the religious ethos of their organisations, it is interesting 
to note that in neither decision was the Charter right to freedom of religion 
given much weight by the courts.  It was referred to briefly by the court in 
Heintz as an aid to interpretation,123 but was not expressly considered as such in 
Caldwell.  Freedom of association, not freedom of religion and not 
accommodating and cooperationist philosophies of church and state relations, I 
would argue, is the clear and guiding principle for the Canadian courts and 
                                         
117 Brossard (ch 5, n 25) [125]. 
118 ibid [126]. 
119 ibid [130]. 
120 ibid [130]. 
121 Caldwell (ch 5, n 25) 
122 Heintz (ch 5, n 22) 
123 ibid [68]-[71]. 
5 Religious group autonomy in employment: Canada 128 
legislature in the development of the law relating to religious autonomy in 
employment.124   
5.4 Conclusion  
To gain a greater insight into aspects of the British employment exceptions, I 
have considered some of Canada’s case law on its exceptions and exemptions in 
this chapter.  I have argued that the case law evidences a holistic interpretation 
by the Canadian judiciary: the technical functions of posts are considered in the 
context of their wider purpose, the mission of the employer and/or the ethos or 
character of the workplace.  This is at odds with the narrower, functional 
approach advocated in the explanatory notes to the EA and by some policy 
makers in the UK Parliament.125  The comparative approach in this chapter has 
thus underlined the case for uncovering principles to guide interpretation of the 
employment exceptions in the EA.  Moreover, by highlighting the lack of any 
express or implied condition (as there is in Canada) that the statutory privileges 
afforded to denominational schools by the E(Sc)A and the SSFA are exercised to 
maintain the school’s denominational character, the case for understanding 
better the principle behind the exceptions in these statutes has been 
strengthened.     
As a step to identifying the principles underlying or informing the British 
employment exceptions, I have also considered the norms influential on the US 
and Canadian models.  I have argued that in the USA and Canada, strong 
principles underpin the approach to religious autonomy in employment: church 
and state relations and positive religious freedom in the USA, and freedom of 
association in Canada. Can the same be said for the employment exceptions in 
Britain?  After all, given the ambiguities in the scope of the EA exceptions, the 
uncertainties surrounding the legitimacy of the exceptions in the E(Sc)A and the 
SSFA and the underdeveloped nature of the jurisprudence in this area, they are 
                                         
124 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reserved judgment in two important appeals 
concerning religious associational rights (Trinity Western University et al v Law Society of Upper 
Canada (Ont) (Civil) (By Leave) and Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western 
University (BC) (Civil) (By Leave).  For a summary of the appeals, see Supreme Court of 
Canada, ‘Bulletin of December 1 available at <https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-
csc/bulletins/en/item/5685/index.do> accessed 16 December 2017.  
125 Se ch 3 at 3.4. 
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perhaps most in need of clear guiding principle.  As a next step to uncovering 
such a principle, and building on the analysis carried out in chapters 4 and 5, the 
next chapter will explore the extent to which, in Britain, church and state 
relations, positive religious freedom and freedom of association have been 
influential in the introduction of the employment exceptions.     
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6 Constitutional, historical and political influences 
on religious autonomy in employment 
6.1 Introduction 
I explored the different approaches to religious autonomy in the USA and Canada 
in the preceding two chapters to highlight and underline aspects pertaining to 
the nature and scope of the employment exceptions in Great Britain.  Further, 
and as a first step to identifying or uncovering principles to guide interpretation 
of the British employment exceptions, I considered the norms which have 
influenced the US and Canadian models.   
I argued that the constitutional church and state divide, and the long history of 
positive religious freedom on which the divide is predicated, have influenced the 
approach taken in the USA to religious autonomy in employment.  I suggested 
that in Canada, meanwhile, the principle of freedom of association has been 
more significant.  In this chapter, I will examine what effect, if any, 
constitutional church and state relations, positive religious freedom and freedom 
of association had on the introduction of the employment exceptions in Britain.     
Whereas I argued in the preceding two chapters that the USA and Canada have 
strong principles to guide the legislative and judicial development of their laws 
on religious autonomy in employment, I argue here that the employment 
exceptions in Britain lack a clear foundational principle.  I will explore the 
implications of the absence of clear principle for the rule of law and will argue 
that one such implication is that the legislature and judiciary are rendered 
susceptible to criticism for championing a secular agenda and prioritising certain 
protected characteristics, particularly sexual orientation and sex, over religion.        
6.2 Influence of church and state relations 
There is no single, clear definition of ‘establishment’1 but it has been described 
as applying when, ‘The state singles out a religion (or several denominations or 
sectors of the same religion) for special recognition and support.’2  It has been 
                                         
1 Colin R Munro, 'Does Scotland Have an Established Church?' (1997) 4 EccLJ 639, 639-40.   
2 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 100. 
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said of establishment that ‘With endorsement comes a measure of regulation 
and direction over religious affairs, whether leadership, membership, doctrine 
and so on.’3  The institution of ‘establishment’ is on this reasoning the source of 
both privileges and obligations for the established religion.   
As was discussed in chapter 2, the Church of England is the established church in 
England.4  State support for and control of the Church of England is articulated 
in particular ways through the church’s relationship with the monarch, the 
courts, parliament and the public.5  The Church of Scotland, meanwhile, enjoys 
some elements of establishment in Scotland.  Although state involvement in 
church affairs and church involvement in state affairs is not as pronounced in 
Scotland as it is in England,6 the Church of Scotland has been described as, ‘a 
church legally recognised as the official Church of the state or nation and having 
a special position in law’.7   
In light of the forms of establishment in England and Scotland, the freedom of 
religion which is guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
‘ECHR’) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (the ‘HRA’) cannot, at least in these 
countries, be read to include quite the same strict principle of neutrality 
arguably required by the first amendment to the United States constitution.  
Might, however, the established nature of church and state relations in England 
and Scotland explain, at least in part, the approach in these countries to the law 
relating to religious autonomy in employment?  One common feature of 
establishment, and evident in the form of establishment in both England and 
Scotland, is the privileging of one religion over another.  If the law on religious 
autonomy in employment favoured the established religions, it would be 
plausible to argue that church and state relations have been influential.  Yet the 
Equality Act 2010 (the ‘EA’) provides the same rights to and places the same 
                                         
3 ibid 100.   
4 It was also the established church in Wales until 1920 when it was disestablished by the Welsh 
Church Act 1914.  Northern Ireland has no established church.   
5 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.2.1; see also Ahdar and Leigh (ch 6, n 2) 101. 
6 See discussion in chapter 2 at 2.2.1.   
7 Munro regards this statement which comes from David Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law 
(Clarendon Press 1980), 431 as an appropriate ‘working definition’ of establishment and 
considers that it describes the Church of Scotland’s relationship with the State, in Munro (ch 6, 
n 1) 640 and 645.   
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restrictions on religious employers regardless of their religious affiliation.  The 
faith schools exception in Scotland, meanwhile, could be described as favouring 
the non-established religions in Scotland.  It was, after all, only the 
denominational schools in Scotland (mainly Roman Catholic) which were 
afforded statutory privileges to maintain their religious character when they 
were subsumed within the state sector in 1918.  No similar safeguards were 
provided on the nationalisation of the Church of Scotland schools, although this 
could have been because of their dominance in the education sector at the 
time.8  Although the Church of England is responsible for the largest number of 
schools with a religious character in England,9 and could therefore be described 
as the main beneficiary of the statutory privileges in the School Standards and 
Framework Act 1998 (the ‘SSFA’) on staffing, schools of other denominations 
have always been entitled to access the same provisions in the SSFA on an equal 
basis.  
Although the UK Parliament passed the Church of Scotland Act 1921 which seeks 
in the Declaratory Articles to preserve to the Church of Scotland, ‘the right to 
determine all questions concerning membership and office in the Church’,10 the 
House of Lords has determined that a complaint by a minister of sex 
discrimination against her church employer is not a spiritual matter within the 
church’s jurisdiction and, as such, must be determined by the civil courts.11  
According to Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, the rights and obligations pertaining to 
                                         
8 Brown, Green and Mair remark, ‘Various denominations continue to enjoy statutory rights over 
denominational schools which are not afforded to the Church of Scotland in respect of the non-
denominational schools, following the abolition of the “educational” jurisdiction of Church of 
Scotland presbyteries in 1872.’ In Callum Brown, Thomas Green and Jane Mair, Religion in 
Scots Law: Report of an Audit at the Univesity of Glasgow (Humanist Society Scotland 2016) 
139. 
9 For a breakdown of number of schools see Department for Education, 'Maintained Faith Schools' 
(FOI Release, Department for Education 20 July 2010) 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/maintained-faith-schools/maintained-faith-schools>  
accessed 28 December 2017.  
10 The Church of Scotland Act 1921, s 1 brought in to force the Articles Declaratory which comprise 
the Church of Scotland’s constitution in relation to spiritual matters (Laws of Scotland: Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia (June 1994) vol 3, para 1501).   Art IV of the Articles Declaratory 
provides that the Church of Scotland is to have exclusive jurisdiction over spiritual matters, 
declaring that the Church has the right, ‘subject to no civil authority to legislate, and to 
adjudicate finally, in all matters of doctrine, worship, government, and discipline in the Church, 
including the right to determine all questions concerning membership and office in the church, 
the constitution and membership of its courts, and the mode of election of its office bearers’.   
11 Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland [2005] UKHL 73, 2006 SC (HL) 1. 
6 Constitutional, historical and political influences on religious autonomy in employment 133 
a contract of employment including statutory rights are not ‘spiritual matters’.12  
Any claim that the Declaratory Articles exclude the application of employment 
equality laws to Church of Scotland employees seems doomed to fail.   
There is no compelling evidence that religious employers affiliated with the 
established religions in Britain are treated favourably in relation to religious 
autonomy in employment.  Another effect of establishment, however, is the 
involvement of the state in church affairs.  It has been shown that the UK 
legislature is more willing than the legislature in the USA to regulate the 
employment relationships in religious organisations.  This begs the question, 
whether Britain’s establishment tradition is responsible, at least in part, for a 
more interventionist approach.  In 1802 when Thomas Jefferson referred to the 
‘wall of separation’ between church and state in the USA, the established 
churches in England and Wales and in Scotland continued to be treated specially 
by the state,13 albeit by the early decades of the 20th century, both the Church 
of England and the Church of Scotland had grown somewhat more independent.14  
Whilst it is difficult to draw any strong link between church and state 
constitutional relations in Britain and the state’s approach to regulating the 
employment relationships of religious organisations, it is at least possible that 
the close involvement of the state in church affairs which can still be observed 
today15 has been a cultural influence on the development of law which keeps 
religious autonomy in employment matters within strict confines. 
Establishment may have been influential in one further respect.  Julian Rivers, 
who is critical of the limited autonomy religious employers have in the UK,16 has 
criticised the law pertaining to organised religions as being too guided by 
individual rights, with insufficient regard being given to ‘their collective 
                                         
12 ibid [40]. 
13 See Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press 2011) 28-29; and Munro 
(ch 6, n 1), 642-43. 
14 Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 6, n 13) 28-29; see also Munro (ch 6, n 1) 643-44; and Julian 
Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (OUP 2010) 
28-30.   
15 Referring to the Church of England specifically, Russell Sandberg remarks on the historical 
‘entanglement with the State’ and observes that this ‘can still be seen in the “incidents of 
establishment” which continue to apply to the Church of England today’.  Sandberg, Law and 
Religion (ch 6, n 13) 24. 
16 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (ch 6, n 14) 122-37.  
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dimension’.17  One consideration is whether the individual trends which Rivers 
has identified could be traced to protestant theology, which has enjoyed more 
prominence in Britain by virtue of the established nature of the Church of 
Scotland and the Church of England.  One academic has drawn a comparison 
between, what he refers to as the, ‘single, sole self’ of the ‘American Protestant 
World’ and the Catholic/Jewish emphasis on ‘community’.18  It is at least 
plausible that the long history of constitutional establishment of the protestant 
religion in Britain has been responsible for injecting ‘individual protestant’ 
values into law and culture.         
These conclusions on the possible influence of the established nature of church 
and state relations on the law relating to religious autonomy in employment are, 
at best, tentative, failing to provide a strong principled basis for the law in this 
area.  Where constitutional relations may have had a greater impact is in the 
approach by the state to the doctrinal independence of religious communities.  
The British judiciary has shown some unwillingness to interpret religious 
doctrine,19 a matter for which they consider themselves to be unqualified.  This 
disinclination towards interfering in doctrinal affairs was relevant it would seem, 
to the inclusion of the organised religion exception in the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 (the ‘SO Regulations’).  When the Joint 
Committee on Statutory Instruments reported on the draft SO Regulations, it 
commented that the Government decided to insert the organised religion 
exception into the draft regulations on the basis of evidence collected in 
consultation exercises and, ‘the Government’s view that the Regulations should 
not interfere in matters of religious doctrine’.20  Similarly, when the then 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Trade and Industry) (Employment Relations and 
Consumer Affairs), Mr Gerry Sutcliffe, spoke to the draft Regulations in 
committee debate, he claimed the organised religion exception was included 
‘for one reason alone’: the regulations should not interfere with religious 
                                         
17 ibid 318-22.  
18 Thomas C Kohler, 'Religion in the Workplace: Faith, Action, and the Religious Foundations of 
American Employment Law' (2008) 83 ChiKent LRev 975, 978-79.  
19 Russell Sandberg, 'The Right to Discriminate' (2011) 13 EccLJ 157, 177-78. 
20 Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, ‘Twenty-First Report of Session 2002-03’ (House of 
Lords and House of Commons 13 June 2003) para 16.  
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teachings or doctrine and it would be inappropriate for doctrine to be litigated 
in the courts and tribunals.21  According to Sutcliffe: 
If there were no regulation 7(3), tribunals would be drawn into 
considering whether it was right that religious doctrine required 
someone to be straight. We do not believe that European law 
intended to interfere with religious doctrine in that way, and nor do 
we believe that the regulations should do so.22 
Yet judicial reluctance to interfere with religious doctrine and teaching cannot 
fully explain the organised religion exception.  After all, the organised religion 
exception does not only permit employers to apply requirements relating to sex, 
sexual orientation etc. for the purposes of doctrinal compliance.  It also allows 
employers to impose such requirements to avoid conflict with a significant 
number of the religion’s followers. There is no stipulation that the ‘conflict’ 
should relate to any particular religious doctrine or teaching.23  Nor do expressed 
concerns about doctrinal independence explain the ethos and faith schools 
exceptions.24  The rationale for these exceptions is better explained, I would 
argue, by the perceived need to preserve the religious character of the 
employer, or school, than by an interest in safeguarding doctrinal autonomy.25    
6.3 Influence of ‘positive religious freedom’ 
Has religious freedom perhaps had a greater influence on the law pertaining to 
religious autonomy in employment than church and state relations?  Sandberg 
                                         
21 HC Fourth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation (Draft Employment Equality (Religion 
or Belief) Regulations 2003 and Draft Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
2003) 17 June 2003, col 029. 
22 ibid col 048. 
23 Equality Act 2010 (EA), sch 9, para 2.  For comment on the organised religion exception, see 
chapter 3 at 3.3.3. 
24 ibid, sch 9, para 3; Education (Scotland) Act 1980, s 21(2); School Standards and Framework 
Act 1998, ss 58-60, s 124A.  For comment on the ethos exception and the faith schools 
exception see chapter 3 at 3.2.13.3.2.     
25 E.g. in Cabinet Office, ‘Towards Equality and Diversity: Implementing the Employment and Race 
Directives’ (Cabinet Office December 2001) para 13.14 the Government comment, ‘We … 
propose to include in the new legislation a provision based on the wording of Article 4(2) to 
allow organisations which have an ethos based on religion or belief to pursue employment 
policies necessary to ensure the preservation of that ethos.’  See also comment by Baroness 
Blackstone on the draft Equal Treatment Directive, ‘We shall press for amendments to the 
directive to ensure that there is no question of religious organisations being forced to employ 
people who are not members of the relevant faith, because that would dilute the maintenance of 
a distinctive religious ethos.’  HL Deb 30 June 2000, vol 614, c 1238.  
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asserts that, in England, ‘the advent of religious freedom as a positive right did 
not really occur until the twenty-first century’.26  He summarises the history of 
law and religion in England, asserting that for a period before the HRA came into 
force in 2000, there was ‘religious toleration’, rather than any ‘legal right to 
religious freedom’.27  Religious toleration was initially evidenced from the 17th 
century onwards, by the gradual removal of the legal disadvantages suffered by 
those who did not adhere to the teachings of the established church, and 
latterly evidenced in the 20th century by the creation of exceptions on religious 
grounds to certain laws of general applicability as well as by the Race Relations 
Act 1976, which was interpreted by the courts as protecting Sikhs and Jews 
against direct and indirect discrimination.28  International human rights laws, 
particularly the ECHR, were also relevant influences in this phase of ‘religious 
toleration’ but as the right to freedom of religion in article 9 could not be 
enforced directly in the UK courts prior to the HRA, the ECHR had ‘little effect’ 
on laws pertaining to religion.29  The HRA and the right therein to freedom of 
religion which could be enforced in UK domestic courts against public authorities 
was, according to Sandberg, the turning point, marking the beginning of a phase 
of positive religious freedom.30    
Given the relatively recent arrival of positive religious freedom in the UK, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that its influence on the employment exceptions has been 
weak.  Exceptions for religious employers to generally applicable principles of 
non-discrimination were first introduced in 1975 in the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 (the ‘SDA’), an Act which was made in the shadow of the UK joining the 
then European Community in 1973 and signing the Treaty of Rome which 
required that men and women be afforded equal pay at work.  The SDA 
contained an exception in respect of employment for the purposes of organised 
religion which allowed an employer to impose a requirement related to sex if 
necessary for compliance with the doctrines of the religion or so as to avoid 
                                         
26 Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 6, n 13) 36. 
27 ibid 30 (and generally 17-38).   
28 ibid 26-36. 
29 ibid 33. 
30 ibid 36-37.  
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offending the susceptibilities of a significant number of the religion’s followers.31  
It is unlikely that any notion of positive religious freedom influenced the 
inclusion of this exception in the SDA given that such a notion was at best in 
embryonic form in 1975.  Although the SO Regulations were made following the 
HRA coming in to force and in a phase, referred to by some, of ‘positive religious 
freedom’32 the decision to include an exception for organised religion which 
replicates almost in its entirety the form of the exception in the SDA, suggests 
that the guarantees of religious freedom in the HRA were not a driving force in 
the legislature’s crafting of the exception. Indeed, there is a little detailed 
consideration of article 9 of the ECHR or the HRA in Parliamentary debates on 
the exceptions to equalities legislation for religious employers which now appear 
in the EA and only cursory mention of the right to religious freedom in reported 
case law on the exceptions.  Whereas the religious exceptions in the USA have 
their origins in strong guarantees of religious freedom, the ethos and organised 
religion exceptions in the EA have emerged from European equality principles as 
limited derogations.  Their narrow scope is indicative of a view that they should 
be regarded as tolerated exceptions to equality norms, rather than as positive 
religious rights.  Nor can the introduction of the faith schools exceptions be 
attributed to any conscious desire to promote positive religious freedom.  The 
exceptions in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (the ‘E(Sc)A’) and the School 
Standards and Framework Act 1998 (the ‘SSFA’) originate from the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1918 and the Education Act 1902 which transferred 
denominational schools in Scotland and voluntary schools in England and Wales 
to the state sector.  These Acts were, of course, enacted long before the phase, 
described by Sandberg, of positive religious freedom and long before 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief or sexual orientation was 
prohibited.33  The faith schools exception, at least at its inception, may have 
represented a compromise among interested parties in the transfer of voluntary 
                                         
31 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s 19. 
32 Sandberg, Law and Religion (ch 6, n 13) 29.   
33 Education (Scotland) Act 1918, s 18(3) provided that all teachers had to be approved by the 
relevant denominational or church body as to their character and religious beliefs; Education Act 
1902, s 7(7) gives the managers of schools which were maintained but not provided by the local 
education authority the exclusive power (subject to exceptions laid out in the statute) of 
appointing and dismissing teachers.   
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schools to the state sector34 and it is the interest in preserving the religious 
character of their schools which is often cited by religious groups as a defence to 
discrimination in denominational schools.35   
6.4 Influence of freedom of association  
The principle of freedom of association, it would seem, has been afforded even 
less significance in the exceptions model than freedom of religion.  Since at 
least the 1980s, an individualistic frame of reference has dominated the 
employment policies of successive governments, with individual human rights 
and equality claims featuring prominently in the jurisprudence on law and 
religion.36  There is only sparse mention of freedom of association in 
Parliamentary debates and material on the ethos and organised religion 
exceptions.  In a public bill committee debate on proposals to widen the 
employment exceptions, John Mason MP remarked that they offered ‘better’ and 
‘wider’ protection for freedom of association37 whilst Baroness O’Cathain 
observed in a House of Lords debate on the exceptions that, ‘A belief in freedom 
of association demands that, even if we do not share the beliefs of an 
organisation, we must stand up for its liberty to choose its own leaders and 
representatives.’38  The Joint Committee on Human Rights also made only the 
briefest reference to freedom of association in the context of the employment 
exceptions when it reported on the Equality Bill, opining that the proposed 
exceptions achieved an appropriate balance between the right to equality and 
non-discrimination and the rights to freedom of religion or belief and 
                                         
34 Brown, Green and Mair remark that the safeguards contained in the 1918 Act with regard to the 
approval of teachers were among provisions included in the legislation ‘to satisfy both the 
Catholic Church and the trustees of the various Catholic schools in Scotland’.  Brown, Green 
and Mair (ch 6, n 8) 151. 
35 E.g. see comment by William Fittal, then Secretary-General of the General Synod of the Church 
of England in HC PBC (Equality Bill) 9 June 2009, col 78.  
36 Brown, Green and Mair (ch 6, n 8) 354.  According to Brown, Green and Mair, ‘“New” religion is 
the religion of individual human rights and of equality, and in these regards the direction of 
change is towards increased presence. Since the mid-twentieth century, and particularly in the 
last few decades, new rights for individuals have been introduced, designed to ensure that they 
have their religious and other beliefs respected and protected. This is an area where there has 
been considerable legislative reform and where it seems likely we will now see many more 
cases in years to come.’ 
37 HC PBC (Equality Bill) 23 June 2009, col 442 and col 444. 
38 HL Deb 25 January 2010, col 1212.  
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association.39  Little attention is similarly given to freedom of association in case 
law on the exceptions40 and it is doubtful that ideals of freedom of association 
(at least as they are understood nowadays in a human rights context) held much 
influence in the settlements of 1918 and 1902 regarding the transfer of voluntary 
schools to the state sector.   
It was argued in chapter 5 that freedom of association principles were behind 
the application in some of the Canadian provinces of the group employment 
exceptions to different types of organisation, such as political, athletic, ethnic 
and fraternal.  Could the same argument be made about the decision to include, 
within the scope of the ethos exception, organisations with an ethos based on 
philosophical belief?  The only widely publicised case law on the ethos exception 
has concerned employers with (or alleged to have) a religious ethos.41  Further, 
the only example given in the explanatory notes to the EA of the use of the 
ethos exception involves an organisation with a religious ethos.42  It is more 
likely that the extension of the ethos exception to philosophical belief 
organisations derived from a need to reflect the coverage of the Equal 
Treatment Directive, which is itself in line with the guarantee in article 9 of the 
ECHR of freedom of conscience, religion or belief.  The trend towards protecting 
philosophical belief in similar fashion to religious belief is a product of the 
individual rights and equality agenda:43 any general principles of association 
advanced in doing so are incidental. 
                                         
39 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Legislative Scrutiny: Equality Bill (Twenty-Sixth Report of 
Session 2008-2009’ (TSO 12 November 2009) 59. 
40 See chapter 9 at 9.3. 
41 Hender v Prospects for People with Learning Disabilities ET 2902090/2006; Sheridan v 
Prospects for People with Learning Disabilities ET 2901366/2006; Glasgow City Council v 
McNab [2007] IRLR 476 (EAT); Muhammed v The Leprosy Mission International 
ET/2303459/2009.   
42 Explanatory Notes to the EA, para 796, ‘A religious organisation may wish to restrict applicants 
for the post of head of its organisation to those people that adhere to that faith. This is because 
to represent the views of that organisation accurately it is felt that the person in charge of that 
organisation must have an in-depth understanding of the religion’s doctrines. This type of 
discrimination could be lawful. However, other posts that do not require this kind of in-depth 
understanding, such as administrative posts, should be open to all people regardless of their 
religion or belief.’ 
43 See comments in chapter 2 at 2.3.3. 
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6.5 Principle or political compromise? 
Given that the influence of church and state relations, positive religious freedom 
and freedom of association is at best unclear, consideration will now be given to 
whether a principled basis for the employment exceptions can be found 
somewhere else.  In this regard, consideration of the legislative history of 
relevant provisions in Council Directive (EC) 2000/7844 (the ‘Equal Treatment 
Directive’) is illuminating.   
The Equal Treatment Directive which required member states to implement 
measures to outlaw employment discrimination on grounds of religion or belief 
and sexual orientation, was first introduced by the European Commission on 25 
November 1999 in the ‘Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.’45  In its original 
form, the Equal Treatment Directive contained a tightly drawn exception to the 
principle of equal treatment in article 4(2), which was directed specifically at 
religion or belief employers.  The exception in article 4(2) could only be relied 
on by, ‘public or private organisations which pursue directly and essentially the 
aim of ideological guidance in the field of religion or belief with respect to 
education, information and the expression of opinions’ and only for, ‘the 
particular occupational activities within those organisations which are directly 
and essentially related to that aim’.  Even then, discrimination based on a 
relevant characteristic related to religion or belief would only be excused 
where, ‘by reason of the nature of these activities’, the characteristic amounted 
to a genuine occupational requirement.46      
In the period of consultation which followed, the UK Government, in its 
negotiations on the draft Directive, expressed concerns about the impact of its 
provisions on the ability of religious organisations, and particularly schools, to 
recruit staff of a particular religion where justified.47  The exception to equal 
                                         
44 Council Directive (EC) 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation [2000] OC L303. 
45 Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Establishing a General Framework for Equal 
Treatment in Employment and Occupation, COM (1999) 565.  
46 Art 4(2) of the draft directive contained in COM (1999) 565 (ch 6, n 45).   
47 See comments by the then Minister for Employment Welfare to Work and Equal Opportunities 
Tessa Jowell in European Standing Committee C, 24 July 2000.  For example, Jowell remarks, 
‘As things stand, there is clear statutory protection for schools in preserving their religious ethos. 
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treatment for religion or belief employers which was included in the final 
version of the Equal Treatment Directive is markedly different to the one first 
introduced.48  The final text of article 4(2) provides that:   
Member States may maintain national legislation in force at the date 
of adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation 
incorporating national practices existing at the date of adoption of 
this Directive pursuant to which, in the case of occupational activities 
within churches and other public or private organisations the ethos of 
which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment based 
on a person’s religion or belief shall not constitute  discrimination 
where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in 
which they are carried out, a person’s religion or belief constitute a 
genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having 
regard to the organisation’s ethos.  This difference in treatment shall 
be implemented taking account of Member States’ constitutional 
provisions and principles, as well as the general principles of 
Community Law, and should not justify discrimination on another 
ground.   
Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this 
Directive shall thus not prejudice the right of churches and other 
public or private organisations, the ethos of which is based on religion 
or belief, acting in conformity with national constitutions and laws, to 
require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with 
loyalty to the organisation’s ethos.   
In many ways, the final version of article 4(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive 
is wider than the version which was first introduced.  It can be relied on by any 
organisation with an ethos based on religion or belief, and whether religion or 
belief is an occupational requirement is considered by looking not only at the 
nature of the work, but also at the context in which it is carried out having 
regard for the employer’s ethos.  Yet, in two very important respects, it is 
narrower.  Firstly, whereas the original version of article 4(2) permitted 
discrimination on the basis of any characteristic ‘related to’ religion or belief, 
which could, for example, arguably include sex or sexual orientation, the final 
version of the exception only excuses discrimination which is ‘based on a 
person’s religion or belief’ and discrimination on the grounds of any other 
                                         
One of our key negotiating objectives is to retain the present relevant legislative framework 
under the School Standards and Framework Act 1998. We want Church schools to remain free 
to recruit teaching staff of the faith in question.’ 
48 For comment on the draft and the amendments made to it, see Ian Leigh, ‘Clashing Rights, 
Exemptions, and Opt-Outs: Religious Liberty and “Homophobia”’ in O'Dair R and Lewis A (eds), 
Law and Religion: Current Legal Issues, Vol 4 (OUP 2001) 268-70. 
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protected characteristic is expressly prohibited.  Secondly, the final version of 
article 4(2) provides that derogations from the principle of equal treatment for 
employers with an ethos based on religion or belief will be permitted where 
‘necessary’ to maintain the status quo in the member state, existing in national 
legislation or practices at the date the Equal Treatment Directive came into 
force.  The original version of the exception, by comparison, was not 
conditioned in this way.  The stipulation that article 4(2) will only apply to 
permit member states, ‘to maintain national legislation in force at the date of 
adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating national 
practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive’, is a strong indicator 
that, rather than being agreed from a point of principle, the final text was born 
out of a desire to alleviate the concerns of member states that their status quo 
would be upset by the new provisions on equal treatment.    
Thus, rather than being rooted in church and state relations or buttressed by 
principles of religious freedom or freedom of association, the ethos exception, 
which is based on article 4(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive, began life as a 
product of political compromise.  There is further evidence that article 4(2) of 
the Equal Treatment Directive is more a political concession than a rule 
grounded in principle.  In this statement made by the EC Employment and Social 
Policy Council the negotiations with member states are described as ‘difficult’ 
and the final text as a ‘compromise’: 
After difficult negotiations the Council reached unanimous political 
agreement on the proposal for a Directive establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. …  
Agreement was finally reached on the basis of a compromise text 
which accommodated the difficulties encountered by certain Member 
States concerning, in particular, the possibility for churches and 
organisations the ethics of which were based on religion or belief of 
applying different treatment on account of essential, legitimate and 
justified professional requirements.49  
It is also instructive to consider the motivations of the UK Government in its 
negotiations on article 4(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive.  Their efforts to 
                                         
49 Employment and Social Policy Council press release, 17 October 2000 available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-00-378_en.htm> accessed 28 December 2017. 
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protect religious organisations appear to have stemmed more from a desire to 
maintain the status quo, particularly in denominational schooling, than from any 
attempt to achieve substantive equality for the religious individual or group.  
Denominational schooling in the UK has a long history and it will be recalled that 
statutory privileges permitting discrimination in the employment of staff in 
denominational schools to preserve the school ethos existed prior to the Equal 
Treatment Directive on equal treatment and the HRA.50  In a recent report on 
the place of religion in Scots Law, the authors remarked on the ‘increasing’ 
influence of religion in education and, in particular, a ‘strengthening’ of 
religion’s status in ‘curricular and governance structures’.51  This was in contrast 
to what the authors had found to have been, in the main, a ‘general trend … 
towards the secularisation of the law’ in other areas.52  When the text of the 
Equal Treatment Directive was ultimately agreed, the UK Government issued a 
press release in which it quoted then Employment Minister Tessa Jowell claiming 
to have been ‘successful’ in ‘negotiations to protect the traditions of religious 
schools in line with existing UK legislation’.53  The desire to protect the UK’s 
system of denominational schooling thus appears to have been a driving force in 
the UK’s negotiations.    
Article 4(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive, from which the ethos exception in 
the EA derives, is not the only example of political compromise in the exceptions 
model.  The origin of the organised religion exception to sexual orientation 
discrimination can also be traced to political lobbying.  The organised religion 
exception was not contained within the first draft of the SO Regulations but was 
included, instead, following submissions from certain Church representatives, 
including the Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England.54  As mentioned 
above at 6.2, the Government defended the later inclusion of the organised 
religion exception in the draft SO Regulations by arguing that the requirements 
                                         
50 For a discussion of the history of denominational and non-denominational schooling in Scotland, 
see Brown, Green and Mair (ch 6, n 8) 137-92.   
51 ibid 187. 
52 ibid 187.   
53 DfEE press release, referred to in Timothy Edmunds and Julia Lourie, ‘Employment Equality 
Regulations: Religion and Sexual Orientation’ (House of Commons Research Paper 03/54, 9 
June 2003) 13-14.   
54 R (on the application of Amicus) v The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 
260 (Admin), [2007] ICR 1176 (Amicus) [90].   
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of religious doctrine and teaching in relation to particular posts would otherwise 
need to be litigated in the tribunals and courts under the OR exception, which 
would be inappropriate.55  The shortcomings of this argument as a justification 
for the organised religion exception have already been explored.56  Moreover, 
the concerns of the lobbyists which led to the inclusion of the organised religion 
exception in the SO Regulations were not solely about the risk that courts and 
tribunals would become embroiled in interpreting religious doctrine.  In this 
excerpt taken from a letter dated 9 June 2003 from the Secretary General of the 
General Synod and the Archbishops’ Council to the Clerk of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, the Archbishops’ Council explain that 
the organised religion exception is needed to permit occupational requirements 
related, not to sexuality, but rather to sexual behaviour: 
The difficulty is that regulation 7(2) applies only where being of a 
particular sexual orientation is a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement. As explained above, we have no posts or 
offices where there is a requirement to be heterosexual (or indeed 
homosexual). Our requirements are in relation to behaviour, not 
sexuality itself. That is why the new regulations 7(3) and 16(3) refer 
to a ‘requirement related to sexual orientation’.57  
Whilst concerns about the propriety of courts or tribunals interpreting religious 
doctrine may well have impacted on the Government’s decision to include the 
organised religion exception in the SO Regulations, it is likely that the political 
pressure of the church representatives was an equal, if not greater, influence.  
Although the Government claimed in committee debate on the SO Regulations 
that the organised religion exception was, ‘not a compromise between two sides 
of a debate’ its explanation that it did, ‘justice to the directive, to the 
traditions in this country, and to the right of people, enshrined in article 9’58 
                                         
55 Minister of State, Lord Sainsbury of Turville in HL Deb 17 June 2003, vol 649 cols 778-80.  For 
details of the OR exception, see chapter 3 at 3.3.1. 
56 See above at 6.2. 
57 Letter from the Secretary General of the General Synod and the Archbishops' Council to the 
Clerk to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (9 June 2003) para 13 
referred to in Amicus (ch 6, n 54) [92].   
58 HC Fourth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation (Draft Employment Equality (Religion 
or Belief) Regulations 2003 and Draft Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
2003) 17 June 2003, col 032. 
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simply calls attention to the piecemeal array of influences on the development 
of the law in this area.     
A variety of motivations, then, appear to have influenced the approach to 
religious autonomy in employment: the history of an established church and the 
long tradition of denominational schooling; the move from religious toleration to 
positive religious freedom; the requirement to respond to the European equality 
programme, the incorporation of the ECHR, and the political compromises made 
along the way.  These historical, constitutional and political influences present 
as inconsistent at times: the established nature of church state relations and the 
move to positive religious freedom; the history of denominational schooling and 
the response to the European equality programme, for example.  Driven and 
shaped by a variety of sometimes competing influences, the model of 
employment exceptions in Britain, I argue, lacks a clear and strong principled 
underpinning to guide the judiciary and legislature in future.  The implications 
of this for the rule of law will be explored below.     
6.6 Implications of a lack of principle 
I argued in chapter 3 that aspects of the law on religious autonomy in 
employment in Britain are ambiguous and/or of uncertain legitimacy, generating 
legal uncertainty for employers, applicants and employees.  I argued that the 
conflict between the ‘instrumental’ and ‘organic’ perspectives of some policy 
makers and church representatives contributed to the ambiguity surrounding the 
scope of the exceptions, and that the paucity of widely publicised case law was 
an exacerbating factor.59 
In each of the jurisdictions studied, the courts are asked to answer difficult 
questions in their application of the relevant exception or exemption models: is 
the entity, seeking to rely on the derogation from equalities legislation, a 
relevant employing entity for the applicable legislative provision; does the 
discriminatory treatment pursue a legitimate aim; is the requirement justified 
by the objectives of the employer, or by the nature or context of the work 
undertaken; how should the rights of the employer be balanced with the 
                                         
59 See chapter 3 at 3.4 and 3.5.   
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equality rights of individuals?  Though the answers to these questions are not 
usually straightforward, the courts in the USA and Canada have, at least, clear 
principle, in church and state relations and freedom of association respectively, 
to guide their analysis.  The British courts, by contrast, have no such obvious 
reference point.  This makes it difficult to predict judicial determinations and 
risks inconsistency in the case law.  This is particularly concerning in light of the 
recent report by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (the ‘EHRC’) into 
religion or belief in the workplace and in service delivery.  The EHRC’s report, 
published at the end of 2016, examined whether the protection afforded by the 
law both to individuals with a religion or belief and to the ‘distinctiveness’ of 
religion or belief organisations, was adequate and appropriate.  It recognised 
that case law on religion or belief discrimination was in its infancy and 
acknowledged the importance of legal judgments in, ‘clarifying our 
understanding of the interaction between equality and human rights law, and 
balancing competing rights’. 60  Other than recommending that the provisions in 
the E(Sc)A and the SSFA which permit schools to impose religious requirements 
on their employees are reviewed for compatibility with the Equal Treatment 
Directive, the EHRC declined to recommend any amendments to the law 
pertaining to the definition of religion or belief, the individual manifestation of 
religion or belief in the workplace, religion or belief requirements in 
employment, or religion or belief in the provision of services.  As far as the EHRC 
was concerned, the law was, in the main, ‘working’.  It did, however, admit that 
‘clarification’ was needed in some areas, including in the definition of belief and 
in the measure of freedom of expression and freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion afforded to religious organisations.61  That clarification, however, 
was not to be given by the legislature, but by the judiciary through case law.      
Developing the law in this area, incrementally through case law, is the EHRC’s 
preferred approach and, given there is no legislative reform of the relevant law 
on the Government’s policy agenda, it will likely be the approach which is 
adopted.  It is, moreover, surely right that the law on religion or belief in 
employment develops in this way.  This is because the outcomes in 
                                         
60 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Religion or Belief: is the Law Working?’ (Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, December 2016) 17. 
61  ibid 16. 
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discrimination complaints which involve religion or belief are particularly 
sensitive to the factual matrices in which they are engaged.  Of all the 
protected characteristics, religion or belief has the most variables.  Unlike sex, 
sexual orientation, age and marital or civil partnership status, for example, the 
array of beliefs protected under the banner, ‘religion or belief’ is 
immeasurable.62  The modes of manifestation of belief, moreover, are 
innumerable.  Legislation is too blunt an instrument to accommodate, in each 
factual situation, the delicate balancing exercise between religion or belief and 
competing interests.  The judiciary, rather, must lead the way.   
It is, therefore, all the more important that the judiciary has a clear 
understanding as to the principles guiding interpretation of the exceptions.  
According to the EHRC: 
When assessing whether the legal framework is effective, our starting 
point has been that the law needs to protect competing rights fairly, 
for example the right to manifest religious belief and the rights of 
others not to be discriminated against.63 
The determination of whether competing rights have been protected ‘fairly’, 
however, cannot occur in a vacuum.  Fairness can only be assessed when there is 
a clear understanding as to why particular rights, individuals and groups are 
afforded protection in the first place.  Without this, decisions may turn on the 
different perceptions of fairness held by the particular judge or judges in each 
case.  There is a risk that the inconsistent decisions which ensue are not 
regarded as a problem as such, but are instead explained by reference to their 
‘fact sensitive’ nature.  
Moreover, without clear guiding principle, defending the exceptions model to 
those who oppose it, whether because too narrow or too wide, is made all the 
more challenging.  For example, two particular criticisms levelled at the 
treatment of religion in law are that it promotes: (i) an agenda of ‘secularism-
                                         
62 Comment made by participant at roundtable event on ‘Religion and the Individual: Belief and 
Employment’ held at the University of Glasgow in conjunction with Humanist Society Scotland 
on 30 June 2017. 
63 ECHR, ‘Religion or Belief’ (ch 6, n 60) 15. 
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as-indifference’;64 and (ii) a hierarchy of rights. Lacking a clear principled basis, 
the exceptions model is left exposed to both these criticisms.  Rivers, for 
example, argues that since 2000, developments in various aspects of the law 
relating to religious organisations reflect a downgrading in the importance of 
religious interests.65  He sees his thesis as also reflected in the law on exceptions 
to equality legislation for religious organisations, contending that, ‘the law 
creates rather narrow exceptions expressed in terms which are unreasoned, or 
at best a matter of temporary political expedient’.66  There is a perception, 
meanwhile, held by some that sexual orientation equality and secular values, in 
particular, are prioritised over the right to freedom of religion.  The EHRC made 
findings from its call for evidence that some Christian managers and employers 
considered other religions as well as other groups (such as the lesbian, gay and 
bisexual group) and the so-called secular ‘lobby’ enjoyed greater rights.67   
Rivers also expresses concerns that, ‘the gender-equality programme is 
restricting the scope of religious liberty’68 and refers to the employment of 
clergy and of staff in denominational schools as examples of situations where 
gender equality and religious interests may clash.69   
These current and complex debates are fuelled in part by the lack of principle 
underpinning the approach in Britain to religious autonomy in employment.  
Having a clear principle to support the exceptions model will not quieten all of 
its critics.  In such a contested area as law and religion, consensus on approach 
is not a realistic goal.   It would, however, at least provide a common starting 
point for the debate.   
                                         
64 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (ch 6, n 14) 328-34; see also Julian  Rivers, 'The 
Secularisation of the British Constitution ' (2012) 14 EccLJ 371 and comments by Lucy Vickers 
on Rivers’ thesis in The Law of Organized Religions, in Lucy Vickers, 'Twin Approaches to 
Secularism: Organized Religion and Society' (2012) 32 OJLS 197. 
65 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (ch 6, n 14) 333-34. 
66 ibid 334.  
67 Martin Mitchell and others, ‘Religion or Belief in the Workplace and Service Delivery: Findings 
from a Call for Evidence’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015) 56 and 62-63. 
68 Julian Rivers, 'Law, Religion and Gender Equality' (2007) 9 EccLJ 24, 38 (‘gender equality’ is 
used by Rivers as a collective reference to the principles of non-discrimination on grounds of 
sex, transsexual status and sexual orientation). 
69 ibid 39-41. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
Rivers has asserted that, ‘The relationship between law and religion in any 
country is a reflection of historical contingencies, controversies and 
compromises.’70  This, I have argued, is particularly the case in Britain with 
regard to religious autonomy in employment.  Whereas church and state 
relations and freedom of association, respectively, positively guide the USA and 
Canada in carving out the scope of derogations from employment equality law, a 
patchwork of historical, constitutional and political influences have shaped the 
model in Britain, rendering it without grounding in a clear foundational 
principle.   
In the absence of a clear foundational principle, what norms could guide the 
judiciary in its interpretation of the employment exceptions?  Determining the 
limits of religious autonomy in employment requires a careful balancing exercise 
between freedom and equality, public and private, group and individual.  Given 
the myriad of factual matrices in which religious autonomy issues arise, the role 
of the judiciary in this exercise is crucial, and a ‘purposive’ approach to the 
employment exceptions is needed.   
What ‘purpose’, however, do the employment exceptions serve?  In the next 
chapter, a better understanding of the interests protected by the employment 
exceptions will be sought in data from a qualitative empirical study involving 10 
employers with a religious or faith ethos.  The aims of the study were to learn 
more about the relationship between an employer’s religious ethos and its 
employment practices, and to find out how religious groups regard the 
employment exceptions in the EA.  The findings of the study are instructive and 
support the consideration given in chapter 8 to the utility of freedom of 
association in the interpretation of the employment exceptions. 
                                         
70 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (ch 6, n 14) 1.  In his monograph, Rivers conducts a 
comprehensive review of the law of organised religion in the UK as it manifests itself in various 
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7 A study of ‘ethos’ in a religious or faith inspired 
organisation 
7.1 Study introduction and aims 
Navigation of the ambiguities and uncertainties in the application and 
interpretation of the employment exceptions requires to be guided, I have 
argued, by clear and consistent principle.  In the quest for uncovering such 
principle, an empirical methodology is used in this chapter to investigate the 
influence of an employer’s religious or faith ethos on its employment practices 
and relationships.  The study undertaken and reported in this chapter involved 
qualitative interviews with employers that had a religious or faith ethos to 
uncover experiences ‘on the ground’ of the importance to the religious employer 
of its ethos and attain views on the appropriateness of the employment 
exceptions.  The results of the study provide empirical evidence of the 
importance of an employer’s religious or faith ethos to its employment practices 
and relationships, and of the views of some religious or faith ethos employers on 
the employment exceptions.     
In many ways, the study investigated and developed particular ideas about the 
relationship between ethos and employment presented in a publication by 
Faithworks on religious discrimination and Christian ethos. 1  The said publication 
arose from a joint project by Faithworks, the Hindu Forum of Britain, the Muslim 
Council of Britain, the Network of Sikh Organisations and the United Synagogue.  
Faithworks provide guidance in the publication to Christian employers on 
relating the use of religion as an occupational requirement to their 
organisational ethos.2  Faithworks further emphasise the importance of 
employers defining and identifying their Christian ethos and applying it to their 
organisational behaviour and practices in the areas of recruitment, relations, 
development, reward and faith.3  
                                         
1 Faithworks, ‘Christian Ethos Audit’ (Faithworks 2003).  The publication is available at 
<www.religionlaw.co.uk/FWChristian.pdf> accessed 28 December 2017. 
2 ibid 2-3, 11. 
3 ibid 12-19. 
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7.2 Methodology 
 EHRC empirical research 
There has been limited empirical research conducted in Great Britain on the 
needs and interests of employers with a religious or faith ethos.  In 2012 the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (the ‘EHRC’) commissioned a study on 
equality and human rights in relation to religion or belief in England and Wales.4  
As the aims of this study were wide, it did not explore in detail the current 
model of exceptions from the prohibition of discrimination in employment 
contained in the Equality Act 2010 (the ‘EA’) and the School Standards and 
Framework Act 1998 (the ‘SSFA’).  It was reported that most of those 
interviewed in the study who represented religion or belief groups were, 
‘broadly happy’ with the current model of exceptions, notwithstanding they 
were disappointed with the ‘lack of clarity’ around the wording used in the EA.5  
A small number of religious participants and some academics were reported to 
be ‘uncomfortable’ with the exceptions in the EA, 6 and concerns were expressed 
both that the courts and tribunals ‘interpreted the exceptions too narrowly’ and 
that the exceptions were ‘applied too widely in practice’.7  Interviewees in the 
study’s religious ‘strand’ mentioned that there was at times disagreement on 
whether holding a particular religion or belief is an occupational requirement,8 
and one interviewee, referring to the ethos exception, felt there was a lack of 
guidance to assist religious or belief groups to express their ethos and apply the 
exception appropriately.9  It was also reported that several interviewees were 
concerned about the ‘practical impact’ of the provisions in the SSFA relating to 
the employment of teachers in schools with a religious character.10  One 
interviewee commented that the provisions, ‘create real problems for someone 
                                         
4 Alice Donald, ‘Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 84: Religion or Belief, 
Equality and Human Rights in England and Wales’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
Summer 2012) 94-99. 
5 ibid 97. 
6 ibid (one Christian participant is reported to have favoured a presumption in favour of equality, 
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7 ibid 97-98.  
8 ibid 99. 
9 ibid 98. 
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who is not religious, or has a different religion, or simply chooses not to use 
their religion and wants to get a job on their own merits’.11   
A recommendation was made in the report for further research to be carried out 
in relation to, ‘the application and impact on the ground of some of the 
exceptions in the EA and the SSFA’.12  In August 2014, the EHRC issued a call for 
evidence with the stated aim of exploring, ‘the direct and personal experiences 
of employees and service users concerning religion or belief, as well as the views 
of employers, service providers, relevant organisations and the legal and advice 
sectors’ in Scotland, England and Wales.13  Subsequently, the findings of the call 
for evidence, which was conducted in an EHRC survey, were published in 2015.14  
Of the 2483 individuals and organisations who responded to the call, only 14 
were employers or managers of an organisation that ‘practised, advanced or 
taught’ religion or belief.15   
Among the key findings of the EHRC survey was that some Christian employers 
and managers considered that they were subjected to unfair treatment.16  For 
example, some (though not all) Christian employers explained that they wanted 
greater freedom to recruit Christians to work in their organisations17 and there 
was a perception among some Christian employers and managers that 
Christianity was given less protection in the workplace than other religions, 
protected groups and ‘the secular lobby’.18  
Building on the findings of the EHRC in 2012, I designed the study reported in 
this chapter to serve the aim of better understanding the needs and interests of 
organisations with a religious or faith ethos, focusing particularly on how and 
why the ethos might influence or impact on their employment practices, both at 
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14 ibid. 
15 ibid 51. 
16 ibid 56-63. 
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the recruitment stage and throughout the employment relationship, and on their 
views on current employment and equality laws.  The study also sought to elicit 
what influence participants considered religion had on their employees’ 
experience of employment and the extent to which faith was a motivation for 
work.   
The aims of the present study sought to augment those of the previous studies 
conducted by the EHRC by seeking a more in-depth understanding of the issues 
relevant to employers with a religious or faith ethos, with reference to their 
emloyment practices.  To this end, two aspects of the methodology of the 
present study, which is discussed in more detail below, were particularly 
important.  Firstly, the study participants were employers, which enabled 
evidence to be collected from experiences ‘on the ground’ (as recommended by 
the first EHRC study).  Secondly, data were collected through face-to-face or 
telephone interviews with participants rather than surveys, which was the 
method of data collection used in the EHRC’s second study.  The use of 
interviews facilitated an interaction between participants and interviewer 
conducive to obtaining detailed accounts of the participants’ experiences.   
 Recruitment 
Probability sampling was not used in this study to identify the participants as it 
was not within the scope of this study to obtain views that could be claimed to 
be representative of all religious organisations.  Efforts, however, were made to 
recruit participants from organisations of different religious affiliations, and to 
recruit a greater number of participants associated with Christianity and then 
Islam in light of the popularity of these religions in Scotland.19  Efforts were also 
made to recruit participants from organisations of varying sizes and operating in 
a variety of sectors.  This approach was taken with a view to identifying possible 
trends in the data collected according to the size, type and religious affiliation 
of the participant’s organisation.  In the end, however, this exercise was not 
possible in light of the number and variety of participants who were successfully 
                                         
19 Scotland's Census, 'Scotland's Census 2011 - Religion Detailed' (Scotland's Census, Release 
2A) 
<www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/documents/censusresults/release2a/rel2A_Religion_detailed_Sc
otland.pdf>  accessed 28 December 2017. 
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recruited.  To aid the data collection, it was considered preferable to conduct 
face-to-face interviews with participants, where possible.  For this reason, the 
pool of potential participants was restricted to those from organisations with 
operations in Glasgow and the surrounding areas (regardless of the geographical 
location of the head office).  The first phase of recruitment ran from March 2015 
to July 2015.  The second phase of recruitment ran from November 2016 to July 
2017.   
In the first phase of recruitment, 49 organisations with a religious or faith ethos 
were identified using prior knowledge and focused internet searches.  Of these, 
29 were affiliated with Christianity, 10 with Judaism, 6 with Islam, 3 with 
Hinduism and 1 with Buddhism.  Participants A to I were recruited in this phase.   
Following the end of the first phase of recruitment, I was on leave for a period 
of 12 months.   A second phase of recruitment commenced near the end of 2016.  
Recruitment efforts were somewhat more targeted in the second phase of 
recruitment, and there was a particular focus on recruiting organisations 
associated with Islam.  Information about the study was provided to particular 
individuals whom it was considered could assist, identify or recommend suitable 
organisations to be invited to participate in the study.  A further 17 
organisations were identified in the second phase of recruitment: some from 
recommendations made by contacts, but most from focused internet searches.  
These 17 organisations were subsequently invited to participate in the study.  Of 
these, 13 were associated with Islam,20 3 with Christianity, and 1 which worked 
with several different faith groups.  Participants J and K were the only 
participants successfully recruited in this second phase.    
Prior consent to contacting denominational schools in the state sector was 
sought and obtained from one local authority.  Letters were written to each 
organisation identified, inviting participation in the study (Appendix 1).  With 
each letter there was enclosed a copy of the plain language statement (entitled 
‘participant information sheet’) (Appendix 2)21 providing more detail on the 
                                         
20 One invitation to an organisation associated with Islam was returned undelivered with advice that 
the intended recipient had ‘gone away’.   
21 In the second phase of recruitment, a slightly revised version of the participant information sheet 
was issued to reflect revised timescales for the study.   
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study and the involvement requested of the participant.  Where it was possible 
to identify a relevant person in the organisation, either from prior knowledge or 
publicly available information, the letter was addressed to that person.  In the 
majority of cases, however, the letters were addressed more generally to the 
organisation, it being left to the recipient to identify the appropriate person to 
respond.  A follow-up letter was issued to all targeted individuals or 
organisations that did not respond to the initial communication.  If there was 
still no response forthcoming, an attempt was made to contact the individual or 
organisation by telephone to encourage participation and answer any queries.22   
 Participants 
Eleven participants were interviewed from organisations with a religious or faith 
ethos operating in a variety of sectors in Glasgow and/or the surrounding areas.  
Eight of the participants were from organisations associated with Christianity, 
which was considered to be appropriate given it is reported that more people in 
Scotland associate with Christianity than with other religions.23  Two 
organisations were associated with Judaism and one with Islam.  Invitations 
extended to organisations affiliated with other religions to participate in the 
study were not accepted (see below at 7.2.2 Recruitment).  The organisations 
varied in size, from one represented by participant H, which at the time had no 
employees, engaging a few self-employed contractors instead, to another which 
employed almost 2000 employees in Scotland.  Although the organisation of 
participant H was ‘staffed’ by self-employed contractors rather than employees, 
it was considered that the participant could nevertheless provide an insight into 
the needs and interests of his organisation in the engagement of these 
individuals.  Given participant I’s retired status (see further below), he was 
unable to confirm the current employment arrangements at his former 
organisation, but he was able to speak more broadly on some of the issues 
relevant to the study.  The participants represented a range of organisations, 
including establishments of organised religions, charities and mission 
                                         
22 Except where no telephone contact number was available, a telephone call was made to try to 
reach each intended participant who did not respond to the second letter of invitation.  If the 
telephone call was not answered and a voicemail was activated, a message was left inviting the 
intended participant to return the call to discuss the study.   
23 Scotland's Census (ch 7, n 19). 
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movements, as well as education and service providers.  A description of the 
religious affiliation of each participant’s organisation is provided below at Table 
A.  Specific religious denominations and descriptions of the nature of each 
organisation are not provided, with a view to preserving the participants’ 
anonymity. 
Table A 
INTERVIEW CODE RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION  
A (pilot) Christianity 
B Christianity 
C Christianity 
D Judaism 
E Christianity 
F Christianity 
G Christianity 
H Judaism 
I Christianity 
J Christianity 
K Islam  
   
The participants themselves occupied different roles in the organisations, and 
included chief executives as well as individuals in management, finance, 
fundraising, human resource and voluntary roles.  Participant D emphasised that 
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the views expressed in her interview were personal, and not necessarily 
representative of the views of her organisation.  Meanwhile, participant I was, at 
the time of interview, retired and, therefore, no longer accountable for the 
organisation he spoke about.  It was considered, given the aims of the study, 
that both participant D and participant I’s involvement was nevertheless of 
value, both being able to provide an insight into employment in organisations 
with a religious or faith ethos.  Although the remaining participants held 
positions in their organisations which permitted them to speak more closely from 
the perspective of an employer, some of the questions invited views which relied 
on the individual participant’s interpretation of a particular phenomenon from a 
position of experience.  Participants C1 and C2 represent two participants from 
the same organisation who attended at interview together.  Participant C2 
wished his organisation to be described as a faith-based organisation, and not a 
religious organisation as it did not proselytize Christianity.  Participant K 
preferred her organisation to be described as ‘faith-inspired’ to reflect that its 
purpose was not to preach Islam.  Rather, participant K’s organisation, which 
worked with and for a faith community, was inspired by faith principles and used 
aspects of the faith in the delivery of its work.  The participants’ organisations 
will be referred to collectively in this study as organisations with a religious or 
faith ethos.      
 Interviews 
One interview, lasting between approximately 1 and 1½ hours was held with 
each participant.  With one exception, interviews were held face-to-face at the 
participant’s place of business or work.  One participant worked remotely from a 
location in a different part of Scotland and for reasons of convenience, this 
interview was conducted by telephone.  Given the participant was experienced 
in working remotely, the telephone medium provided no difficulties for data 
collection.  Each participant was issued with a list of interview themes two 
working days prior to interview (Appendix 3).  A list of questions was prepared in 
advance of the interviews, and each interview was structured around these 
questions, modified where appropriate to take into account answers given. This 
approach was taken to ensure discussion of the relevant themes at each 
interview and to aid comparison of the data collected.  Some of the questions 
posed were designed to investigate and develop ideas from the Faithworks 
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publication referred to at 7.1 above.  One participant (participant A) was a 
personal contact and acted as a pilot for the study.  The outcome of the pilot 
led to a refinement and reduction in volume of the interview questions, and 
data from the pilot are not included in the study’s findings which are reported 
below.   
With the exception of the pilot interview, all interviews were audio recorded 
with the consent of the participants and transcribed in full, replacing any 
reference to the name of the organisation or participant with pre-assigned 
participant codes to anonymise the data.   
 Analysis 
The interview themes which were issued to the participants formed the basis for 
the analysis of the data obtained from the interviews.  Data relevant to each 
theme were identified in the transcripts of the interviews and compared.  The 
findings are reported below.  Given the number of participants and the adoption 
of non-probability sampling in recruitment, the views expressed by the 
participants are not to be considered representative of the wider population.  
The study is valuable in the provision of an initial evidence base which can be 
used to develop further research.  Findings are reported below at 7.3 to 7.5 and 
collated under three main themes: recruitment of employees; relationships; and 
employment / equality law.   
7.3 Recruitment of employees 
The findings of the study suggest that faith is often a, or even the, motivation 
for employees to work for an organisation with a religious or faith ethos, and 
that work itself can be a form of worship.  In the recruitment of employees, 
there is evidence that religion is considered an occupational requirement in 
certain posts.  Such occupational requirements are often imposed to maintain 
the ethos of the organisation, or in recognition of the context in which particular 
job functions are to be carried out.       
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 Faith as motivation 
Most, but not all, participants expressed the belief that a significant number of 
those who worked for their organisation chose the organisation as their place of 
work because of its religious or faith ethos.  Indeed, participant B believed that 
this was the case for all of the staff at his organisation.  Faith was described by 
participant B as, ‘a hugely motivating factor for people’.24  Employees would 
say, ‘I’m motivated out of love because I feel God loves me’, and some would 
consider the work they do for the organisation as, ‘a calling’.  Participant E also 
considered that faith was ‘very much’ a motivation for work, commenting that it 
was important to the organisation’s Christian employees that the job was in a 
Christian organisation where they were ‘free and able to express their Christian 
faith’ both with their colleagues and when performing their job responsibilities.  
That faith is a motivation for work was echoed by participant F.  Opining that 
being able to bring faith and profession together was, ‘a privilege and a unique 
opportunity’, participant F commented that a lot of staff he spoke to had chosen 
to work at his organisation because it gave them, ‘an opportunity to apply their 
professional skills or their skills in a Christian way’.  Participant G considered 
that ‘quite a lot’ of staff chose to work for his organisation because of its 
religious ethos and values, though others might simply, ‘drift into’ a job at the 
organisation.  Participant G was unsure what motivated staff to work, though he 
acknowledged it could be their religious beliefs or their values which motivated 
them.  Participant J estimated that between 50% and 60% of staff at her 
organisation chose to work there because it was faith-inspired.  Participant K, 
meanwhile, guessed that about a third of the employees at her organisation 
chose to work there because it was faith-inspired.  This participant also 
expressed the belief, however, that the faith element of the organisation was 
not the main attraction for a lot of the volunteers who provided their services.   
Although it was considered that the religious character of the organisation was 
not the attraction for the small number of employees who worked in participant 
D’s regional office, it was estimated that up to 75% of staff at the much larger 
head office chose to work there because of the organisation’s religious 
                                         
24 Where appropriate quotations throughout have been edited to remove hesitancies in speech (for 
example, word repetitions or phrases such as ‘em’ or ‘you know’).    
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character.  Participant D explained that the majority of employees at the head 
office had been, ‘brought up’ with the organisation ‘all their lives’ and working 
for the organisation was, for them, ‘giving back’.  When asked whether faith is 
the motivation for work in her organisation, participant D acknowledged 
personally, ‘being Jewish and working for a Jewish organisation, you do want to 
prove yourself’.  Participant I considered that all of those who chose to work for 
his former organisation (excluding contractors) did so because of its religious 
character and that members volunteered their services because of their beliefs.  
Talking generally from his experience of religious organisations, he agreed that 
faith was a motivation for work, commenting that, ‘if you are working for a 
church organisation then the fact that you also have faith will make a complete 
difference for sure’.   
Participant C1 believed that the ‘values’ of her organisation and their 
manifestation in the organisation’s work attracted some people to it.  Although 
these values were Christian values, participant C1 observed they were also held 
by others.  Participant C2 considered there was a ‘range’ of reasons why people 
were drawn to work for the organisation: some because of its ‘core values’ and 
because they were ‘inspired’ and ‘motivated’ by its vision; others because the 
organisation’s work was ‘core’ to part of their ‘faith journey’.   
Speaking of some of his contractors, participant H believed that, rather than 
describe them as having chosen to work for his organisation because of its 
religious character, it was more accurate to say that their roles were, 
‘intrinsically tied to the nature of the congregation’ noting that the services 
they provided (with the exception of those performing janitorial functions) 
could, in Glasgow, likely only be provided to a synagogue of a particular type.   
Referring separately to members of his synagogue who would volunteer their 
services, participant H observed that many seek a ‘sense of belonging’ and 
therefore involvement in the synagogue in a volunteer capacity was, ‘perhaps as 
important as what happens on the Sabbath day if you’re there in the synagogue 
praying’.     
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 Work as worship 
The idea that work in an organisation with a religious or faith ethos is, or can 
be, a form of worship was shared by some of the participants, with Participant I 
observing that the word ‘liturgy’ is Greek for ‘the people’s work’.  This was felt 
very strongly by participant B for himself and his organisation.  Explaining that in 
Hebrew, ‘avoda’ can mean ‘worship’ or ‘work’, participant B believed that, ‘our 
work can be worship to God’.  He considered that there were many 
opportunities for his staff to worship through their work, commenting: 
The way in which we answer the phone, to the way we open the door, 
to the way we make a cup of tea and sit down and talk with 
somebody, to our attitude in serving, in our worship, our work, in 
organising the store, all of these things we would say is an opportunity 
for an expression of worship, an expression of our faith and would be 
important to us. 
His organisation’s work was, according to participant B, ‘love in action’: an 
expression of God’s love in the care provided to those in need.  Referring to the 
Epistle of James that teaches that, ‘faith without works is dead’, participant B 
noted that the organisation gave volunteers a ‘place to express’, their faith and 
described how he found it helpful to think, ‘Lord, this has been my work today, I 
hope you find it acceptable worship’.     
Participant F observed that some would consider their role in his organisation to 
be simply, ‘a job’ whilst others would view it as, ‘a calling’.  For himself, 
participant F considered it was, ‘the desires of God’ that he work in his current 
position.  Participant J, meanwhile, sought to put the values of her faith ‘in to 
action’ every day and this led her to show care, respect and compassion in her 
work.  Participant H also considered that at least some of his contractors 
considered their work was, ‘part of their engagement with the congregation’ and 
‘part of their engagement with their own religious practice and belief’.  
Acknowledging another of his contractors might consider her work as, ‘part of 
her communal engagement’, participant H commented that, ‘in Judaism that 
sense of communal engagement might be as high as the worship’.   Participant K 
acknowledged that some of her organisation’s staff, board members or 
volunteers would consider the work they did for the organisation to be a form of 
worship.  Although her employment in the organisation had led to participant K 
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becoming ‘more attached’ to her faith, through conversations with colleagues on 
Islamic issues, for example, she personally believed that if the organisation did 
not have a faith element, it would still be fundamentally part of who she was.   
 Occupational requirement 
Most, but not all, of the participants identified at least some of the posts in 
their organisation as requiring the post holder to be of a particular religion.  
There was a wide variety in the reported numbers of such posts: from all posts, 
at one end of the spectrum, to just a few posts, at the other end.  Participant D 
believed it, ‘probably would make very little difference’ whether or not the post 
holders in her organisation were of the Jewish faith, commenting that, ‘if 
someone’s got the organisation in their heart what does it matter where their 
background is’.  Notwithstanding this, it was her belief that all employees in her 
organisation were nonetheless Jewish.  Participant K, meanwhile, explained that 
her organisation had never, to her knowledge, used religion as an occupational 
requirement for any post.     
Of those participants whose organisations made religion an occupational 
requirement in at least some posts, a significant proportion indicated that the 
occupational requirement was necessary for the maintenance of the 
organisation’s ethos or values.   
The organisation represented by participants C1 and C2 placed religion as a 
requirement on only a small minority of posts which were, in the main, senior or 
leadership roles.  Participant C2 explained that the organisation required the 
post holders in one level of leadership to be Christians because they were 
responsible for the ethos of the organisation.  Participant J similarly recognised 
that it would only be beneficial to engage a co-religionist for ‘strategic influence 
and direction and guidance’.25  
Likewise participant G identified a small minority of posts in the part of his 
organisation for which he was responsible26 which required the post holder to be 
                                         
25 Though it is unknown whether religious commitment was an occupational requirement in respect 
of any such positions at Participant K’s organisation.   
26 Participant G was unsure the position with regard to posts in a different part of the organisation. 
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of a particular religion: these, other than posts involved in religious instruction 
and education, were senior positions.  Echoing the sentiment of participant C2, 
participant G attributed the occupational requirement in the senior positions to 
the need to maintain the organisation’s ethos and values.  In the participant’s 
view, these positions, ‘set the tone for the [organisation],27 set the ethos’ and as 
such it would be, ‘very very difficult’ for a non-Catholic to perform in these 
roles.     
Participant F also identified a connection between the use by his organisation of 
the occupational requirement in respect of certain positions in his organisation 
and the ethos and values of the organisation, explaining that religion was an 
occupational requirement for those staff in his organisation who had a, ‘one-to-
one relationship’ with the service users because they needed to, ‘uphold’ the 
organisation’s Christian ethos and values.  It was also important that senior staff 
and policy makers at Participant F’s organisation had an understanding of the 
Christian faith to ensure that policies were in line with the organisation’s 
Christian beliefs.  
Believing that it was the staff who ‘create’ the ‘culture’ or the, ‘ethos’ of the 
organisation, participant B identified his organisation’s ‘culture’, which relied 
heavily on the use of prayer as the reason for requiring its employees to be of 
the Christian faith.  Explaining why it would be beneficial for, say, the 
receptionist in his organisation to be of the Christian faith, participant B 
explained, ‘when we would gather together, when things are difficult and we’re 
wanting to pray together, we’re wanting people to be able to connect, to 
understand, this is what we’re about, and this is why it’s important’. 
Although participant K’s organisation had never used religion as an occupational 
requirement for any post, the participant considered it could be beneficial for 
the chief executive of her organisation, which worked predominately with a 
section of the Muslim community, to be Muslim.  According to the participant, a 
chief executive who ascribes to elements of the Muslim faith will find it more 
natural to use the faith as inspiration for the organisation’s work.  Participant K 
also considered that a Muslim chief executive could be ‘more powerful’ to effect 
                                         
27 Description of organisation used by participant removed to anonymise data. 
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change by bringing lived experience to his or her work and might have a better 
understanding of the services the organisation offered and the political 
environment in which it operated.     
When participants made reference to specific job tasks which needed to be 
performed by someone of a particular religion, it was apparent that the nature 
of the job task was not always considered in isolation from the context in which 
it was to be carried out.  Thus, whilst specific job tasks such as, leading prayers 
and explaining the Christian faith if requested, needed to be performed by a 
Christian employee in participant F’s organisation, it was also considered 
‘appropriate’ that staff, on a ‘one-to-one basis’ with service users, were able, in 
providing care and support, ‘to reflect the love and the experience that they 
have from a faith perspective’.   
The wider context in which job tasks are performed was also highlighted as 
important in the explanation given by participant C1 of why religion was an 
occupational requirement for the heads of the geographical branches in her 
organisation.  She explained that the occupational requirement was necessary 
because of the ‘relationships’ her organisation forged with the churches.  The 
organisation was, in one way, an ‘agent of the churches’ and participant C1 
believed that to have such a partnership and relationship with the churches, 
understanding them was insufficient: rather, it was necessary to ‘share’ what 
she described as ‘that degree of commitment’.  She also said that being of the 
Christian faith gave them added authority in the eyes of the churches.  Thus it is 
observed that the nature of the job task might relate to the formation of 
relationships, but the context in which this is to be undertaken, from a position 
of commitment and authority, is also relevant.   
Participant K also identified that service users in her organisation seeking Islamic 
advice considered it more credible if the advice was provided by a Muslim.  If 
the role in participant K’s organisation dedicated to this service was to become 
vacant in the future the organisation would likely seek someone of the Islam 
faith to fill it.  Participant K also observed that although her organisation had 
never insisted on its staff members being Muslim, the lived experience of Muslim 
employees could (though not always) assist those in client facing roles have a 
better understanding of the issues facing the users of their services.     
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Participant E’s explanation of the use of religion as an occupational requirement 
in her organisation gives further weight to the idea that the context in which 
work is carried out is an important factor.  Occupational requirements were 
applied in her organisation because employees needed to, ‘explain the Christian 
faith’ but this was to be, ‘from a position of actually believing it and applying it 
to their day to day life’.  This, in turn, involved, ‘a regular prayer life’ as well as 
‘a dependence on God for guidance and direction’.  She explained that 
understanding what the Bible says and quoting it is, ‘different to actually 
believing it and living by the principles and the requirements that God’s word 
has upon us’.  The participant’s own position in Human Resources had religion as 
an occupational requirement because she needed to have, ‘a believing faith as it 
is described in the Bible’ to apply the employment policies, all of which 
contained ‘the principles of Christian relationship’.   
This participant agreed ‘quite strongly’ that the ‘context’ in which work is 
carried out is a relevant factor when considering whether it would be beneficial 
to have religion as an occupational requirement.  For her, ‘context’ related to, 
‘the reason that the organisation exists’ and as her own organisation had a 
mission purpose, it was important its employees and volunteers had, ‘a very 
clear understanding’ and ‘personal belief’. The participant explained that the 
reason her organisation exists is to help people and their ‘trust and faith in in 
God’ was essential to this end.  For this reason, participant E explained that it 
was important that employees did not simply ‘pay lip service’ to that, but rather 
that they ‘actually live it, breathe it’ and ‘are it’ to the children and adults the 
organisation assisted, as well as to the other employees and volunteers in the 
organisation.  Believing a viewpoint to be ‘right and proper and true’, according 
to participant E, impacted on how one carried out his work and volunteering 
activities.   
Participant H explained that it was a doctrinal requirement that the two 
contractors who participated in the services of the congregation were Jews 
(subscribing to a particular type of Judaism) and male.  He did not consider that 
his contractors in administrative or janitorial roles needed to be of the Jewish 
faith, although those in janitorial roles required to be, ‘open minded’ and 
‘willing to learn the Jewish requirements’.  Participant I, speaking about another 
organisation affiliated with his religion, expressed the belief that it might feel 
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‘more comfortable’ employing a co-religionist in, for example, a finance role, 
even where there was no ‘technical’ reason to do so, because that person would 
be privy to knowledge of income sources and expenditure.  He did not, however, 
know what this organisation did in practice and did not think it would greatly 
concern anyone if the person responsible for the finances was not a co-
religionist.              
 ‘Sympathy’ with ethos 
In respect of those posts for which it was not an occupational requirement that 
the post holder be of a particular religion, there was a range of descriptions 
adopted by the participants’ organisations with regard to the commitment they 
sought from the post holder to the organisation’s ethos and values.  Participant 
C1 explained that staff needed to, ‘recognise’ its organisation’s Christian ethos 
and ‘respect’ the people and communities they work with and their faith even if 
they do not agree with it.  Seemingly requiring more, participant E’s 
organisation required staff to be, ‘broadly in agreement’ with its principles and 
aims.  Participant F looked for its staff to be, ‘in sympathy’ with the 
organisation’s ethos and values, to ‘respect’ the organisation’s beliefs and not 
‘undermine’ its position.  In this regard, values were written in a manner which 
both Christians and non-Christians could easily agree to.  Understanding of ethos 
was important for the organisation’s culture and for staff to be able to ‘reflect’ 
the organisation’s mission in their work.  Participant G’s organisation asked that 
all staff members ‘support’ its ethos, which was not considered to be ‘difficult’ 
given the values of the organisation were also ‘human values’ and ‘values in 
society’.  Recognition by staff at participant J’s organisation of its guiding values 
which were borne from gospel values was ‘non-negotiable’, although it was 
acknowledged that it was not only Christians who held those particular values.  
Understanding of and sympathy with the religious ethos was described by 
participant H as ‘essential’ for undertaking certain roles in his organisation, as 
was engaging with the ‘openness’ of the synagogue, which the participant 
referred to as the, ‘congregational ethos’.  Staff at participant K’s organisation, 
meanwhile, needed to understand the organisation’s ethos, including the 
manner in which the organisation used aspects of the faith in particular projects 
and culturally based sensitivities.  Whilst it was technically important, according 
to participant I, that those working for his former organisation understood (or 
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even agreed) with its religious values, he acknowledged that the extent of their 
understanding / beliefs might be unknown.  Participant D, by contrast, did not 
consider it important that staff understand the Jewish character of the 
organisation, commenting that it was more important that they understood 
‘charity’.  She did not believe it was necessary to be Jewish to learn about the 
projects and programmes she needed to have knowledge of in her own post.  
Although participant D advised that it was not as important that the post holders 
in her organisation understand its Jewish character or belong to the Jewish 
faith, she acknowledged that sharing the same religion was a ‘bond’ among 
staff.  She described the character or ethos of her organisation as, ‘very family’ 
and noted that, ‘family and Jewish probably come together in the same thing’.  
Participant D was also of the view that staff in an organisation without a 
religious ethos would find a different bond. 
 Recruitment strategy  
One of the participants advised that its organisation was ‘targeting’ applicants 
who had the same religious affiliation as the organisation more in its recruitment 
strategies, by virtue of where they placed their advertisements for vacancies.  
The participant explained this was not an attempt to exclude applicants who did 
not have the same religious affiliation as the organisation, but was because 
those who did have the same religious affiliation were more likely to want to 
work for it.   
7.4 Relationships  
From the findings of the study, it is evident that the religious or faith ethos of 
the organisations has, in many instances, an influence on their employment 
relationships, whether in the manner in which they handle employee disputes, or 
through the opportunities provided to staff for spiritual development or to 
participate in forms of worship together.       
 Prayer and other joint acts of worship 
For many of the organisations there were opportunities, and in some cases an 
expectation, in the working day for staff to pray or participate in other forms of 
communal worship.  For some organisations, these acts of worship in the 
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workplace were considered to be very important to the organisation.  
Participant B confirmed that prayer was part of its organisation’s opening weekly 
meeting, explaining they gave the ‘week over to God in prayer’.  The opening 
weekly meeting in participant B’s organisation was supplemented by prayer 
meetings held at weekly and monthly intervals.  Prayer, as well as sung worship 
and scripture reading, also formed part of quarterly staff meetings and volunteer 
training sessions.  Participant B described prayer as, ‘a value that was 
important’ to the organisation and his organisation sought to recruit staff who 
would ‘value’ it and participate in it.  Believing that, ‘prayer makes a 
difference’, the organisation asked its team to pray, and the participant gave 
examples of staff praying at work for the service users.  These acts of worship 
were, according to participant B, instrumental in creating the culture of the 
organisation from which the service users benefit: the work carried out by the 
organisation was ‘service’ to God and these acts of worship gave, ‘God the right 
place in the building’.  Further, it was believed that employee relations 
benefitted from acts of worship in the workplace, participant B saying: 
We do feel that when we worship together, when we pray, when we 
pray for each other, we can deal with issues such as parking egos, 
dealing with division, trying to bring unity in the organisation – that 
it’s not about me, it’s about the other, reminding each other of that.   
Participant E also described the use of prayer in managing employee relations, 
explaining that employees involved in the mediation of a grievance would be 
asked by the mediator to pray together.  The staff in participant E’s organisation 
were ‘encouraged’ to come together to pray weekly, it being ‘expected’ that 
the staff in one part of its service and for whom religion is an occupational 
requirement attend short bible study and daily prayers.  Visitors to the 
organisation who carry out Christian activities abroad will give talks which the 
staff are welcome to attend, and the organisation’s annual conference will host 
some religious activity, though there is no expectation that those who do not 
share the faith with which the organisation is affiliated take part in that 
activity.    
As in participant B’s organisation, staff prayers were also part of regular morning 
worship in participant F’s organisation and for similar purpose.  There was an 
‘expectation’ of attendance but it was not ‘mandatory’.  As his organisation, 
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‘delivers services in Christ’s name’, Participant F said he considered it was 
‘appropriate’ to ‘commit the work that you’re doing to God at the start of the 
day and to worship the subject of your common interest and your common 
motivation’.  Participant F referred to an, ‘ongoing worshipful relationship’ 
among staff, giving the example of one employee saying to another that they are 
praying for them in their bereavement.     
Others did not describe the same level of importance of joint acts of worship to 
the work of their organisation, though some recognised the potential personal 
benefit of such opportunities to the staff.  Participant C2 explained that there 
were opportunities in his organisation for staff to form prayer groups and attend 
services on religious festivals but these were ‘not obligatory’ and there was ‘no 
pressure’ on staff to participate.  In his view, it was likely that those who did 
partake of the opportunities did so in part because they viewed their work with 
the organisation as, ‘very much part of connecting with their faith’.  Participant 
G referred to opportunities including liturgies and retreats for staff to ‘deepen 
their faith’ though these were not compulsory.  Participant D described a 
monthly forum at which a religious piece was delivered for staff, and an act of 
religious observance in the office at Hanukah, whilst participant K recalled 
sharing the opening of the fast with staff which she considered gave a ‘sense of 
team and respect’.  Referring to masses and carol services which staff could 
attend at Christmas and communications from the Archdiocese about 
opportunities for involvement in activities or prayer groups, participant J 
considered that faith was used as a motivation in her organisation in indirect 
ways through the clergy and the ‘presence and involvement’ of the church.  In 
participant J’s organisation prayers were only said at board meetings and 
meetings of senior management which involved board members.  The 
importance of the faith aspect of the organisation to at least half of its 
employees and to its service users had led one individual in the organisation of 
participant J to comment that, ‘the faith element was defined by the people’.  
Of those participants who referred to joint acts of worship in the workplace, 
including prayer, various reasons were cited and varying levels of importance 
were attached.  Whilst some participants focused on the personal benefit 
perceived by staff from such acts, other participants viewed the joint acts of 
worship as more integral to the workings of the organisation: serving God; 
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creating culture; and improving employee relations.  Of particular note is that 
the participants who emphasised the importance of joint acts of worship for 
their organisation also expressed the greater interest in reserving roles in their 
organisation for co-religionists.     
 Spiritual development 
There were mixed responses to the question enquiring of participants what role, 
if any, their organisation considered it had in providing its staff with spiritual 
direction or meeting their spiritual needs.  Most, but not all, provided staff with 
some opportunities for spiritual development though the means by which this 
was provided ranged from direct involvement, at one end of the spectrum, to 
the ‘unintended consequences’ of working to an ethos and values, at the other.   
The organisations of participants B and E came closest to taking an active role in 
their staff’s spiritual development.  Participant B commented that the primary 
responsibility for spiritual development lay with the employees’ churches but 
that his staff and volunteers were often on a ‘journey of discipleship’ at work.  
Their involvement in the organisation ‘changed’ them: they began to view their 
faith, or the service users, differently.  More recently, and in response to this 
phenomenon, participant B’s organisation piloted a scheme involving a small 
number of staff and volunteers who would meet weekly with another member of 
staff as mentor to, ‘biblically reflect over what’s happened and ask theological 
questions’.  This, participant B considered, was of benefit to the organisation 
and its service users, commenting that he wanted people ‘of a mature faith’ and 
‘a maturity that can see stuff, and can interpret it, and park it and it doesn’t 
wobble them too much’.   
Participant E described the active role its organisation took in its staff’s 
‘spiritual’ needs.  Commenting on how its staff, ‘grow day by day and mature’ in 
Christian faith, participant E explained that as part of line management, there 
would be ‘discussion’ about that and its effect on how they do their jobs and 
what they do in their jobs.  This, however, was not to be mistaken for a pastoral 
role which remained the primary responsibility of the churches to which the 
employees belonged.  That said, participant E acknowledged there could be 
some ‘overlap’ since, ‘who we are as people … sometimes has an outflow in our 
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work’.  Accordingly, if an employee is experiencing ‘spiritual difficulty’, mainly 
in their ‘relationship with God’, then the organisation would ask the employee’s 
permission to work together with the employee’s church in dealing with it.   
There was no ‘discipleship programme’ at participant F’s organisation: the ‘level 
of spirituality’ of its employees being a ‘personal issue’ which was ‘between 
them and God’.  Spiritual development came from the employees’ personal faith 
and was the reason many staff would go to church.  However, participant F 
referred to what he would describe as, ‘unintended consequences’ which arose 
from participation in worship in the workplace, as well as in, ‘the examples that 
we see in fellow colleagues and the encouragement to try and actually reflect 
Christ in what we do’.  Giving an example, participant F referred to the 
organisation’s ‘no blame culture’ which was derived from Christian values and 
noted the importance of managers and directors setting a good example in this 
regard.  The participant quoted the Biblical reference, ‘iron sharpening iron’,28 
explaining that when working to an ethos and values, ‘people will sharpen each 
other’.  In participant F’s organisation, performance reviews of staff would 
involve consideration of how the staff member had demonstrated the ethos and 
values of the organisation in his work.   
In participant J’s organisation, a chaplaincy service was offered to give staff 
spiritual direction and meet their spiritual needs but it was also considered that 
‘elements of spirituality’ occurred ‘by the default’ of the organisation being 
faith-inspired.  The example given of this was a conversation between colleagues 
about the church’s stance on homosexuality, initiated by a staff member who 
was gay.    
Participants C and G referred to opportunities for spiritual development in their 
organisations.  Participant G referred to opportunities for staff to, ‘deepen their 
faith’, including liturgies and retreats, whilst participant C2 noted opportunities 
for spiritual development in prayer groups and services on religious festivals, 
attendance at which was entirely voluntary.  Participant C2 considered that the 
opportunities given by the organisation to its staff to develop their knowledge of 
                                         
28 Proverbs 27:17. 
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the ‘bigger issues in this world’, for example through attendance at a talk, or on 
a visit, ‘feeds’ the ‘spiritual journey’ of those of faith and those of none.   
Participant K, meanwhile, explained that since the majority of staff in her 
organisation were Muslim the organisation had an interest in supporting their 
spiritual needs.  In this regard, the organisation provided a comfortable 
environment for staff to pray and considered alternative work patterns for staff 
fasting during Ramadan.   
Aside from the provision of a religious piece at a monthly staff forum, 
participant D did not consider her organisation had any role in attending to the 
spiritual needs of its employees, explaining that most employees would visit 
their Rabbi for that purpose.  Participant H, meanwhile, considered his 
organisation did not have any role in meeting the spiritual needs of its 
contractors, or giving them spiritual guidance.   
 Employee discipline and grievance (and other relationship 
management) 
Some of the participants, particularly B, E and F reported that the handling of 
employee discipline and grievance matters was influenced by the religious ethos 
and/or values of their organisation.  Participant B confirmed there had been a, 
‘biblical precedent’ for historical decisions by management on recruitment, 
redundancy and discipline and that scripture provided guidance.  Participant B 
considered that, influenced by faith, his organisation had, ‘greater tolerance’, 
ensuring in its discipline policies that staff were given the ‘opportunity to 
change’.  In a similar way, participant F identified the, ‘no blame culture’ in his 
organisation as deriving from the organisation’s Christian values.  ‘Conflict 
resolution’ and ‘relationship restoration’, through enquiring whether the person 
is sorry and has learnt from the experience was part of what participant E 
described as a ‘biblical approach’ in her organisation.  Participant E explained 
that the workplace policies in her organisation quoted from God’s word, 
referring to where ‘God’s word is clear’ on behaviour towards one another 
(including the employer-employee relationship).  Both participants E and F 
considered their organisation’s ethos and values had some influence on how they 
handled employee grievances.  In participant E’s organisation, prayer would be 
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part of the mediation of a grievance to assist those involved to search for ‘God’s 
word’ and for what God says about how the dispute should be approached.  
Participant F, meanwhile, commented that there was an ‘expectation’ that the 
Christian principles of ‘mercy’, ‘forgiveness’ and ‘justice’ were relevant to the 
resolution of employee grievance issues in his organisation. 
Participant J identified a number of ways in which the values of her organisation 
(derived from gospel values) had been important in the management of 
employment relationships.  In particular, the organisation’s emphasis on its 
values in discussions with staff had helped it to improve absence levels, and 
consult on service closures, as well as change and manage behaviours of staff.  
The values of the organisation, in participant J’s view, also led the organisation 
to ‘less confrontation’ with the unions.  In employment disputes, participant J 
also noted the ‘guidance’ and ‘direction’ received from clergy involved with the 
organisation.     
Participants C1 and C2 also acknowledged that the values of their organisation 
guided its approach to relationships within the organisation, which were to be 
respectful and loving and supportive of human dignity.  An example was given as 
to how this was achieved in performance matters: through examining the 
manner in which work was carried out, instead of focusing solely on the work 
outputs.  It was felt that ‘robust and clear and legal disciplinary frameworks’ 
were necessary to provide ‘security and transparency’, both important values to 
the organisation, with ‘good administration’ being described as ‘a form of love’.   
Other participants, including participant H did not identify such a strong 
influence.  Participants D and K did not believe that their organisations’ religious 
ethos or values had a bearing on how employee discipline or grievance issues 
were handled.  Participant G, meanwhile, considered that his organisation’s 
ethos might be influential in avoiding the escalation of an employee competency 
or grievance issue in the first place but that if this were unsuccessful, 
employment law compliant policies would guide the approach.   
7 A study of ‘ethos’ in a religious or faith inspired organisation 174 
 Multi-faith employee relations 
The organisation of participants C1 and C2 was described as having a ‘multi-faith 
staff’ at one of its branches.  Participant C2 referred to a Muslim member of his 
staff who had described his experience of working for the Christian organisation 
as, ‘very positive’.  The staff member reported feeling ‘very welcomed’, finding 
his own faith and values ‘reflected’ in those of the organisation and observing 
that he did not feel, in any way, under pressure to become a Christian.  Instead, 
the ‘most difficult tensions’ in the organisation were described by participant C1 
as coming from the different Christian views on issues like gay marriage or 
relating to gender.  Whilst participant C1 explained that they ‘live with these’ 
and tried to negotiate or discuss them, she noted firmly that the organisation 
was ‘very clear’ the law applies to them.  Explaining that they ‘treasure’ 
diversity in the organisation, participant C2 referred to the need to ‘create 
space’ for those of different faiths and beliefs.  As such, he considered that 
there was at times, ‘a fine line … to draw’ in relation to how Christian the 
organisation was in its culture.     
Participant G and E both reported having experienced no difficulties with 
employing staff who did not share the organisation’s faith, with participant E 
noting that it was important such individuals were not ‘hostile’ or ‘antagonistic’, 
commenting that it could be, ‘to some extent beneficial’ with regard to the 
mission purpose of the organisation which was to expose people to God’s word.  
Participant E acknowledged, however, that it would be ‘very difficult’ to employ 
someone who was ‘active’ in a different faith, saying it would be, ‘in 
contradiction to why we exist and what we exist for’.  That participant would 
find it hard to understand why, other than to be ‘divisive’, someone who was of 
opposing views to the faith with which the organisation was affiliated, would 
wish to work for it.    
Participant J acknowledged that there was a risk that newer or younger 
employees might experience feelings of isolation in those parts of her 
organisation which were staffed largely by longer serving staff who were in the 
main Christian or, particularly, Roman Catholic and referred to work in her 
organisation to address this.   
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Although participant K had not found managing a multi-faith staff to be an issue, 
the participant acknowledged that a challenge for the organisation was 
managing the expectations of service users in particular settings who might 
expect the employee providing the services to be Muslim, and supporting the 
non-Muslim employee in this regard.  Although feedback from non-Muslim staff 
in exit interviews had generally been very positive, participant K recognised that 
non-Muslim employees were in the minority in her organisation.  As such she was 
conscious of their experiences of working in the organisation, and sensitive to 
any perception from them that Muslim staff were afforded preference and which 
could lead to a tribunal claim.    
7.5 Employment and equality law  
 Expertise 
There was a large range of expertise in employment law amongst the 
participants, from, at one end of the spectrum, experienced human resource 
personnel, to, at the other end, those who described having no employment law 
knowledge whatsoever.     
 Views on employment and equality law 
Some, but not all, of the participants provided comment on the provisions in the 
EA on occupational requirements for religious ethos employers.  One participant 
(B) described the provisions as, ‘grey and uncomfortable’.  The burden of proof 
on the employer to demonstrate the occupational requirement was cited as a 
particular concern given that someone might dispute his view of his 
organisation’s needs.   
Participant E cited similar concerns about the ambiguity surrounding the 
application of the current provisions on occupational requirements.  The 
participant felt the outcomes of tribunal decisions on the occupational 
requirement provisions were, ‘unpredictable’, noting concern that, ‘the basis’ 
on which tribunals are to make judgments in this area, ‘is not clear’.  She 
considered the judgements were based on the view of the tribunal rather than 
legal principle and this put her organisation, as a Christian organisation, at risk 
particularly because the tribunal would not necessarily fully understand the 
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Christian or faith ethos of each organisation.  She observed that, ‘tribunals have 
not been sympathetic’ in cases brought against other Christian organisations, 
considering that the reason for this might be in part due to ‘a lack of 
understanding of the Christian faith’.  Participant B felt that one of the greatest 
challenges for Christian organisations is for them to, ‘express themselves 
maturely enough and well enough for others of no faith to understand what they 
are trying to do’.  The perceived lack of sympathy identified by participant E, 
was echoed by participant F who observed that he felt there was ‘more 
intolerance’ towards and a ‘greater readiness to question’ his organisation’s use 
of the occupational requirement provisions.   
Participant B would like to see a ‘clearer’ definition of faith organisation and, 
provided the organisation falls within that definition, a ‘freedom’ to recruit 
people from the same faith.  Participant E also suggested it would be her 
preference for ‘a wider element of trust’ that individuals and organisations 
would be ‘ethical’ in the manner in which they handled matters, though she 
accepted this could not be applied ‘randomly’.  She expressed a sadness that it 
was necessary to demonstrate satisfaction of the occupational requirement 
provisions, saying: 
I think as an organisation we’d love for it to be that because we are 
clear and open and honest about what it is that we believe and why 
we do what we do that it would be perfectly acceptable both to the 
law and to the public that we chose to employ people who thought 
the same as we did.   
In its current form, however, the organisation could ‘work with it’: it gave the 
organisation an, ‘element of choice’ and participant E considered it was ‘not 
difficult’ to provide evidence of compliance.   
Not all participants were concerned about the impact of the occupational 
requirement provisions on recruitment. Participant G, for example, confirmed it 
caused his organisation no difficulties, which is understood to be a view shared 
by Participant C.  Participant J was ‘comfortable’ with the provisions and 
considered her organisation worked ‘very clearly within the parameters of the 
law’.  She acknowledged, however, that increased secularisation and the need 
to balance the expectations of Christian staff as well as those engaging a faith-
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inspired service with the legal challenges of employing a diverse workforce and 
keeping the faith message and the organisation’s values ‘alive’, was an ‘ongoing 
challenge’.  Participant J was strongly of the view that the organisation needed 
to engage a diverse workforce and serve a diverse user base in order to 
‘articulate and demonstrate’ Catholic teachings through its actions.  
Commenting on employment law more generally, one participant observed that 
difficulties could arise where an employee behaves in a way which brings the 
organisation into disrepute, for example by having an extra-marital affair: 
employment law may not permit a fair dismissal in these circumstances. 
Participant I did not personally have a strong view on the ethos exception.  He 
believed that the regulation surrounding employment for the purposes of an 
organised religion would ‘terrify’ others in his position, and be considered ‘all 
too much’.  Understood to be speaking more generally about employment law 
regulation, participant I expressed the opinion that most others in his position 
would prefer, if possible, not to have the legal responsibility of being an 
employer.  He expressed the belief that the religious group of which his 
organisation forms part has avoided employment issues in the past rather than 
keep abreast of employment law requirements.   
More generally, both participants E and F made comments suggestive of a belief 
that Christianity may not be given its rightful place in law.  Participant F wanted 
to see in the implementation and interpretation of laws, ‘as much respect of the 
Christian faith as there is for all faiths’.  Participant E, meanwhile, felt the 
obligation on organisations to comply with European legislation was causing 
Britain to lose to a degree, ‘what would have been a historic Christian identity’.  
She felt personally that legal protections had been put in place to protect 
people against faith groups which were, ‘harmful to either people’s personal 
safety or the population as a whole’ because of their, ‘particular views or 
values’.  She felt this approach, ‘disproportionately affects all faith groups’.   
Participant E also made reference to the plight of conscientious objectors in the 
workplace and to a tendency in some cases for gender to be prioritised over 
faith.  She would like to see ‘more safeguards’ for religious organisations and 
religious individuals in situations where there were no safety concerns to the 
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public.  She drew a comparison with what she saw as the, ‘very clear safeguards’ 
there were for political parties and affiliations.  She spoke about the need for 
freedom of speech for those ‘who will exercise it responsibly’: a freedom her 
organisation felt was, to some degree, being ‘eroded’.   
Other changes to employment law the participants would like included a desire 
for greater clarity on the distinction between employee and self-employed 
status (participant H), a strengthening of gender equality (participant C), and a 
‘recognition’ of the difficulties experienced by religious organisations which 
relied on charitable donations and external funding in meeting changes in 
employment law which might be ‘well based and fair’ but which had a financial 
implication (participant F).   
 Negative public opinion  
Views were sought from some of the participants on how they would respond to 
the opinion of some sections of the public that all jobs in an organisation with a 
religious or faith ethos should be open to applicants of all faiths or none.  
Participant J agreed with this view, commenting that to be ‘faith-inspired’ an 
organisation should be ‘inclusive’. Participant J also commented positively that 
having a diverse staff enabled the organisation to be challenged.  Participant E 
considered that ‘choice’ was relevant: in her view imposition of the 
occupational requirement in her organisation did not exclude an individual from 
exercising their skills elsewhere.  ‘Explanation’, ‘education’ and ‘awareness’ 
were cited by participant E as being needed to change attitudes.  Participant G, 
meanwhile, who believed that employing, ‘a central cadre’ of staff and a 
leadership who were Catholic was necessary to maintain the organisation as a 
‘Catholic’ one, considered, ‘respect’ for views and values was needed to change 
the public attitude.  Concern about changing public attitudes towards faith 
organisations was expressed by participant E who thought, though she did not 
know for certain, that there may be ‘a growing lack of tolerance or 
understanding of what faith organisations are about and may be a lack of respect 
perhaps for them which perhaps society had’.   
This sentiment that negative public attitude to the use by organisations with a 
religious or faith ethos of occupational requirements may, in part, be 
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attributable to a lack of understanding, was echoed by participant F who 
commented, ‘I think that if people don’t fully understand the elements of your 
faith they they’re not going to fully understand why you might want to do 
things.’  For participant F, the faith requirement in certain roles was ‘important’ 
for his organisation’s ethos and values.  Whilst he hoped that the public 
attitudes could be changed by the recognition that there was a ‘clear 
connection’ between his organisation’s ‘good outcomes’ and operating to a 
‘common ethos and common values’, he did not believe the public could be 
persuaded of this, as it was, in his view, ‘something that needs to be seen and 
experienced in order to understand’.     
7.6 Conclusion  
The study provided participants with an opportunity to convey their views and 
share their experiences as managers or employers of employment in 
organisations with a religious or faith ethos.  Although the scale of the study 
would suggest that caution be exercised before reaching firm conclusions, the 
study nonetheless offers a valuable insight into the needs and interests of 
employers.  As reported above, it reveals some divergence of opinion or in 
experience among the participants, but so too does it disclose a significant level 
of common ground and shared understanding.  This section will bring together 
and provide comment on what are considered to be the strongest ideas to have 
emerged from the study.  These are: the relevance of organisational purpose, 
staff relationships and worship in the workplace, on the use of religion as an 
occupational requirement; the importance of ethos; and the interdependency of 
staff and ethos.  
 Religion as an occupational requirement: purpose; 
relationships and worship   
Whereas there was a significant degree of convergence in opinion on the 
importance of organisational ethos and values in employment matters, 
approaches diverged on the use of religion as an occupational requirement.  
Although the perceived need for the use of the occupational requirement varied 
from one participant to the next, each participant could quite clearly articulate 
the reason or reasons for desiring its imposition in each case.  It was evident 
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that the perceived needs of all participants who used the occupational 
requirement were considered and were felt quite strongly.   
Of particular interest was the range of responses in respect of the use of the 
occupational requirement: from all jobs at one end of the spectrum to just a 
few, or even none, at the other.  In search of an explanation for this divergence, 
three themes emerge as important and may be worthy of further investigation.  
These are: purpose; relationships; and worship.  There is some evidence from 
the study’s findings to suggest that there may be a greater perceived need for 
the use of the occupational requirement in those organisations with a ‘missional’ 
purpose,29 and/or in those organisations where relationships among staff who are 
co-religionists, including worshipful relationships, are valued or even integral to 
the work of the organisation.  These aspects of employment form part of the 
‘context’ in which work is performed and were important to some of the 
participants.   
 Importance of ethos  
Although ‘ethos’ has been described as a ‘fluid and indeterminate’ concept,30 
most of the participants appeared nonetheless to be very comfortable describing 
the ethos or character of their organisations in some detail, often with reference 
to organisational purpose and guiding values.  The ease and detail with which 
organisational ethos and values were referred to by the participants was the first 
indicator of their importance.  It was observed that most of the participants 
spoke about the ethos and values of their organisations with what could be 
described as a sense of pride and ownership.   
The importance of ethos and values to the participants’ organisations was 
further underlined by the descriptions given by many of the participants of their 
influence on internal and external relationships.  There was often a clear 
connection drawn by the participants between the organisational ethos and 
values and its approach to the external activity it carried out, whether in serving 
those in need or in educating others, for example.  Yet, of even more interest 
                                         
29 ‘Missional’ is referred to here in the sense of introducing or educating individuals in the religion.   
30 Mark Coen, ‘Religious Ethos and Employment Equality: a Comparative Irish Perspective’ (Sep 
2008) 28 LS 452, 458.   
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was the evidence from several of the participants that organisational ethos and 
values were also important to the relationship between the organisation and its 
staff, and/or to the relationships among staff members.  Indeed, the information 
provided by several of the participants about the pervasiveness of organisational 
ethos and values in employment matters was striking.  Ethos and values, it 
would appear, were relevant and influential at many stages of the employment 
relationship, from recruitment through to decisions on termination.  The need 
for the post holder to uphold the organisational ethos was often cited as a 
reason by participants for requiring religion as an occupational requirement.  
Organisational ethos and values were further referred to by certain of the 
participants as relevant or influential in the organisations’ approaches to 
absence management, performance monitoring, change management, as well as 
in discipline and grievance matters.   
It is instructive to pause and ask whether the tie between organisational ethos 
and values and managing employment relationships to which several of the 
participants attested is unique to organisations which are religious or faith-
inspired.  One might speculate that it is not.  After all, many organisations 
nowadays claim to have a set of values or principles designed to guide their 
approach to internal and external relationships, albeit the influence of such 
values or principles will likely vary from organisation to organisation.   Still, it 
remains open to question whether the intensity of the connection between ethos 
or values and employment relationships of which there is some evidence in this 
study, is peculiar to religious or faith-inspired organisations.  Some of the 
participants expressed views on what, if anything, made their organisations 
different to organisations which did not have a religious or faith ethos.  One 
participant agreed that the values of her organisation might have greater 
significance because the organisation was clear about their gospel roots.  
Another participant insightfully observed that those staff in an organisation with 
a religious or faith ethos who performed in roles with religion as an occupational 
requirement shared, ‘a mutual starting point’.  This, he thought, made the 
organisation different (though, he stressed he was not declaring it was 
necessarily better) to an organisation which recruited staff who were 
‘converted’ or ‘inducted’ into the organisation’s principles or culture after 
joining.  A third participant observed that having in an organisation, a faith 
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ethos, even if it is not particularly strong, together with a majority of staff who 
share the faith, ‘can help bring people together in terms of an ultimate, kind of 
goal’.  Another participant who considered there was an ‘enormous’ difference 
between organisations with a religious character and those without, made 
reference to ‘the voluntary aspect’ and the fact people in organisations with a 
religious character ‘go the further mile’.  According to this participant, the 
additional effort by staff who ‘believe their job is more than what they are paid 
for’ gave a religious care home which he had visited ‘a community atmosphere’.  
Not all participants agreed that the difference was significant.  One participant 
considered that although a shared religion was a bond among staff in an 
organisation with a religious ethos, employees working in another organisation 
would find a different bond.   
 Interdependency of staff and ethos 
Of further interest from the study is the evidence gathered from the participants 
of what could be described as, the ‘inter-dependency’ of organisational ethos 
and staff.  Most participants considered that their staff (or at least some of their 
staff) contributed in an important way to the organisation’s ethos, albeit that 
the desired level of commitment to the ethos varied from participant to 
participant and from role to role.  That an organisation’s ethos depends, at least 
in part, on the actions and behaviours of its staff is perhaps obvious.  Of more 
interest than an organisation’s dependency on staff for its ethos, however, is the 
dependency of some staff in the participants’ organisations on the organisational 
ethos.  This is because most of the participants reported that a significant 
number of their employees chose to work for their organisation because of its 
religious or faith nature.  It was believed that some employees considered 
employment with the participants’ organisations to be, a ‘calling’ or even a form 
of religious worship.  Work for many of those motivated to seek employment in a 
religious or faith ethos organisation was not only driven by faith but was an 
integral part of the exercise of it.  Employment in a religious or faith ethos 
organisation may thus be important, or even essential, to the exercise by certain 
individuals of their religion or belief.   
Whereas individuals who seek employment in organisations which are not 
religious or faith-inspired may, in part, be attracted by their organisations’ 
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values or principles, it is likely that a number of other factors will also motivate 
their decision: job availability, location, promotion prospects, salary, for 
example.  If religious or faith-inspired organisations are unique insofar as they 
attract a significant number of staff whose faith is the dominant motive for 
employment, the inter-dependency of organisational ethos and staff may be a 
significant feature differentiating those organisations with a religious or faith 
ethos, from those without.  
 Implications for interpretation of the employment 
exceptions 
If the inter-dependency of organisational ethos and staff makes religious or faith-
inspired organisations unique, it may also support a different approach to 
interpretation of the employment exceptions31 than to interpretation of the OR 
exception which, it will be recalled, can be relied on by any employer and can 
permit discrimination on any grounds.32  In particular, the findings of this study 
support an approach to the employment exceptions, which considers the context 
in which work is carried out, including the ethos of the employer, as especially 
important.    
                                         
31 I.e. the religious ethos exception, the organised religion exception and the faith schools 
exception (see chapter 3 at 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.2.1). 
32 For the detail of the OR exception, see chapter 3 at 3.3.1. 
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8 Freedom of association as a basis for 
interpretation of the employment exceptions 
8.1 Introduction 
I argued in chapter 6 that the employment equality exceptions for religious 
employers in Britain lack a principled underpinning.   An empirical study, seeking 
the perspective of religious employers, found that ethos and values were nearly 
always central to the work and employment relationships of employers with a 
religious or faith-based ethos.  The study uncovered evidence of the faith 
motivations of employees and the relational aspects of some religious 
workplaces.  It also highlighted the importance of organisational purpose, ethos 
and relationships to the use of the employment exceptions.1  In light of these 
findings relating to associative life, the present chapter will consider the utility 
of freedom of association as a basis for interpretation of the employment 
exceptions.   
In this chapter, the nature of freedom of association will be explored, as well as 
its value and the extent to which it is protected under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (the ‘ECHR’) and in the UK.  Despite the extensive scope of the 
right to freedom of association under the ECHR, it will be observed that most 
judicial consideration of this liberty in the UK concerns mainly its impact on 
trade union activity.  In particular, freedom of association is rarely considered in 
any detail in British cases concerning exclusionary employment policies: a trend 
which is also reflected in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(the ‘ECtHR’).  I will make the case for applying freedom of association to the 
question of interpretation of the employment exceptions.  Freedom of 
association is an important basis of religious autonomy, and the employment 
decisions of religious employers should engage the protections which the right 
affords against state interference in an association’s internal affairs.  I will argue 
that freedom of association calls for an interpretation of the employment 
exceptions that is identity-protecting.  On this analysis the employment 
exceptions offer a vehicle through which employers may discriminate in order to 
preserve their unique ethos for the benefit of the membership they serve, 
                                         
1 For a report and comment on the findings of the empirical study, see chapter 7. 
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provided always that this does not disproportionately infringe the rights and 
interests of others.  I will contend that this interpretation of freedom of 
association offers a principled justification for the employment exceptions and a 
sound basis for defining their limits.   
8.2 Freedom of Association: value and scope 
 Value of freedom of association 
Freedom of association protects the right to form or to join an association for a 
common purpose.  Individuals associate in innumerable ways and for various 
reasons: as members of religious congregations, for example, or of recreational 
clubs, trade unions, political parties or advocacy groups, to name only a few.2  
Individuals derive enjoyment from the many ‘experiences’ which associations 
give rise to, identified as including: 
the opportunity for the display of energy and shrewdness presented by 
business life … the activism, daring, and creativity summoned by 
political, moral and cultural movements; the exhilaration that arises 
from involvement in political life or the life of public advocacy; the 
camaraderie and self-confirmation that comes from social clubs; the 
gratification of loyally helping to maintain a tradition or way of life; 
and so on.3 
At the heart of the value of freedom of association is the essential role it plays 
in the development of one’s identity.4  There are many variables which influence 
the formation of individual identity, but perhaps none more so than expression, 
thought, religion and/or conscience.  Each supports individuals to pursue their 
chosen paths in life, and to formulate their own morality.  It follows that respect 
                                         
2 For comment on the range of associations which people establish, see Amy Gutmann, 'An 
Introductory Essay' in Amy Gutmann (ed), Freedom of Association (Princeton University Press 
1998) 3; see also Larry Alexander, 'What is Freedom of Association, and What is its Denial?' 
(2008) 25 Social Philosophy and Policy 1, 1 where Alexander comments, ‘Freedom of 
association, as I understand it, refers to the liberty a person possesses to enter into 
relationships with others – for any and all purposes, for a momentary or long-term duration, by 
contract, consent, or acquiescence.’ 
3 George Kateb, 'The Value of Association' in Amy Gutmann (ed), Freedom of Association (1998) 
38-39. 
4 Kent Greenawalt has asserted, ‘associations are valuable because they represent human choices 
about how to live and because of their influence on people’s lives’ in Kent Greenawalt, 
'Freedom of Association and Religious Association' in Amy Gutmann (ed), Freedom of 
Association (Princeton University Press 1998) 110. 
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for autonomy and human dignity requires that each be protected.5  Though 
expression, thought, religion and conscience can be practised individually, their 
exercise can require or be enhanced by association with others.  The importance 
of the collective exercise of religion to the individual has already been explored 
and attested to.6  Collective effort is also often required to realise freedom of 
expression since the individual voice is restricted in what it can achieve.7  One 
way of understanding the value of association, then, is to regard it as deserving 
of protection because it is necessary for the full realisation of freedoms that 
protect individual identity.  One academic draws attention to the works of John 
Rawls as authority for understanding freedom of association as, ‘the collective 
ancillary to individuals’ moral self-determination’.8  He remarks:  
In the Rawlsian, liberal analysis, freedom of thought and conscience 
protects citizens’ exercise and development of different conceptions 
of the good — public and private — whereas freedom of association 
safeguards the concrete social structures needed for the practical 
realisation of these projects and commitments in various social 
frameworks.  Accordingly, it enables the effective realisation of moral 
personality, which would otherwise remain abstract and hollow, 
devoid of the concrete social structures that are necessary to ensure 
its flourishing.9 
On this interpretation, associational life is justified primarily by its contribution 
to individual identity or, more particularly, ‘moral personality’.10  It is, however, 
not only associations which permit individuals to realise their rights to free 
expression, thought, conscience and religion that are valuable.  Relationships of 
many different kinds can provide the individual with a sense of belonging or 
purpose, essential to their well-being.11  Freedom of association enables 
                                         
5 See discussion on autonomy and human dignity as justifications for freedom of religion in chapter 
2 at 2.4.4.  
6 See discussion on the role of religious communities in the individual practice of religion in chapter 
2 at 2.4.4.   
7 Gutmann (ch 8, n 2) 3.  
8 Eoin Daly, 'Freedom of Association Through the Prism of Gender Quotas in Politics' (2012) 47 IJ 
76, 98. 
9 ibid 97.    
10 ibid 97-98.  See also Merilin Kiviorg ‘Collective Religious Autonomy versus Individual Rights: A 
Challenge for the ECHR?’ (2014) 39 Review of Central and East European Law 315 where 
Kiviorg argues that the individual autonomy rationale for both individual and collective religious 
freedom ought to guide the ECtHR in navigating the conflict between collective religious 
autonomy and individual rights.   
11 In reference to ideas propounded by Robert Cover in Robert M Cover, 'The Supreme Court 1982 
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative' 97 HarvLRev 4, Martha Minow comments ’smaller than the 
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individuals to form close relationships of ‘love and friendship’12 and other ties 
which may have importance in their lives.  In itself, the autonomy to freely 
choose and develop relationships contributes considerably to character 
formation.13   
The ‘qualities of human life’ brought about by involvement in an association 
have been said to include: ‘camaraderie, cooperation, dialogue, deliberation, 
negotiation, competition, creativity, and the kinds of self-expression and self-
sacrifice that are possible only in association with others’.14  Associational 
activity has been rightly praised for cultivating, ‘respect, equality, deliberation, 
discussion, compromise, and self-sacrifice’ and teaching individuals how, ‘to 
deal fairly with their fellows’.15  Whilst these qualities enhance individual 
experience, their cultivation in individuals will benefit society as well.   There is 
other societal benefit to be derived from the value which freedom of association 
affords to the individual.  For example, whilst political associations play an 
essential role in facilitating the individual’s freedom of expression in the 
political process,16 they also safeguard, ‘the integrity of the political process 
against partisan manipulation in the conduct of competition for public power’.17  
In enhancing an individual’s ability freely to pursue his personal vision of what is 
right and important, associational life advances diversity, essential for a liberal 
state,18 and creates a ‘vibrant “public sphere”’, claimed to act, ‘as a 
counterweight to the power of the State’.19 
                                         
state, and exemplified by religious communities, meaningful subcommunities generate norms 
embedded in texts and histories that organize many people’s lives and lend them both order 
and a sense of significance.’  Martha Minow, 'Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil 
Rights Laws?' (2007) 48 BCLRev 781, 825.       
12 Gutmann (ch 8, n 2) 3.   
13 George Kateb comments, ‘Inseparable and indistinguishable from being a self – having a unique 
identity – is having the relationships that one wants.’ Kateb (ch 8, n 3) 48; see also at 36, where 
he asserts  ‘Picking one’s company is part of living as one likes, living as one likes (provided 
one does not injure the vital claims of others) is what being free means.’ 
14 Gutmann (ch 8, n 2) 4.       
15 Greenawalt (ch 8, n 4) 110. 
16 Gutmann (ch 8, n 2) 3.  
17 Daly (ch 8, n 8) 99-101.   
18 See also Patrick Lenta, 'Taking Diversity Seriously: Religious Associations and Work-Related 
Discrimination' (2009) 126 SALJ 827, 832-33. 
19 Daly (ch 8, n 8) 99, referring to Justice Brennan in Roberts v United States Jaycees 468 US 609 
(1984) (Roberts) at 618-19.  See also Greenawalt (ch 8, n 4) 110 where Greenawalt comments, 
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 Scope of legal protection for freedom of association  
The recognition of freedom of association in various national, European and 
international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights20 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,21 is 
indicative of its value.  Article 11 of the ECHR provides, under the heading, 
‘Freedom of assembly and association’, that, ‘Everyone has the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the 
right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.’  
Although specific reference is made in the article to trade unions, the ECtHR has 
held that an association is ‘a form of voluntary grouping for a common goal’22 
and therefore has interpreted the article widely.23  To rely on article 11, the 
association must be a ‘membership’ organisation,24  ‘voluntary’ in nature and set 
up in order to pursue a ‘legitimate goal for mutual or public benefit’.25  The 
association must also demonstrate a, ‘certain institutional character’26 excluding 
social ties of friendship, for example, from the scope of article 11.  The ECtHR 
has found a wide range of associations capable of satisfying these tests, 
                                         
‘Associations help prevent a tyranny of the majority and forestall absolutist pretentions of 
government officials’.     
20 Art 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ‘Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.’ 
21 Art 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that, 
‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all 
levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone 
to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests. 
2. Political parties at Union level contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens of the 
Union.’ 
In the workplace context, see also, Art 5 and art 6 of the European Social Charter and the 
preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (the ‘ILO’), as well as the 
ILO’s Convention No 87 on ‘Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise’. 
22 Young, James and Webster v the United Kingdom, nos 7601/76 and 7896/77, (Commission’s 
report, 14 December 1979), para 167 available at 
<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-73526"]}> accessed 28 December 2017. 
23   Zvonimir Mataga, 'The Right to Freedom of Association under the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (Strasbourg, October 2006) 5 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan044376.pdf>   
accessed 28 December 2017. 
24 Dragan Golubovic, 'Freedom of Association in the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights' (2013) 17 IJHR 758, 761-62. 
25 ibid 761-63. 
26 Mataga (ch 8, n 23) 5. 
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including companies.27  Associations which will not engage article 11 include 
public law associations, such as the Law Society of Scotland which practising 
solicitors in Scotland must join.  Set up by public act, associations like these 
have public powers and are not primarily engaged in serving their members’ 
private interests.28      
The positive rights under article 11 to form and join associations include the 
right of the association to carry out any action in the pursuit of its goals, acquire 
legal personality, and, importantly, control its internal structure.29  The ECtHR 
has also held that article 11 includes the right of an association to freely 
determine its membership.30  In ASLEF v the United Kingdom,31 the ECtHR found 
that the UK had violated the right to freedom of association in preventing a 
trade union from expelling an unwanted member because of his political views.  
Delivering the judgment, the then President of the ECtHR, Mr J Casadevall, 
opined:  
Where associations are formed by people, who, espousing particular 
values or ideals, intend to pursue common goals, it would run counter 
to the very effectiveness of the freedom at stake if they had no 
control over their membership.32 
The United States Supreme Court has expressed a similar sentiment in respect of 
its constitutional protection of free association, affirming that compelled 
membership is the clearest example of interference with a group’s internal 
organisation and concerns.33  The right to associate freely is often said to require 
a corresponding right to exclude the unwanted from participating in the 
                                         
27 For comment on freedom of association cases concerning companies, see Mataga (ch 8, n 23) 
6. 
28 ibid 6-7.  See also, Golubovic (ch 8, n 24) 762.    
29 Mataga (ch 8, n 23) 8-11. 
30 Cheall v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR CD74 [6]  ‘In the exercise of rights under Article 11(1), 
unions must remain free to decide, in accordance with union rules, questions concerning 
admission to and expulsion from the union.’   
31Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) v United Kingdom (2007) 45 
EHRR 34 (ASLEF). 
32 ibid [39]; see also dicta of Justice Brennan in Roberts (ch 8, n 19) 623 ‘Freedom of association 
therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.’    
33 Per Justice Brennan in Roberts (ch 8, n 19) 623 ‘There can be no clearer example of an intrusion 
into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to 
accept members it does not desire.’    
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relationship.34  Few would disagree with the proposition that the right to exclude 
is, ‘to some degree, an integral and important part of freedom of association’:35 
if a group is compelled to accept any individual requesting membership, the 
element of choice inferred in the freedom to associate is diminished.36   
In addition to these positive rights, article 11 can also engage a negative right 
not to be a member of an association.  In this regard the ECtHR has found that 
some trade union closed shop arrangements infringe article 11.37  The right to 
freedom of association is qualified, and restrictions must be ‘prescribed by law’ 
and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for one of the reasons stated in the 
second subsection of the article which include, ‘the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’.38  States have a margin of appreciation in determining the 
appropriate balance to be struck between freedom of association and competing 
interests.    
Each signatory to the ECHR is under a positive duty to ensure the right to 
freedom of association is complied with in their jurisdiction, and a negative duty 
to avoid interference with the right.39  In the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998 
(the ‘HRA’) obliges public authorities to comply with the ECHR.40  This extends to 
a duty on the judiciary to interpret legislation where possible in compliance with 
convention rights, including article 11.41  Notwithstanding the ‘capacious’ scope 
                                         
34 For example, Stuart White, 'Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude' (1997) 5 The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 373, 373.   
35 ibid 373.  See also Gutmann (ch 8, n 2) 11 where Gutmann comments, ‘A requirement of open 
membership would undermine the value of many secondary associations and destroy any 
meaningful sense of freedom of association as it applies to secondary associations.’ 
36 The European Court of Human Rights opined that ‘the notion of a freedom implies some 
measure of freedom of choice as to its exercise’ in Young, James and Webster v United 
Kingdom (App no 7601/76) (1982) 4 EHRR 38, [52]. 
37 ibid; see discussion in Mataga (ch 8, n 23) 11-13. 
38 Art 11(2) provides that, ‘No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than 
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not 
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the 
armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.’ 
39 Mataga (ch 8, n 23) 23-24.    
40 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6. 
41 ibid, s 3 and s 6.  
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of freedom of association,42 and the obligation on the judiciary to read and give 
effect to legislation, where possible, in a way which is compatible with 
convention rights, article 11 has received very little judicial attention in the 
UK.43  A relatively limited number of cases in the UK have explored freedom of 
association in any detail,44 and most of these relate to trade union activities.  
Even in the context of trade union activities, exploration of the principle of 
freedom of association has been constrained by an apparent reluctance on the 
part of the judiciary, at least until more recently, to consider relevant European 
and international jurisprudence.  One academic, reviewing trade union rights in 
the UK, makes reference to, ‘the resistance by the domestic judiciary to take 
account of the legal principles set out in a number of later Strasbourg decisions 
handed down both before, and since, the Human Rights Act 1998 became 
enforceable in 2000’.45  The Court of Appeal’s decision in Metrobus v UNITE the 
Union,46 is indicative.  Arguments by Counsel for UNITE that the ECtHR case of 
Demir and Baykara v Turkey47 provided authority for the relevance of the 
jurisprudence of the International Labour Organisation and European Social 
Charter in determining the extent of article 11 rights, and in interpreting UK 
statutory law, were given little attention.48 
Outside of the trade union context, only a few cases in the UK have considered 
freedom of association.  In one of these, RSPCA v Attorney General,49 the 
Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice had to determine whether the 
RSPCA was entitled to adopt a policy to exclude pro-hunting individuals from its 
membership.  Finding that article 11 enshrined the, ‘freedom to exclude from 
association those whose membership it honestly believes to be damaging to the 
                                         
42 Alexander (ch 8, n 2) 1. 
43 Daly has similarly identified a lack of legal analysis in the Republic of Ireland, opining that, 
‘Freedom of association remains one of the least theorised, and doctrinally underdeveloped of 
constitutional rights in this jurisdiction.’ Daly (ch 8, n 8) 116. 
44 In a Westlaw search, carried out on 10 January 2017, only 58 cases in the UK jurisdiction had in 
the subject line ‘freedom of association’ or ‘freedom of assembly and association’.   
45 Charles Barrow, 'Trade Union Rights in the United Kingdom and Article 11 of the European 
Convention: Past Failures and Future Possibilities' (2013) EHRLR 56, 57.   
46 Metrobus v Unite the Union [2009] EWCA Civ 829, [2010] ICR 173. 
47 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 EHRR 54.  
48 See discussion in Ruth Dukes, 'The Right to Strike Under UK Law: Not More Than Just a 
Slogan?' (2010) 39 ILJ 82. 
49 RSPCA v Attorney General (2002) 1 WLR 448 (Ch).  
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interests of the society’,50 the court determined that the RSPCA was entitled to 
adopt the exclusionary membership policy, though it ultimately concluded that 
the scheme proposed by the RSPCA to implement the policy was inappropriate 
insofar as it did not give the excluded applicant or member an opportunity to 
state his case.       
Specific accommodation for exclusionary membership policies by associations is 
made in the Equality Act 2010 (the ‘EA’).51  In order to satisfy the definition of 
‘association’ in the EA the body must have at least 25 members and rules 
regulating membership which involve a selection process.52  Though such 
associations are subject to the general prohibition of discrimination on protected 
grounds, they are permitted by the EA to restrict membership and access to 
benefits by associates and guests to people who share a particular 
characteristic, other than colour.53  Thus, as guidance from the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission explains, ‘An association for Christian women does not 
have to admit women of beliefs other than Christianity, nor does it have to 
admit men whether Christian or of any other belief.’54  It is only where the 
association, ‘has been set up for people who share a protected characteristic’ 
that it can discriminate,55 and the only discrimination permitted is restriction of 
membership or access to persons holding that characteristic.  Thus, as the EHRC 
guidance explains, ‘A men’s amateur rugby club can refuse to accept women but 
it cannot reject men because of their race or their sexual orientation.’56   
                                         
50 ibid [37(b)]. 
51  Equality Act 2010 (EA), pt 7 and sch 16. There are, additionally, special exceptions in the EA 
permitting religion or belief organisations to restrict membership, participation in its activities or 
the provision of goods, facilities and services, to persons of a particular religion or belief.  The 
purpose of the religion or belief organisation must be, ‘to practice, promote or teach a religion or 
belief’, and its sole purpose must not be commercial.  The restriction will be permitted if the 
purpose of the organisation is to provide services to one religion or belief, or if it is necessary to 
avoid causing offence to persons with the same religion or belief as the organisation. 
52 ibid s 107.   
53 ibid, sch 16.  Note, this exception does not apply to political parties.   
54 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘What Equality Law Means For Your Association, Club 
or Society’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission First Published January 2011 and Updated 
April 2014) 20.  
55 ibid 21. 
56 ibid 22. 
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The origins of these provisions pre-date the EA.  Prior to the consolidation of 
equalities legislation, private clubs were prohibited from discriminating against 
members, associates and applicant members on grounds of race, sexual 
orientation and disability, but were exempted from liability if the club was 
formed for people who shared one of these protected characteristics.  When the 
EA extended the prohibition of discrimination by private clubs to cover 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, sex, pregnancy or maternity, age, 
and gender reassignment, it also extended the exemption to cover clubs set up 
for people sharing one of these additional protected characteristics.   
Some indication of the policy reason behind these provisions in the EA (and those 
it consolidated) can be gleaned from the Government’s response to its 
consultation on the Equality Bill.57  Although the Government does not refer 
explicitly to freedom of association, there is evidence of its influence.  
Committing to retain the threshold of 25 members before an association will be 
subject to non-discrimination norms, the Government explained this would, 
‘ensure that the law does not impinge on private gatherings’.58  By excluding 
private gatherings from the ambit of the provisions, the Government provides 
heightened protection for freedom of intimate association.  The Government’s 
stated reason for retaining the exemption for single characteristic clubs is 
further evidence of freedom of association underpinning its approach.  
Commenting on the response in its consultation to the proposal to retain the 
exemption, the Government said:  
Over 90 per cent of respondents agreed, recognising that it can be a 
positive benefit to have clubs set up for groups against whom 
discrimination is prohibited; and that it is important for groups of 
people to have their own space.  We agree that this must not provide 
an excuse for people to set up clubs just so as to exclude particular 
vulnerable groups of people and that it should be for a real positive 
benefit rather than for purposes of segregation.59 
The Government’s references to the, ‘positive benefit’ of the single 
characteristic club for its members and the importance of ensuring groups of 
                                         
57 Government Equalities Office, The Equality Bill - Government Response to the Consultation (Cm 
7454, 21 July 2008). 
58 ibid 159, para 12.14. 
59  ibid 159, para 12.12. 
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people have their, ‘own space’ resonate with the value in freedom of association 
identified at the outset of this chapter. There is benefit to individuals in forming 
relationships with others who share the same protected characteristics given the 
contribution of protected characteristics to personal identity, and the utility of 
association in developing identity.  Discrimination is permitted by these 
provisions because restricting membership in this way serves the interests of the 
people for whom the association was created.  Though it is likely that freedom 
of association underlies these provisions, there has yet to be a case on them 
which would give the judiciary the opportunity to explore the concept further.   
8.3 The case for reading freedom of association into the 
employment exceptions 
 Freedom of association as a source of religious autonomy 
I have argued above at 8.2.2 that despite the importance and extensive scope of 
the right to freedom of association under the ECHR, and the obligations on the 
UK to abide by convention rights, it remains an underdeveloped concept in UK 
jurisprudence.  Against this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that there has 
been little analysis of freedom of association in the reported case law on the 
employment exceptions.  Richards J of the Queens Bench Division gives only the 
briefest of mentions to ECtHR dicta that article 9 ought to be interpreted in light 
of article 11 when he delivers his judgment in R (on the application of Amicus) v 
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry60 on the compatibility of the 
employment exceptions in the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003 with Council Directive 2000/78/EC.  This is a trend that is 
reflected in ECHR jurisprudence on the employment equality exceptions of other 
member states.  In the recent cases of, Fernandez Martinez v Spain,61 Schuth v 
Germany,62 and Obst v Germany,63 the ECtHR was asked to determine whether 
religiously motivated employment decisions of employers violated the 
protections afforded to employees under article 8 of the ECHR.  Although in all 
                                         
60 R (on the application of Amicus) v The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 
260 (Admin), [2007] ICR 1176 (Amicus). 
61 Fernandez Martinez v Spain (2015) 60 EHRR 3.   
62 Schuth v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 32. 
63 Obst v Germany App no 425/03 (ECtHR, 23 September 2010) (French only). 
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three of these cases, the ECtHR acknowledged the obligation to consider the 
autonomy claims of the religious employers in the context of the right to 
freedom of association under article 11, it gave no express consideration as to 
how this impacted on its decision.64   
The absence of discussion of article 11 in the context of case law on the 
employment exceptions is striking.  The employment exceptions afford religious 
employers a greater measure of autonomy than other employers with regard to 
their employment policies.  This autonomy is often defended on grounds of 
freedom of religion, and article 9.  Yet, religious autonomy is not derived solely 
from freedom of religion.  Article 9 of the ECHR grants individuals the right to 
manifest their religion either alone or in community with others.  Still, it is 
freedom of association, under article 11, which limits State interference in the 
‘social structures’65 which facilitate communal religious exercise.  It is freedom 
of religion and freedom of association which together form the basis of the right 
to religious autonomy.  Support for this proposition is found in the following 
dicta of the ECtHR in the case of Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria, which has been 
quoted with authority in subsequent cases.66     
Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Article 
9 must be interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention 
which safeguards associative life against unjustified State 
interference.  Seen in this perspective, the believer’s right to freedom 
of religion encompasses the expectation that the community will be 
allowed to function peacefully free from arbitrary State 
intervention.67 
Notwithstanding this, freedom of association is, ‘often overlooked’ as a source 
of religious autonomy.68  The UK judiciary has given little consideration to 
                                         
64 Fernandez Martinez (ch 8, n 61) [127]; Schuth (ch 8, n 62) [57]-[58]; Obst (ch 8, n 63) [43]-[44]. 
65 Daly (ch 8, n 8) 98. 
66 Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v Bulgaria (App no 39023/97) (2005) 41 EHRR 
3; Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova (App no 45701/99) (2002) 35 EHRR 13.  
67 Hasan v Bulgaria (App no 30985/96) (2002) 34 EHRR 55 (Hasan) [62]. 
68 Mark E Chopko and Michael F Moses, remarking in the context of the US jurisdiction in, Mark E 
Chopko and Michael F Moses, 'Freedom to be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Rights 
of Church Autonomy' (2005) 3 The Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 387, 390.  See 
also Patrick Lenta criticising the judgment of Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente, 
Moreleta Park 2009 (4) SA 510 (T) (Equality Court of South Africa) for only referring to freedom 
of association briefly once in Lenta, 'Taking Diversity Seriously’ (ch 8, n 18) 834.   
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freedom of association in the context of the collective exercise of religion.  In 
only two recorded cases has a religious group argued that the freedoms of both 
religion and association are together relevant to its claim, and, even then, no 
detailed judicial analysis of these rights was carried out.69   
The contribution of freedom of association to religious autonomy claims, 
including in the employment context, should not be so understated.  The right to 
exercise religion in community with others has been shown to be important to 
the exercise by individuals of their right to religious freedom: a right essential 
for human dignity.70 As the ECtHR has admitted, it is article 11 which protects, 
‘associative life’ and gives meaning to the religious believer’s right to exercise 
religion in community with others by ensuring that the community can, ‘function 
peacefully free from arbitrary State intervention’.  The Supreme Court of 
Canada has recognised the importance of freedom of association to religious 
autonomy claims in the employment context, finding it to be the rationale for 
the employment exceptions in several of the human rights statutes of the 
Canadian provinces.71  The close relationship between freedom of religion and 
freedom of association is also illustrated in the constitutions of the USA and the 
Republic of South Africa.  There is no explicit reference to freedom of 
association in the United States constitution but it is implied in the first 
amendment, which safeguards, among other things, freedom of religion, and in 
the fourteenth amendment, which makes it unlawful to deprive ‘any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’.72  Both freedom of 
religion and freedom of association are explicitly acknowledged in the 
                                         
69 Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v Price [2004] EWHC 3245 (QB) [56], in which 
representatives of the Mormon Church argued that actions by the defendant which the court 
found amounted to nuisance and unlawful harassment had interfered with church members’ 
right to practice their religion and right to freedom of association.  R (on the application of Watch 
Tower Bible and Tract Society) v Charity Commission [2016] EWCA Civ 154, [2016] 1 WLR 
2625 in which a charity within the Jehovah’s Witness movement argued that the Charity 
Commission’s order requiring them to produce certain documents interfered with their right to 
freedom of religion and association.  This excludes cases concerning protests on religious 
grounds which may refer to both Art 9 and Art 11 rights, such as R v Uddin (Mohan) [2015] 
EWCA Crim 1918, [2016] 4 WLR 24 and Othman v English National Resistance [2013] EWHC 
1421 (QB).  Cases identified from Westlaw search carried out on 11 January 2017, using 
‘freedom of association’ and ‘religion’ in the ‘free text’ box, which received 47 results in the UK 
jurisdiction.  
70 See chapter 2 at 2.4.4. 
71 See chapter 5 at 5.3.2. 
72 Gutmann (ch 8, n 2) 9-10.   
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, in s 15(1) and s 18 respectively.  Of 
particular interest, however, the two freedoms are brought together in a further 
reference to them in s 31(1):   
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may 
not be denied the right, with other members of that community – (a) 
to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; 
and (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society.73 
Aptly described as the, ‘constitutional cousin’ of religious freedom,74 freedom of 
association is an important source of religious autonomy and should therefore 
assume particular importance in the interpretation of the employment 
exceptions which afford religious employers greater scope to discriminate in 
their employment policies.75  Before arguing for a particular interpretation of 
freedom of association for the employment exceptions, the difficulties with 
applying it in this context will be explored and addressed.  Freedom of 
association, at least as interpreted by the ECtHR, is concerned with membership 
organisations, and particularly with the relationship between the organisation 
and its members or prospective members.  Can a trade union expel a member 
whose political views it disagrees with?76  Can a religious community be forced to 
accept a leader appointed by the state?77  Can a shareholder be forced to accept 
                                         
73 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 31(1). 
74 Mark E Chopko and Michael F Moses referring to the United States constitution in Chopko and 
Moses (ch 8, n 68) 406.   
75 The significance of the freedom of association principle to religious autonomy claims in the 
employment context has been recognised in a series of academic works originating from the 
jurisdiction of South Africa.  See, particularly, Lenta, 'Taking Diversity Seriously’ (ch 8, n 18); 
Stuart Woolman, 'On the Fragility of Associational Life: A Constitutive Liberal's Response to 
Patrick Lenta' (2009) 25 SAJHR 280; David Bilchitz, 'Should Religious Associations be Allowed 
to Discriminate?' (2011) 27 SAJHR 219; David Bilchitz, 'Why Courts Should Not Sanction Unfair 
Discrimination in the Private Sphere: A Reply' (2012) 28 SAJHR 296; Patrick Lenta, 'The Right 
of Religious Associations to Discriminate' (2012) 28 SAJHR 231; Shaun de Freitas, 'Freedom of 
Association as a Foundational Right: Religious Associations and Strydom v Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Gemeente, Moreleta Park' (2012) 28 SAJHR 258; Shaun de Freitas, 'Religious 
Associational Rights and Sexual Conduct in South Africa: Towards the Furtherance of the 
Accommodation of a Diversity of Beliefs' (2013) BYU LRev 421; Shaun Alberto de Freitas, 
'Doctrinal Sanction and the Protection of the Rights of Religious Associations: Ecclesia De 
Lange v The Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa (726/13) [2014] 
ZASCA 151 (June 7, 2016)' (2016) 19 PELJ available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2862609> 
accessed 28 December 2017.   
76 ASLEF (ch 8, n 31). 
77 Hasan (ch 8, n 67). 
8 Freedom of association as a basis for interpretation of the employment exceptions 198 
a change in company structure?78  Those who object to the application of 
freedom of association to the employment exceptions may protest that an 
employer’s relationships with its employees or prospective employees are 
fundamentally different to relations between an organisation and its members 
and that the more private and voluntary nature of ‘membership’ justifies a more 
compelling claim to the protections which freedom of association offer.  There 
may also be others who assert that article 11 adds nothing of value to article 9, 
which already protects the right to manifest religion or belief in community with 
others.  Each of these objections is addressed in turn below.          
 ‘Membership’ and ‘employment’  
There are similarities between membership of and employment in a particular 
organisation.  Both membership and employment give individuals purpose to 
their days and provide a forum for them to forge meaningful relationships.  They 
both contribute to an individual’s feelings of self-worth, and offer opportunities 
and experiences which further the development of personal identity.  
Membership and employment, however, are not synonymous.  An individual 
chooses to become a member of an association, whether a congregation, a book 
group, a political party, or a civil rights advocacy group, primarily because of 
the association’s vision, values, purpose, or pursuits.  There is usually no 
compulsion to become a member of any particular association, thus the decision 
to associate is mostly driven by the individual’s character and interests, and 
exercised free of external pressures.79  An individual’s choice of employment, by 
comparison, is more variable.  Whilst the vision, values, purpose or pursuits of 
the employing organisation might be the primary attraction for some employees, 
the geographical location, job requirements, earning potential and job 
availability will usually be a weighty influence on the individual’s choice.  
Employment is, for most people, a necessary undertaking.  It provides a wage or 
salary which enables individuals to provide for themselves and their families.80  
                                         
78 See discussion in Mataga (ch 8, n 23) 6 of Cesnieks v Latvia, no 56400/00, 12 December 2002. 
79 It is acknowledged that individuals who consider they are born in to a religion may consider 
themselves to be compelled to join a particular religious community and the limited rights of exit 
of some religious communities (e.g. shunning in the Amish community) affect the ‘voluntary’ 
nature of these association.   
80 For comment on the benefits of employment see Lucy Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious 
Discrimination and the Workplace (OUP 2016) 56-59. 
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The decision to engage in a particular employment, therefore, is not as 
voluntary an undertaking as the resolution to become a member of a particular 
association.  Relations between employer and employee commonly involve an 
imbalance of power: control by the ‘master’ of the ‘servant’ is still today a 
primary indicator of employment status.  By contrast, relations between an 
association and its members are usually more equal.  Whilst membership of an 
association denotes an interest in pursuing a common goal, the interests of 
employer and employee may more often diverge and conflict.   
For all these reasons, it could be argued that membership implies a more 
‘private’ relationship than employment, and that it is the private nature of the 
relationships in membership organisations which provides the justification for 
limiting state interference into their internal affairs.  It is not disputed that the 
employment relationship is of a more ‘public’ nature.  There are convincing 
reasons why the state should have a greater interest in the employment 
decisions of an organisation than in its membership criteria. The undisputed 
opportunities – economic and social – which employment affords individuals, and 
the imbalance of power in employment relationships, give the state a moral 
justification for greater regulation of employment decisions than membership 
policies, to ensure individuals are not unfairly excluded, at least not on account 
of a protected characteristic.81   
Yet, I would argue that there is a conception of freedom of association 
originating in principles of membership protection, which justifies its application 
to the employment decisions of religious employers.  I argued above that the 
primary value in freedom of association is its contribution to the identities and 
personalities of those who decide to associate: the members.82  So understood, 
freedom of association is protected because it serves the interests of an 
association’s members.  This interpretation of freedom of association accords 
with the EA’s approach to the exclusionary policies of associations: 
discrimination against prospective members, as well as guests and associates, is 
                                         
81 David Bilchitz refers to the history of his jurisdiction (South Africa), the economic and societal 
import of employment as well as its effect on individuals, and the imbalance of power between 
employer and employee to explain why in South African law, the employment relationship is not 
treated as solely a private matter (in Bilchitz, 'Why Courts Should Not Sanction Unfair 
Discrimination in the Private Sphere’ (ch 8, n 75) 312). 
82 See above at 8.2.1. 
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permitted because it serves the legitimate interests of the association’s 
members.83  The interests of the membership are legitimate because they share 
a protected characteristic.  It is arguable that religious employers can also be 
regarded as serving the interests of ‘members’ of a group defined by their 
religion.  I argue here, that where an employer’s discriminatory employment 
policies serve the legitimate interests of these members, they could, like 
discriminatory membership policies, be justified on associative freedom grounds.   
Applying this hypothesis to employers with a religious or faith-based ethos, it is 
possible in most instances to identify ‘members’ who share the same religion or 
faith, and whose legitimate interests the employer serves.  The identity of these 
‘members’ will vary, sometimes quite markedly, depending on the type of 
employer.  Sometimes the employer will itself be the association with members.  
Other times, the employer will serve the interests of members of a separate 
association.  ‘Member’ is defined simply as, ‘a person … that is part of a 
group’.84  The breadth of this definition lends itself to varying interpretations 
depending on the context in which it is used.  The employment decisions of an 
organised religion – a church, synagogue, mosque or temple, for example - may 
serve the interests of its congregation, as members.  It is the congregation’s 
interests which are served, for example, by insisting that the individual 
employed to lead the congregation shares their religion or belief.  In Catholic 
schools, meanwhile, the ‘members’ whose interests are served by employment 
decisions may be the Catholic parents in the local catholic parish to which the 
school is attached, or the church and parent representatives on the school’s 
governing board.  Other religious organisations, such as religious or faith-based 
charities, are often set up by churches, or by individuals who see faith in action 
as their ‘calling’.  In these cases, the ‘members’ who are served by employment 
decisions of the organisation might be the church community, or the trustees, or 
top-layer of management.  Sometimes the service users in whose interests the 
employer acts will be the relevant members.       
                                         
83 EA, sch 16.   
84 Cambridge English dictionary online <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ > accessed 24 January 
2017.   
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In some cases, the employees themselves might be the ‘members’ whose 
interests the organisation serves.  It has been argued, for instance, by South 
African academic, Shaun de Freitas, that Alvin Esau’s ‘organic’ theory of 
employment regards employees of religious organisations as being in 
‘membership’ with them.  De Freitas comments that Esau’s ‘organic’ theory of 
employment:    
emphasises ‘membership’ of a religious institution as an important 
factor irrespective of the task expected of such a person – the person 
(employee or independent contractor) is invited into a relationship 
and into membership with the group, and on obtaining membership, 
the person becomes inextricably related to the religious ethos of the 
relevant group which has a core relational understanding 
encompassing it.85   
It is important, however, to exercise caution with any interpretation that 
assumes the employees in a religious organisation can also be the members 
which the organisation serves.  This may be an accurate description of 
employment in some religious organisations, but it certainly will not be in 
others, or even in most.  Any religious organisation could engage a religiously 
homogenous staff and then argue that the employees are akin to members 
whose interests are served by continuing their restrictive recruitment practices.  
If this were too readily accepted, the scope for discrimination could become 
unacceptably wide.   
Still, there may be some force in the argument that an employer’s employees 
are the relevant ‘members’ whose interests the employer serves if it can be 
demonstrated that the primary purpose of the organisation is to provide a forum 
for religious believers to put their faith into action.  The Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice held in the case of Ontario Human Rights Commission v Christian 
Horizons that a religious organisation can be primarily engaged in serving the 
interests of, among others, its employees.86  The religious organisation in that 
                                         
85 de Freitas, 'Freedom of Association as a Foundational Right’ (ch 8, n 75) 267-68. The European 
Commission’s finding in Young, James and Webster (ch 8, n 23) at para 167 that the 
‘relationship between workers employed by the same employer cannot be understood as an 
association in the sense of Art. 11 because it depends only on the contractual relationship 
between employee and employer’ arguably does not take into account this interpretation of 
employment in a religious organisation.   
86 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Christian Horizons 2010 ONSC 2015 (CanLII), (2010) 102 
OR (3d) 267 (Heintz cited to ONSC). 
8 Freedom of association as a basis for interpretation of the employment exceptions 202 
case, Christian Horizons, carried out charitable work for people of any and no 
religion who had developmental disabilities.  It sought to rely on the special 
employment exception in Ontario’s Human Rights Code, to require its staff to 
adhere to a Lifestyle and Morality Statement which was religiously based.  To 
rely on this exception, Christian Horizons had to convince the court that it was 
primarily engaged in serving the needs of individuals defined by their creed.  
Accepting that it was primarily engaged in serving, among others, its employees, 
the Court found that: 
The charitable work it undertook for persons with developmental 
disabilities was undertaken as a religious activity through which those 
involved could live out their Christian faith and carry out their 
Christian ministry to serve people with developmental disabilities.87  
The court acknowledged that Christian Horizons was, ‘structured as a community 
of co-religionists’ and that it saw itself as, ‘a vehicle through which individuals 
who identify as Evangelical Christians can live out their faith’.  This included the 
staff, who were found to, ‘live out their Christian calling’ in their work.88   
Importantly, providing a forum in which Evangelical Christians could exercise 
their faith through employment endeavours was a primary reason for Christian 
Horizons’ existence.  Whilst the Christian Horizons model is not unique, neither 
is it the norm.  Most organisations with a religious or faith-based ethos do not 
serve the interests of their employees as a primary purpose, notwithstanding 
some employees might consider employment in the organisation as a religious 
‘calling’.  These organisations must recognise other persons as members of an 
identifiable group defined by religion whose interests their work serves if they 
want to rely on associative freedom grounds to justify employment 
discrimination.  As the ‘members’ could, as discussed above, comprise the local 
religious community, a specific congregation of worshippers, a group of trustees 
or senior management, or even the employer’s service users, this should not be 
too onerous a task. 
                                         
87 ibid [77].   
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The theory that exclusionary employment policies can be justified on a 
membership-protecting interpretation of freedom of association is supported by 
an analysis of freedom of association which regards the privileges it affords 
religious associations as derivative of their members’ rights.89  This, I would 
argue, is to be preferred to regarding religious institutions as having rights which 
are independent of their members.  Religious institutionalist claims, gaining 
prominence in the USA at the moment, are argued on the basis that churches 
have sovereignty that is, ‘basic and irreducible’.90  Although various arguments 
have been led in defence of religious institutionalist claims, including that their 
sovereignty is derived from God, one argument relies particularly on the 
associative role of churches as, ‘counter-weights to the overweening state’.91 
Concerns, however, have rightly been voiced that religious institutionalist claims 
entail church autonomy rights which are, ‘potentially unlimited’.92  Though it is 
accepted that churches, like many other types of association, provide an 
important check on state power, I have argued that the primary value of 
association is, rather, its contribution to the formation of individual identity.93   
Rooting the justification for freedom of association in its worth to individuals, 
buttresses the argument that legal privileges afforded to associations are 
derivative of their members’ rights.  The idea that religious groups have a 
derivative right to associative freedom is not without difficulties.  It will not 
always be easy to assess the sincerity of a group’s derivative claim: is the 
group’s claim, for example, based on, ‘conscientious religious commitments’ or 
‘bad faith’ motives?94  Nor is it clear how a large, complex, hierarchical 
organisation (such as the Roman Catholic Church) can legitimately represent the 
interests of its members when it makes unchecked decisions independently of 
                                         
89 For an interesting article on the concepts of ‘collectivism’ and ‘individualism’ in the context of 
freedom of association, see Alan Bogg, ''Individualism' and 'Collectivism' in Collective Labour 
Law' (2017) 46 ILJ 72.    
90 Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman, 'Against Religious Institutionalism' (2013) 99 
VaLRev 917, 920.   
91 ibid 924. 
92 ibid 932 and 945-49.  Schragger and Schwartzmann consider and reject religious institutionalist 
claims and consider that religious autonomy rights derive from rights of individual conscience, 
and not the religion clauses.   
93 See 8.2.1 above.  
94 Ira C Lupu, 'Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: the Case of Employment 
Discrimination' (1987) 67 BULRev 391, 427. 
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them.95   Indeed, the idea of ‘membership’ in the first place may not fit well 
with the way in which certain groups are set up, organised and run.96  Further 
difficulties can also arise when the membership, or sections of it, does not agree 
on particular tenets of the religion: in whose interests does the group act?   
Still, the courts are well-equipped and experienced in determining the sincerity 
of a person’s motives.97  Whilst testing the sincerity of an individual might be a 
more straightforward task, the sincerity of a group’s concerns could be 
evidenced by reference to practised doctrine and by a consideration of whether 
the group’s behaviour is consistent with the asserted belief.98  Certainly, the 
larger and more diverse the religious group in question, the more imperfect is 
this analysis.  Although these are undoubtedly challenges for the derivative 
rights account of freedom of association, rights pertaining to this freedom must 
be framed and applied to reflect the individual concerns of group members if 
such rights are to find justification in the protection of individual interests.   
There is a further justification for treating freedom of association as affording 
groups a derivative right.  If the legal privileges afforded to groups are enjoyed 
independently of their members, it is very difficult to ever defend their 
prioritisation in any clash with rights held by individuals.99  The harm inflicted on 
an individual subjected to discrimination because of a protected characteristic 
will, for example, surely always outweigh any harm suffered by a group unless 
                                         
95 Alan Brownstein, 'Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions' (2013) 21 
JContempLegalIssues 201 211. 
96 ibid 211. 
97 Peter Edge comments that, ‘Courts appear to be comparatively comfortable with determining the 
intensely subjective in the criminal arena, so that a similar investigation in relation to key areas 
of religion law developing in the 21st century may be less challenging than at first appears.’  
Peter Edge, 'Determining Religion in English courts' (2012) 1 OJLR 402, 420-21. 
98 Andrew Hambler argues that the consistency of an individual’s behaviour with his asserted belief 
is relevant to determining sincerity, in Andrew Hambler, 'A Private Matter? Evolving Approaches 
to the Freedom to Manifest Religious Convictions in the Workplace' (2008) 3 Religion and 
Human Rights 111.  
99 Referring to the claim that there is a group aspect to religious interests which is independent of 
the individual aspect, Lucy Vickers remarks, ‘the difficulty with this collective view of religion is 
that if one recognises collective interests as having a separate independent existence, they 
could continue to have weight even if no individuals actually hold the beliefs being collectively 
represented’ in Vickers, Religious Freedom (ch 8, n 80) 51.  
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the group is understood as the instrument of its individual members’ interests.100  
Understanding freedom of association as affording groups only those rights which 
are derived from the need to protect their members’ interests provides a 
context in which principled limits on these rights can be determined and 
enforced.   
 Article 9 or article 11?  
A second objection to be addressed to the case for applying freedom of 
association to the employment exceptions is whether article 11 enhances an 
analysis of the employment exceptions carried out under article 9.  After all, 
article 9 already protects the freedom to manifest religion or belief, ‘either 
alone or in community with others’, and the absence of any detailed discussion 
by the ECtHR of article 11 in several cases involving the collective exercise of 
religion is perhaps indicative of a view that an article 9 analysis is sufficient.   
There is no dispute that article 9 identifies the collective aspect of religion or 
belief in worship, practice, teaching or observance as a human right.  Indeed, 
the article’s explicit reference to the collective aspect of religion or belief is 
indicative of its significance to the individual freedom, particularly when it is 
observed that thought, conscience and expression are identified in the ECHR, 
without any mention of the right to exercise these freedoms collectively.  
Importantly, however, and as aforementioned, the ECtHR in Hasan and Chaush 
has emphasised that article 9 must be interpreted in the light of article 11 of 
the ECHR, at least in questions involving the organisation of the religious 
community.101  At issue in Hasan and Chaush was the appointment of the Muslim 
community’s leadership in Bulgaria but ultimately article 11 was relevant in 
Hasan and Chaush because it is the article which, ‘safeguards associative life 
against unjustified State interference’.102  Put another way, ‘It protects the 
                                         
100 For a discussion on the harm experienced by individuals subjected to unlawful discrimination 
see Greg Walsh, 'The Right to Equality and the Employment Decisions of Religious Schools' 
(2014) 16 The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 107.   
101 Hasan (ch 8, n 67) [62] and [65]. 
102 ibid [62] 
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associative structures in society which help to give life and reality’ to the 
personal freedoms of religion and expression.103    
Just as freedom of religion under article 9 is, alone, insufficient to explain and 
interpret the employment exceptions, so too is freedom of association under 
article 11 when it is considered in isolation of its freedom of religion 
counterpart.  After all, the employment exceptions only apply to religion or 
belief organisations – and rightly so.  If discrimination in employment were to be 
permitted on freedom of association grounds in the multitude of settings in 
which people may associate, a wholly unacceptable level of discrimination in the 
workplace would ensue.104  A line must be drawn between those organisations 
permitted on freedom of association grounds to discriminate in employment 
(within limits) and those which may not.  The legislature drew the line at 
religion or belief organisations and for good reason.  Providing elevated 
protection to religion or belief organisations over others simply recognises the 
unique and important contribution religion or belief organisations make to the 
individual exercise of religious freedom, which itself is essential for human 
dignity and autonomy.   
If it is accepted, then, that a proper legal analysis of any claim under the 
employment exceptions must have regard for article 9, interpreted in light of 
article 11, what is the added value in this?  Acknowledging that the right to 
discriminate pursuant to the exceptions derives from two freedoms protected 
under the ECHR may serve to elevate its importance in the public eye.  The 
significance of article 11, however, is more than symbolic.  If it is article 11 
which protects, ‘associative life’ then it is article 11, and not article 9, which is 
responsible for setting the contours in which individuals may enjoy the collective 
dimension of their freedom to exercise religion or belief.  The jurisprudence of 
article 11 should thus assume particular significance in determining the extent of 
the autonomy which religious organisations enjoy, recognising too that religious 
associations may have a greater claim to autonomy in certain situations because 
                                         
103 Daly (ch 8, n 8) 97. 
104 Martha Minow comments in relation to the option of extending exemptions from civil rights 
norms to groups other than religious groups, that ‘each additional exemption curtails the 
application of the overarching norm-and civil rights laws as a result can be too easily and 
thoroughly undermined’.  Minow (ch 8, n 11) 27-28.  
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they derive rights not only from associational freedom, but also from religious 
freedom.105 
Perhaps most importantly of all, applying freedom of association to the 
collective aspect of freedom of religion provides an important context for the 
protection of religious association under various guises, including the 
employment exceptions.  This context, centred around membership protection, 
is critical in both justifying, and setting the limits of, the employment 
exceptions.106  I have argued that it is possible on a freedom of association 
analysis to regard employers as serving the interests of a group of members 
defined by their religion, and to understand the employment exceptions as a 
vehicle for safeguarding these interests.  This, together with an understanding of 
the value in association, is crucial to the argument at 8.4 below for an identity-
protecting interpretation of the employment exceptions, underpinned by 
freedom of association.   
8.4 An identity-protecting interpretation of the 
employment exceptions 
 Benefit to members of collective identity  
I argued above at 8.2 that the value of freedom of association  may be 
understood to lie with the fact that associations serve members’ interests.  This 
interpretation stems from the belief that, ‘associations do not possess value that 
is independent of individuals’,107 and is consistent with the derivative account of 
group privileges argued for.  How does an association best serve its membership?  
I have argued that the value in association for individuals is its contribution to 
the formation of individual identity.108  I argue here that the collective identity 
of the association is critical to realising this worth.  Individuals are nurtured and 
                                         
105 Patrick Lenta suggests that the combination of religious freedom and freedom of association 
may lend religious associations a greater claim to discriminate in Lenta, 'Taking Diversity 
Seriously’ (ch 8, n 18) 834.    
106 Brossard (Town) v Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne) [1988] 2 SCR 279, [133] 
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107 Greenawalt (ch 8, n 4) 110. 
108 See above at 8.2.1.   
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mature through their autonomous choice of relationships and their collaboration 
to achieve shared goals.  On one view, the identity of an association is an 
extension, or representative, of its members’ identities.  Acknowledging the 
importance of religious practice to human dignity, de Freitas observes:  
This experience of a specific identity via religious practices is also 
attained within a collection of individuals who have the same religious 
beliefs and interest and respective practices, and who are but an 
extension of the private domain.109   
Whilst there can, and in larger associations may likely be, divergence among the 
membership in relation to the content of, and/or weight to be given to, the 
various purposes or objectives of an association, the identity of the association 
must be protected if members are to enjoy the full benefit to self that freedom 
of association offers.  Safeguarding the religious employer’s ethos, I argue, is 
critical to protecting the collective identity of the members which it serves.  It 
follows that discrimination in employment can be defended on associative 
freedom grounds when it is necessary to maintain the employer’s ethos, 
provided it does not disproportionately impact on the rights and freedoms of 
others.110      
What is an association’s identity?  According to the Cambridge English dictionary, 
‘identity’ describes‘who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that 
make them different from others’.111  Exactly what an association’s identity 
encompasses will differ from one association to another.  It might include the 
association’s vision or values, its purpose or objectives, or its approach to 
internal or external relationships.  More likely, it will include a combination of 
these.  The weaker a group identity is, the harder it will be for the employer to 
                                         
109 de Freitas, 'Freedom of Association as a Foundational Right’ (ch 8, n 75) 262.  DeFreitas argues 
at 267 that it follows from the ‘private’ nature of the religious association that its membership 
decisions should attract more ‘respectability’.     
110 Freedom of association, after all, is not an absolute right.  Ira Lupu refers to the relationship 
between employees and organisational purpose, aims and interests in support of his argument 
on freedom of association grounds that a religious association should be permitted to exclude 
‘non-members’ from employment positions of ‘associational significance’.  Lupu, however, 
considers that religious associations should (acting in good faith and consistently with 
membership policies) be able to reserve any employment position for members, regardless of 
the equality interests affected – an approach which is not advocated in this thesis.  Lupu (ch 8, 
n 94) 431-42.   
111 Cambridge English dictionary online <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ > accessed 28 
December 2017.   
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demonstrate that it necessitates discrimination.  An example might be a dental 
surgery set up by three co-religionists but operating as a ‘secular’ dental surgery 
in every other respect: the dental surgery would not be able to demonstrate it 
had a religious ethos which required its employees to share the founders’ faith.  
Even a strong group identity, coupled with a strong argument that it calls for 
discrimination in a particular position, may be insufficient if in the particular 
case the discrimination entails serious infringement of the rights and interests of 
others. 
 Benefit of an identity-protecting interpretation  
Deriving, as it does, from a principled analysis of religious associational freedom, 
the identity-protecting model is a sound basis for interpreting the employment 
exceptions.  De Freitas also argues on the basis of freedom of association as a 
foundational right for, ‘an approach to appointments by religious associations, 
based on “religious ethos”’,112 believing that ‘a religious association represents a 
unique and important ethos (especially and foremost to its members)’.113  He is 
particularly concerned that discrimination is permitted in those roles which do 
not, to an outside observer, appear to involve religious functions if the 
discrimination is required by the religious ethos of the organisation.  According 
to de Freitas, the religious ethos might require discrimination in circumstances 
where the organisation considers that the particular job has a ‘religious 
foundation’ because, for example, it involves prayer or because the organisation 
regards the post holder as being in ‘community’ with other believers in the 
workplace.114  I would argue, however, that it is not only these ‘relational’ 
aspects of employment which might necessitate employees to hold the religion 
or faith of the organisation.  As the study carried out and reported in chapter 7 
found, the maintenance of ethos relies heavily on its employees: whilst it may 
be enough for employees to simply have an understanding of ethos, there was a 
                                         
112 de Freitas, 'Freedom of Association as a Foundational Right’ (ch 8, n 75) 271. 
113 ibid 259. 
114 ibid 269-71. Iain Benson also argues for a ‘permeated ethos’ approach to religious employer 
exemptions, asserting that ‘it is the identity of the religious employees and their group beliefs in 
co-operation’ which justifies protecting religious group autonomy, in Iain T Benson, 'An 
Associational Framework for the Reconciliation of Competing Rights Claims Involving the 
Freedom of Religion' (DPhil thesis, University of the Witwatersrand 2013) 149 available at 
<http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/jspui/handle/10539/14004?mode=full> accessed 28 December 
2017. 
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commonly held view shared by a number of participants that those in leadership 
roles needed to actually share the religion or faith to effectively uphold the 
organisational ethos.  Insisting that religion is an occupational requirement for 
those employees, who are not in leadership roles but who are instead 
responsible for spreading the word of their religion, may also be justified by the 
need to preserve the identity of the organisation, recognising that these 
individuals represent and personify the organisation’s ethos in the outside world.   
Other suggested approaches to exclusionary policies grounded in principles of 
associative freedom have focused on one of either the purpose of the entity, or 
the relationship between the job and the doctrinal core of the employer’s 
religion.  The real benefit of the identity-protecting model, however, is its 
capability to admit a multifaceted and individualised assessment of whether 
discrimination pursuant to the employment exceptions should be permitted in 
any case.  In the identity-protecting model, the purpose and nature of the 
employer, and the proximity of the job to the doctrinal core of the religion are 
each relevant in the overall assessment of whether a particular policy is 
defensible, but, importantly, neither by itself is decisive.   
In the USA, the associative purpose of the group, seeking to rely on the 
constitutional protection afforded associational freedom, is particularly 
relevant.  Freedom of association is not itself mentioned in the United States 
constitution but is indirectly protected in the first amendment115 and because of 
the fourteenth amendment’s protection of privacy.116  As the contours of the 
right to freedom of association have been drawn with reference to freedom of 
expression and privacy concerns, expressive and intimate purposes have largely 
been recognised by the United States judiciary as the only ones to benefit from 
associative freedom.117   
Social philosopher, Stuart White, is supportive of a framework that provides 
heightened protection for expressive and intimate associative purposes.  He 
considers that the advancement of an association’s expressive or intimate 
                                         
115 Roberts (ch 8, n 19) 622; see Gutmann (ch 8, n 2) 9-10.  
116 Gutmann (ch 8, n 2) 9-10.   
117 Though see White (ch 8, n 34) 390-91 on recent US jurisprudence which has respected a right 
of ‘private association’ different to ‘intimate association’.   
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purpose is especially important and will therefore weigh very heavily in the 
balance with competing interests.118  Categorical exclusion rules for the 
advancement of other purposes, by contrast, will not normally be morally 
justified if they cause damage to ‘opportunity interests’.  These include an 
interest in not being excluded from associations which provide access to income 
and wealth, or civic and community participation, and an interest in not being 
subjected to rules which those left out, acting reasonably, consider to be 
stigmatizing.119   
The associative purpose of the association is of relevance to the identity-
protecting model for the employment exceptions: job roles which are directly 
connected to expressive concerns, such as leaders of religious congregations, 
will be particularly important to the association’s identity.  Rigidly introducing 
concepts of expressive and intimate association to the employment law 
jurisprudence of the UK, however, should be avoided.  Not only would this add a 
significant additional layer of complexity,120 it would be unwarranted by the UK’s 
commitment to article 11 of the ECHR.  Unlike the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of freedom of association under the United States 
Constitution, the ECtHR has never interpreted the article 11 right to freedom of 
association as only relevant to the attainment of expressive or intimate 
purposes.  The advantage of the identity-protecting model is that it 
accommodates a consideration of the association’s purpose, without being 
constrained by it.   
A different approach advocated by proponents who find the justification for 
exceptions to employment equality norms in freedom of association and freedom 
                                         
118 White identifies two particular associative purposes, which should be afforded heightened 
protection because of their contribution to, ‘the development and expression of ethical 
personality’: these are, ‘the exploration and/or propagation of distinctive religious and/or 
philosophical beliefs’ and, ‘intimate association’.  Exclusion rules which protect these purposes 
should have, ‘an especially strong presumption of legitimacy’ ibid 385.  
119 ibid 382-86. 
120 There are undoubtedly complexities associated with linking associative freedom rights to 
expressive and intimate purposes, many of which White acknowledges and on which he gives 
his views.  When is an association considered to have an expressive purpose, or an intimate 
purpose?  What importance must the expressive purpose have in the context of the 
association’s overall ends and objectives?  Are all beliefs propagated through an association’s 
expressive purpose to be considered as having equal value?  Who determines the content of 
the expressive purpose?  See ibid 386-91. 
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of religion, is to assess the relationship between the nature of the job and the 
doctrinal core of the religion.  Patrick Lenta argues that the religious basis for a 
claim by a religious employer to discriminate in employment must be closely 
examined with reference to what he describes as a, ‘spectrum of greater to 
lesser proximity to the doctrinal core of the religion’.121  According to Lenta, 
spiritual and religious leaders sit at one end of the spectrum, and employees or 
workers such as janitors and secretaries sit at the other.  Discrimination on 
grounds of protected characteristics should be permitted in respect of the 
former, but not the latter, because their work is not, unlike the work of spiritual 
and religious leaders, closely connected to the doctrinal core of the religion.122  
This approach is similar to a theory expounded by Bruce Bagni, which calls for an 
assessment of the ‘secularity’ of the particular activity or relationship.123   
The identity-protecting model is to be preferred to the spectrum model because 
it provides a more multifaceted and individualised approach to determining 
when the employment exceptions should permit discrimination.  Firstly, there is 
a difficulty with determining or predicting where on the spectrum any particular 
job sits124 because it oversimplifies the process required to measure the religious 
basis for any claim to discriminate.  The assertion, for example, that the work of 
                                         
121 Lenta, 'Taking Diversity Seriously’ (ch 8, n 18) 859.   
122 ibid 859.   
123 Bruce N Bagni, 'Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination 
by Religious Organisations' (1979) 79 ColumLRev 1514, 1539-49.   Bagni devises a, ‘concentric 
circle’ model to guide decisions on when discrimination by religious organisations should be 
permitted.  Under this model, three concentric circles orbit an epicentre.  At the epicentre, lies 
church clergy relations, worship and ritual, membership policies, religious education (for 
example Sunday school) and potentially religious schools where religion pervades non-secular 
subjects.  In the first circle, there are, what Bagni describes as, ‘church sponsored community 
activities’ such as adoption agencies and hospitals, as well as religious schools where the 
teaching of secular subjects is not infused by religion, and relations with support employees with 
certain religious or quasi-religious functions.  The second circle includes ‘secular business 
activities’ and relations with clerical and janitorial employees who have no spiritual functions.  
The third circle refers to, ‘the totally secular world’. (Bagni, 1539)  It is Bagni’s theory that the 
State should, in most circumstances, refrain from regulating the epicentre in order to safeguard 
the US constitutional right to free exercise of religion.  However, as Bagni explains, State 
regulation becomes increasingly justified the more the activity or relationship in question, 
‘moves closer to the purely secular world’ (Bagni, 1540).  
124 Lenta recognises this in respect of some roles but not others.  He does not consider any 
circumstance in which discrimination may be permitted in respect of typists of janitors but 
confesses that it will be difficult to determine where on the spectrum other jobs will sit.  He 
comments, ‘There are, however, positions intermediate between these two poles: a teacher 
whose duties extend only to non-religious subject occupies one such a position.  It may be 
difficult, admittedly, to judge when such intermediate positions are sufficiently close to matters 
of faith to mandate a constitutional exemption, but such a determination is necessary in each 
case.’ Lenta, 'Taking Diversity Seriously’ (ch 8, n 18) 859.      
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typists and janitors is always similar in nature and that it should be at the end of 
the spectrum which is far away from the doctrinal core of the religion has been 
criticised by de Freitas for not being, ‘an approach that is sufficiently layered or 
nuanced’125 and for failing to take account of, ‘other possible interpretations of 
associational rights’126 such as Alvin Esau’s organic interpretation of employment 
in a religious entity.127  An organic view of the role of typist in a religious 
organisation, which takes into account the value of relationships among co-
religionists, for example, might justify a placement further along the spectrum 
and closer to the ‘doctrinal core’.128  In the identity-protecting model, the 
relationship between the job and the doctrinal core of the religion will be an 
important factor.  After all, it would appear that the spectrum approach was 
derived largely from a desire to protect the identity or ethos of the religious 
employer.129  Naturally, job roles with close proximity to the doctrinal core, such 
as spiritual leaders, will be particularly important to the associative identity.  It 
will be a rare case where a job position which seemingly has no religious 
functions must be filled by a co-religionist for the preservation of the associative 
identity: a commitment to respect the ethos of the employer would normally 
suffice.  In the identity-protecting model the relationship between the job and 
the doctrinal core of the religion, though important, is not determinative.  To 
this end, the model provides added value in the harder cases: a more flexible 
approach which assesses the job role in the broader context of the employer’s 
ethos is required in these cases to access the heart of the associative claim.     
                                         
125 de Freitas, 'Freedom of Association as a Foundational Right’ (ch 8, n 75) 269.     
126 ibid 269. 
127 ibid 268-69. 
128 ibid 268-69, where De Freitas remarks, ‘Does a typist’s position in a church, whose members 
view the workplace itself as constituting a community of believers where relationships are as 
important if not more so, than narrowly defined role-tasks (where matters of faith rather than 
roles are to a degree the point of the emphasis), not qualify as a ‘religiously-based job’ or a ‘job 
in proximity to the doctrinal core’ or ‘a job that bears a significant relationship to the settled 
religious convictions of the organisations?’ 
129 Patrick Lenta argues, ‘The right place to draw the line as far as permissible discrimination is 
concerned is, I believe, with ‘ordinary’, non-teaching positions such as janitor or secretary, 
which are further from the core of religious doctrine and practice than positions of religious 
leadership.  Individuals doing these jobs do not typically act as mentors, moral advisors, or role 
models to students.  Since prohibiting discrimination in respect of these positions does not 
threaten the religious ethos and identity of religious associations nearly as much as does 
prohibiting discrimination in the case of religious leaders, role models and mentors, such 
discrimination should be illegal.’ Lenta, 'The Right of Religious Associations to Discriminate' (ch 
8, n 75) 238. 
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A further difficulty with the spectrum approach is the implication that the level 
of harm suffered by an individual who is discriminated against is always more 
likely to be outweighed, the closer the job is to the doctrinal core of the 
religion.130  Whilst this may often be the case, it may not always be so.  The 
harm an individual suffers when discriminated against is personal and may 
depend, in part, on the opportunities for work elsewhere.131  It is entirely 
conceivable that in a particular case it might even outweigh the benefits to an 
employer of discriminating in a role which is close to the doctrinal core of the 
religion.  The identity-protecting model offers a more individualised approach 
than the spectrum permits, weighing the benefit to the associative identity in 
each case with the harm caused to the individual subjected to discrimination. 
A third factor which is relevant to the application of the identity-protecting 
model is the nature of the employer.  It is often asserted that rights to freedom 
of association are less compelling in the public arena than in the private.  The 
greater the ties held to the public by an organisation, whether through its 
funding sources, its service users or otherwise, the less latitude it should be 
afforded in the management of its internal affairs, including its employment 
decisions.  Indeed, it is the quasi-public / private nature of political parties and 
some trade unions which is sometimes offered to justify increased state 
regulation of these types of association.132  In the ECtHR case of ASLEF, the court 
opined that whilst article 11(1) of the ECHR entitled trade unions to decide their 
membership for themselves, in line with union rules, this would not necessarily 
be so if the trade union received public monies or carried out public duties:  
This basic premise holds good where the association or trade union is 
a private and independent body, and is not, for example, through 
receipt of public funds or through the fulfilment of public duties 
imposed upon it, acting in a wider context, such as assisting the State 
                                         
130 Patrick Lenta comments that, ‘to the limited extent to which refusal to allow discrimination in 
respect of positions distant from the doctrinal core of the association would disturb the ethos 
and identity of the group, this is a burden it is legitimate for religious associations to bear’ in ibid 
Lenta, 'The Right of Religious Associations to Discriminate' (ch 8, n 75) 238, fn 28.  
131 Lucy Vickers refers to the other employment opportunities of the job applicant as one factor 
which can be considered in assessing the proportionality of a requirement that the post holder is 
of a particular faith.  Lucy Vickers, 'Religion and Belief Discrimination and the Employment of 
Teachers in Faith Schools' (2007) 4 Religion and Human Rights 137, 156.   
132 See discussion in Daly (ch 8, n 8) 89-90. 
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in securing the enjoyment of rights and freedoms, where other 
considerations may well come into play.133   
There is, of course a difficulty with labelling any organisation as ‘private’ or 
‘public’.  Since almost all associations, ‘are facilitated and enabled by some 
form of background State regulation or intervention’, few (if any) can be 
classified as wholly, ‘private’.134  Still, there is a commendable reason for 
providing a more limited freedom of association to those organisations which 
operate more in the public arena than others.  Though the identity of ‘public’ 
organisations deserves as much respect as the identity of those operating in a 
more private sphere, the impact of discrimination in public settings is more 
likely to infringe the rights and interests of others.  To this end, the nature of 
the organisation is most relevant in determining whether the organisation’s 
claim for identity protection on freedom of association grounds is outweighed by 
competing interests.  Given the difficulties with precise categorisation, 
considering the nature of the organisation at this stage of the analysis, is 
preferable to any attempt to exclude ‘public’ organisations from the scope of 
the protections which the employment exceptions offer.  
The identity-protecting model offers a principled understanding of the 
employment exceptions and a sound basis for interpreting their limits.  Involving 
a multifaceted and individualised approach, the model requires the judiciary and 
other decision-makers to take a, ‘cognitively internal’ viewpoint of the needs 
and interests of religious employers,135 and to weigh this against the personal 
impact of discriminatory behaviour.  It asks the judiciary to engage with the 
employer’s claim on a level that takes full cognisance that its roots lie in 
religious and associational freedoms, and its purpose is to protect identity.  
Importantly, it takes the otherwise abstract notion of an employer’s ‘religious 
                                         
133 ASLEF (ch 8, n 31) [40].  
134 Daly (ch 8, n 8) 90. 
135 The concept of a ‘cognitively internal’ perspective is explained in N MacCormack, Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford, 1978), 292 and is referred to in Christopher McCrudden, 
'Religion, Human Rights, Equality and the Public Sphere' (2011) 13 EccLJ 26, 31-32 where 
McCrudden argues that judges should take a ‘cognitively internal’ point of view when 
determining cases which concern religious issues: a perspective he argues has been lacking in 
certain recent decisions.  See also argument by Iain Benson for an approach to religious 
employer exemptions which he describes as ‘seeing through the associational lens’ in Benson 
(ch 8, n 114) 157.      
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freedom’ and gives the claim substance by identifying the membership defined 
by their religion whose interests the employer serves.         
8.5 Conclusion 
On the basis that religious autonomy derives from both religious and 
associational liberties, a case has been made in this chapter for applying 
freedom of association to the employment exceptions for religious employers.  A 
freedom of association analysis of the employment exceptions provides an 
important context to the claims by religious employers to discriminate in their 
employment practices.  It recognises that the autonomy which the employment 
exceptions affords religious employers stems from a need to protect the 
associational interests of the ‘members’ served by the employer.  I argued that 
this is best achieved through retention by the employer of its core ethos.  An 
identity-protecting interpretation of the employment exceptions, which adopts a 
multifaceted approach to assessing the employer’s interest in protecting its 
ethos and weighs it against the discriminatory impact of the employer’s actions, 
has therefore been advanced and developed in this chapter as a principled 
guideline for their application.   
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9 Applying freedom of association to the 
employment exceptions 
9.1 Introduction 
The ambiguities and uncertainties in the application of the employment 
exceptions which were highlighted in chapter 3 formed the basis of my case for 
seeking a principled guideline for their interpretation.  This case was 
strengthened in light of the discovery in chapter 6 that the employment 
exceptions lack any clear and consistent foundational principle, having been 
introduced in a piecemeal fashion and partly in response to political and 
historical pressures.  Building, in part, on the findings of an empirical study into 
employer perceptions, I argued in the last chapter that a helpful way to make 
sense of the employment exceptions is to regard the autonomy which the 
employment exceptions afford religious employers as stemming from a need to 
protect the associational interests of a group membership served by the 
employer. For that reason, the ‘freedom of association’ principle ought to be 
applied to interpretation of the employment exceptions.  Members, I argued, are 
best served by retention of their associative identity, and the employment 
exceptions could therefore be understood as a vehicle through which an 
employer can, within limits, discriminate to preserve its unique ethos.  An 
identity-protecting interpretation of the employment exceptions with roots in 
freedom of religion and freedom of association could provide a principled 
guideline for the application of the employment exceptions in Great Britain.   
This chapter will revisit the current legislative framework for the employment 
exceptions with the aim of assessing the extent to which an identity-protecting 
understanding of freedom of association could explain, and be applied to 
interpretation of, the exceptions in their present form.  The current legislative 
provisions offer a hierarchy of protection for religious employers, determined by 
whether employment is for the purposes of an organised religion,1 education in a 
faith school,2 or otherwise in a religious ethos organisation.3  This hierarchy, I 
                                         
1 Equality Act 2010 (EA), sch 9, para 2. 
2 Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (E(Sc)A), s 21(1); School Standards and Framework Act 1998 
(SSFA), ss 58-60, s 124A.   
3 EA 2010, sch 9, para 3.   
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will argue, is consistent with a concern for the protection of associative identity.  
An interpretation based on an identity-protecting analysis of freedom of 
association could, I will further argue, be accommodated within the current 
legislative framework of employment exceptions.   
This chapter will thereafter consider reported case law on the employment 
exceptions to examine the extent to which an identity-protecting interpretation 
of freedom of association has influenced judicial reasoning in the past.  Whilst 
there is some evidence that the judiciary regards an employer’s ethos or identity 
relevant to its claim, I will argue that their significance is at times 
underdeveloped in the judgments.  There is little reference to ‘associative 
rights’ in the judiciary’s determinations on the employment exceptions, and 
little engagement with the equality interests affected by an exercise of these 
rights.  The exceptions are treated by the judiciary, instead, as derogations from 
the equality principle, which must be interpreted narrowly. 
The final part of this chapter will briefly revisit some of the case law on 
Canada’s employment exceptions.  The Canadian judiciary recognises the 
relevance of freedom of association in this area4 and therefore it is instructive to 
explore how it might have approached the British cases.  Although the Canadian 
judiciary would likely have given greater attention than the British judiciary to 
organisational ethos and identity, I will argue that it would likely have afforded 
insufficient regard to competing equality interests.   
9.2 Revisiting the employment exceptions 
It will be recalled that the principal aim of this thesis was to understand how the 
employment exceptions could best be interpreted.5  It was not the purpose of 
this thesis to consider or recommend any significant reform of the exceptions.  It 
is therefore necessary to consider the extent to which the identity-protecting 
analysis of freedom of association that I have argued for could explain and be 
                                         
4 See chapter 5 at 5.3.2. 
5 See chapter 1 at 1.1. 
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applied to interpretation of the employment exceptions as they are currently 
drafted.     
 Hierarchy of different bases 
To what extent could an identity-protecting interpretation of freedom of 
association explain the legislative decision to provide three distinct bases of 
employment exception for religious employers in Britain: the organised religion 
exception; the faith schools exception; and the religious ethos exception?6   
It is possible to describe this framework of employment exceptions as offering a 
hierarchy of protection, depending on whether employment is for the purposes 
of an organised religion or in a faith school or otherwise.  The organised religion 
exception is arguably the most protective of associative religious needs and 
interests insofar as it permits discrimination on several protected grounds, 
including sex, sexual orientation and marriage, in certain prescribed 
circumstances, without any express requirement to demonstrate that the 
discrimination is a proportionate means to a legitimate end.7  This contrasts with 
the religious ethos exception, which sits at the bottom of the hierarchy and only 
allows employers with an ethos based on religion or belief to impose a 
requirement to be of a particular religion or belief when it is an occupational 
requirement and a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  The faith 
schools exception could be positioned somewhere in the middle of the hierarchy.  
Employers can exercise preferences in employment decisions because of 
religious beliefs unhindered, it would seem, by any requirement to demonstrate 
proportionality.  Further, discrimination on grounds other than religion may be 
permissible in decisions on dismissal insofar as behaviour inconsistent with the 
precepts or the upholding of the tenets of the religion can be taken into 
account.    
                                         
6 See the doctrinal analysis on these employment exceptions in chapter 3 at 3.2.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.  
In addition to these three exceptions which are particularly relevant to employers with an ethos 
based on religion or belief, there is the OR exception which can also be relied on by employers 
without a religious or belief ethos (see chapter 3 at 3.3.1).     
7 See discussion in chapter 3 at 3.3.3 on the measure of ambiguity over whether the organised 
religion exception entails a proportionality assessment.   
9 Applying freedom of association to the employment exceptions 220 
Could the identity-protecting understanding of the principle of freedom of 
association explain this hierarchy?  There is certainly a cogent argument that a 
claim by the membership of a religious association for protection of its 
associative identity is strongest in the context of employment for the purposes 
of an organised religion.  The personnel who lead the members of an organised 
religion in religious worship and those who represent and promote the religion 
have a particularly strong influence on the members’ associative identity. The 
membership concept, moreover, sits most comfortably with organised religion: 
members of a parish, synagogue, temple or mosque, for example, are relatively 
easy to identify.  The strong claim by members of an organised religion to 
protect their associative identity through the autonomous selection of their 
leaders and spokespeople may justify the organised religion exception’s position 
at the top of the hierarchy.  The no-conflict and non-compliance principles of 
the organised religion exception further serve to put membership interests at 
the forefront.  The no-conflict principle expressly refers to the religion’s 
‘followers’ and permits discrimination where necessary to avoid conflict with 
their strongly held convictions.  The non-compliance principle, meanwhile, seeks 
to preserve the integrity of religious doctrine which is, of course, of primary 
significance to the members who subscribe to it.      
The associational claim for identity protection may also explain why faith 
schools have greater latitude to discriminate in their employment practices than 
other types of religious organisation.  Faith schools arguably have a unique and 
special purpose.  The aim of education in a Roman Catholic denominational 
school, for example, has been described as, ‘not merely the transmission of 
knowledge and development of skills, but rather the integral formation of the 
whole person according to a vision of life that is revealed in the Catholic 
tradition’.8  Religious values have been said to infuse every aspect of the pupil’s 
educational experience in a denominational school and, to this end, the 
teachers’ roles have been found to be, ‘fundamental to the whole effort of the 
school, as much in its spiritual nature as in its academic’.9  In this regard, the 
school’s membership, whether comprised of the parents in the parish to which 
                                         
8  Daly v Ontario (Attorney General) (1999) 4 OR (3d) 349, (1999) 172 DLR (4th) 241, 1999 
CarswellOnt 1085, [34] (WL Intl) (ON CA) (cited to CarswellOnt) per Weiler J.A. 
9 Caldwell v Stuart [1984] 2 SCR 603, 624 (CanLII), (1984) 15 DLR (4th) 1 (cited to SCR).   
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the school is attached, or the representatives of the religion on the governing 
boards, may give rise to a particularly strong associational claim to justify 
discrimination in the schools’ employment practices for protection of the 
identity of these associations.   
 Scope for application of freedom of association 
To what extent can the employment exceptions in their current form 
accommodate an interpretation based on an identity-protecting analysis of 
freedom of association?  The religious ethos exception provides the judiciary 
with the most scope to assess the interests of the membership served by an 
employer in protecting its identity.  It requires the judiciary to have regard to 
the employer’s ethos, the nature of the work or its context, and to assess 
whether religion is an occupational requirement and a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim.10  Although it is debatable whether the organised 
religion exception engages the judiciary in assessing the proportionality of a 
particular requirement, it nevertheless provides some scope for the judiciary to 
assess the interests of the members served by the employer.  In determining 
who is, ‘employed for the purposes of an organised religion’, for example, the 
judiciary could have regard to those posts most relevant to the members’ 
associative identity.  Further, it may not be straightforward in every case to 
determine whether any particular requirement, such as sex or sexual orientation 
is necessary in order to comply with a religion’s doctrine or to avoid conflict 
with the convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers.  There 
might be a dispute over the meaning or existence of a particular doctrine, or 
dubiety over the identity of the religion’s followers, or the level of objection 
that is required to engage the no-conflict principle.11  In these more difficult 
cases, the judiciary could assess, in the context of doctrinal requirements and 
membership interests, the extent to which the discrimination is necessary to 
protect the members’ associative identity.     
                                         
10 EA 2010, sch 9, para 3. 
11 Sandberg acknowledges the difficulties with determining whether there has been offence caused 
to a ‘significant number’ of followers, particularly in respect of those religions that do not have a 
definition of membership.  Russell Sandberg, 'The Right to Discriminate' (2011) 13 EccLJ 157,  
177 and fn 142. 
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The opportunity to incorporate the identity-protecting analysis of freedom of 
association into the faith schools exception is admittedly more limited.  The 
faith schools exception affords schools considerable latitude in their 
employment practices and does not require them to demonstrate that their 
actions are proportionate.  Still, the associative claim for identity protection 
could be important to the judiciary’s determination of unfair dismissal claims 
brought by teachers dismissed from employment because of behaviour 
inconsistent with the precepts or the upholding of the tenets of the school’s 
religion.  Although the faith schools exception (at least in England and Wales) 
permits employers to take such behaviour into account they will still be bound to 
demonstrate that any dismissals are fair.  In determining the question of 
fairness, the judiciary could benefit from assessing the extent to which the 
school’s actions were required to protect the associative identity of its 
‘members’.      
9.3 Cases on the employment exceptions 
Although there is scope for applying an identity-protecting analysis of freedom 
of association to interpretation of the employment exceptions, there is no real 
expectation that it will have influenced judicial determinations in the past given 
the lack of direction provided by Parliament in this respect.12  Could judicial 
reasoning on the employment exceptions be improved by application of the 
principle argued for?  This part of the chapter will examine the reported case 
law on the employment exceptions to uncover the extent to which (if at all) 
interpretation of the employment exceptions has in the past been influenced by 
consideration of ‘associative rights’.   
 The Board of Governors of St Matthias Church of England 
School v Mrs Y Crizzle (EAT) 
One of the earliest cases to consider religion as an occupational requirement is 
The Board of Governors of St Matthias Church of England School v Mrs Y 
Crizzle13 (‘Crizzle’).  The respondents in the case, the Board of Governors of a 
                                         
12 See chapter 6.   
13 Board of Governors of St Matthias Church of England School v Crizzle [1993] ICR 401 (EAT) 
(Crizzle).  
9 Applying freedom of association to the employment exceptions 223 
Church of England voluntary aided school, advertised a job vacancy for head 
teacher and specified that applicants were to be ‘committed communicant 
Christians’.14  Ms Crizzle, a non-practising Roman Catholic of Asian descent who 
applied unsuccessfully for the position, argued that the job criterion amounted 
to indirect race discrimination on the basis that fewer applicants of Asian 
descent could comply with it, and that it was not justified.  Although not a case 
decided pursuant to the employment exceptions,15 the analysis in the case of 
whether the criterion was justified offers an insight into the judiciary’s approach 
to employers’ claims for religious autonomy. 
At first instance, the employment tribunal (the ‘ET’) concluded that imposition 
of the criterion was not justified.  The ET dismissed the assertions by the school 
governors that the legitimate aim pursued by imposition of the criterion and 
relevant for the justification of indirect discrimination was the safeguarding of 
the Anglo-Catholic tradition in the school.  The ET concluded instead that it was 
required to assess the needs of the school, and not the governors, and that the 
school’s primary objective was, ‘efficient education in the light of the needs of 
the community’.16  As the criterion prevented the school governors from 
considering whether a candidate could demonstrate ‘sufficient sympathy for the 
Christian faith’ to ensure the necessary link between church and school, it could 
not be justified.17  The ET reached its conclusion after considering a number of 
factors.  These were: the purpose of the school under the Education Act; the 
ethnic and religious background of the pupils, parents, and community; 
recruiting difficulties; the practice of other primary schools; the Diocese 
standard job specification; and the fact a person other than the head teacher 
who was licensed by the Bishop could administer the sacrament to pupils at 
mass.18  It is notable from these factors that the ET had little, if any, regard for 
the associative claim of the school governors or the church.    In fact, the ET 
                                         
14 ibid 405. 
15 The case was prior to the introduction of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003, which introduced the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or 
belief.   
16 Para 45 of ET decision, referred to by EAT in Crizzle (ch 9, n 13) 410. 
17 ibid.   
18 ibid. 
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attempted to distinguish the needs of the school from those of the church, 
stating that only the former were relevant:   
The need we have to assess is not that of the Governors (whether as a 
Board or as individuals), nor of the Parish Church, nor of the London 
Diocesan Board, nor of the Church of England. In our view the need to 
be considered is that of St Matthias School, as a school, regulated by 
the Board of Governors within the framework of the Education Act 
1944.19 
By readily dismissing the school governors’ stated objective for applying the 
criterion, and by instead assessing the school’s needs in its, ‘wider context’,20 
the ET adopted an external perspective of the school’s interests and gave little 
regard to the associative claim of the governors or the church for protection of 
the school’s identity.   
On appeal, the employment appeal tribunal (the ‘EAT’) disapproved of the ET’s 
definition of the school’s needs as ‘efficient education’ and found instead, that 
imposition of the criterion was justified.  Although the EAT purported to 
recognise that the ‘reasonable need’ of the governors which was relevant to the 
justification of indirect discrimination was, ‘religious worship and the ethos of 
the school’,21 its reasoning suggests that the implications of this were never fully 
appreciated.  The EAT’s decision appears to have been heavily influenced by the 
assertion of the school governors that the post-holder had to be a communicant 
Christian in order to administer communion to pupils at mass.22  Although this 
practicality was relevant to the school governors’ claim that the criterion was 
necessary, so too were other factors, which related to the relationship between 
the post-holder and the maintenance of the school’s ethos and identity.23  
Although these factors made up a significant part of the governors’ claim, the 
EAT paid them little attention.  The EAT concluded that the objective pursued 
by the school governors was legitimate, and the means deployed were 
reasonable and proportionate, but provided no explanation as to how it reached 
                                         
19 ibid. 
20 Para 40 of ET decision, referred to by EAT in Crizzle (ch 9, n 13). 
21 Crizzle (ch 9, n 13) 411.   
22 The EAT reports that, ‘It is in the field of worship that the governors' objective was based and it is 
in that context that the test of justifiability must be applied.’ ibid 412.   
23 ibid 407-08. 
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this conclusion.  There was no assessment by the EAT of the discriminatory 
impact on unsuccessful applicants who could not meet the criterion, and no 
consideration of whether less discriminatory alternatives were available.  
Although the EAT found in favour of the school governors, its parting comment in 
the judgment suggests that it may have misunderstood the essence of their 
claim.  Stating its thoughts that there was ‘an important distinction to be 
recognised between education and worship’24 the EAT appears not to have 
appreciated the school governors’ position which was that worship pervaded the 
education which they provided.25  
 Glasgow City Council v McNab (EAT) 
In the next case, Glasgow City Council v McNab26 (‘McNab’), the employer was 
the local authority responsible for maintaining, and employing staff in a Roman 
Catholic school in Scotland.  The employer sought to rely on the faith schools 
exception, the religious ethos exception and the OR exception to defend a 
decision to restrict applicants for the post of acting principal teacher of pastoral 
care to those of the Roman Catholic religion.  In its decision, the EAT 
acknowledged that rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (‘ECHR’) were relevant, but referred only to Mr McNab’s rights under 
articles 9 and 14, and not to the associative right of the church or the catholic 
parent community under articles 9 and 11 of the ECHR.27  The EAT emphasised 
instead in its judgment that the exceptions on which the local authority sought 
to rely were, ‘limited exceptions to a strong non-discriminatory principle’.28  The 
EAT agreed with the ET that the local authority could not rely on the religious 
ethos exception as it was not an employer with a religious ethos,29 and found no 
error in law in the ET’s findings that religion was not a genuine occupational 
requirement for the purposes of the OR exception.30  The reasoning of the ET, 
                                         
24 ibid 412. 
25 The school asserted rather that, ‘the religious and educational life is treated as one’ recorded in 
para 40 of the ET judgment referred to by the EAT in Crizzle (ch 9, n 13) 410.   
26 Glasgow City Council v McNab [2007] IRLR 476 (EAT) (McNab).  
27 ibid [23] and [60].   
28 ibid [60]. 
29 ibid [61]. 
30 ibid [60]. 
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which the EAT reported and considered ‘adequate’,31 again suggests a lack of 
understanding of the interests at stake.  The ET boldly asserted that: 
the ‘nature’ of the job of Pastoral Care Teacher does clearly not 
require the holder of the position to be a Roman Catholic as the 
nature of the position as a teacher of pastoral care can be held by a 
person who is not a Roman Catholic in a non-denominational school.32 
By equating the nature of the role of pastoral care teacher in a denominational 
school with the nature of the same role in a non-denominational school, the ET 
appears to have closed its mind to the potential for the school’s religious ethos 
to influence the pastoral care it provided its pupils.33  Though it later accepted 
that, ‘some elements of personal support and development of a positive school 
ethos may require input from a teacher familiar with the teaching or doctrine of 
the Roman Catholic Church’ it did not consider this to be required in relation to 
‘support on the school curriculum’ or ‘vocational support’.34  It is difficult to 
understand how the ET arrived at the distinction between personal support, 
which might need input from someone knowledgeable of Roman Catholic 
doctrine, and vocational support, which did not.  Indeed, it is noteworthy that 
the ET appears not to have conceded that the teaching of any part of pastoral 
care required a teacher who was of the Roman Catholic religion: knowledge of 
the Roman Catholic doctrine would seem to have sufficed.35  The ET concluded 
that Roman Catholic doctrine would only be relevant in a small number of 
pastoral care matters and since it was possible to call on another teacher to 
assist in these matters, it was not a genuine occupational requirement for the 
post holder to be of the Roman Catholic religion.36  This reasoning is suggestive 
                                         
31 ibid [60]. 
32 Para 114 of the ET decision, referred to by the EAT in McNab (ch 9, n 26) [20].  
33 The Catholic Education Service, for example, relates the pastoral care function in a Catholic 
school to its religious character.  Explaining the ‘distinctive nature’ of Catholic education, the 
Catholic Education Service notes that Jesus Christ and his teachings are at the core.  The 
school must advance the ‘uniqueness of the individual’, in recognition that God made each 
person in his image and loves them.  According to the Catholic Education Service, it follows that 
‘high quality pastoral care’ is required to cater for each individual’s specific needs.  Catholic 
Education Service, ‘Catholic Education in England and Wales’ (revised and approved by the 
Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, May 2014) 2-3 
<https://www.catholiceducation.org.uk/component/k2/item/1002835-bishops-launch-new-
document-in-support-of-catholic-education> accessed 3 December 2017.        
34 Para 116 of the ET decision, referred to by the EAT in McNab (ch 9, n 26) [20]. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid.  
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of a functional or instrumental approach to the role of pastoral care teacher, 
rather than a focus on whether the occupational requirement in the pastoral 
care role was necessary for maintenance of the school’s ethos.37    
 Sheridan and others v Prospects for People with Learning 
Disabilities (ET) 
In Sheridan and others v Prospects for People with Learning Disabilities,38 a 
social care provider for people with physical and learning disabilities, sought to 
rely on the religious ethos exception to defend its decision to require all of the 
level 1 and 2 support posts in its organisation to be filled by practising 
Christians.39  The ET rejected Prospects’ claim that Christianity was an 
occupational requirement for these posts, finding that it had therefore 
discriminated unlawfully against one of its managers contrary to the Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 by requiring him to recruit and 
promote only Christians.  The ET found that Prospects had failed to perform any 
job evaluation for the posts and that it was not proportionate, having regard to 
the nature of the work and the context in which work was carried out, to require 
the post-holders in these roles to be Christians.40   
It is difficult to argue against the outcome reached in this case.  It would appear 
from the ET’s findings of fact that Prospects had been motivated at least in part 
by the mistaken impression that it needed to make religion an occupational 
requirement for all posts in its organisation in order to demonstrate that it had a 
religious ethos and thereby be permitted to discriminate pursuant to the 
religious ethos exception.41  Although Prospects argued that the post-holders had 
to be Christian because of their role in leading prayers, providing service users 
                                         
37 The EAT quickly dismissed the respondents argument on appeal that the ET ought to have found 
that pastoral care was designed to protect Roman Catholic education by stating that the ET 
made no finding that this was the ‘purpose and design of pastoral care’ (at McNab (ch 9, n 26) 
[58].   
38 Sheridan v Prospects for People with Learning Disabilities ET 2901366/06. 
39 Mr Sheridan’s claim was heard together with a claim brought by Ms Louise Hender, a non-
Christian level 1 support worker, who was refused promotion to level 2 because she was not 
Christian.  Evidence and submissions in respect of both claims were heard at a conjoined 
hearing.  A separate judgment was issued in respect of the claim by Ms Hender (Hender v 
Prospects for People with Learning Disabilities ET 2902090/2006). Where relevant, aspects of 
this judgment will be referred to in the footnotes below.   
40 Sheridan (ch 9, n 38) [4.4]. 
41 ibid [2.33]-[2.34]. 
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with spiritual guidance, and representing Prospects in the Christian community,42 
the tribunal found sparse evidence of those in support worker roles exercising 
these functions.43         
Given the lack of evidence that Christianity was an occupational requirement for 
the support worker posts, the ET likely arrived at the right outcome on the facts 
of this case.44  The reasoning in parts of its judgment, however, suggests a lack 
of appreciation of the needs and interests of organisations like Prospects.  It is 
evident from the factual history set out in the ET judgment that Prospects was 
struggling with how to maintain its ethos and, at the same time, respond to its 
growth strategy.  Referring to the fact that by 2005, most services provided by 
Prospects were covered by the Care Standards Act, the ET observed in its 
findings of fact that, ‘It became increasingly difficult to maintain the Christian 
distinctive over secular standards for care.’45  Although initially staffed 
exclusively by Christian employees, Prospects had, over the years, recruited a 
number of employees who were not committed Christians because of the need 
to staff their growing services and to comply with their obligations under the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 when 
taking over services from other providers.46  It was clear that Prospects had 
ongoing concerns about the impact of these recruitments on its policy to employ 
staff committed to a Christian basis of faith47 and on its ability to maintain a 
Christian ethos.48   
                                         
42 ibid [2.19]-[2.20]. 
43 ibid [2.22] where the ET notes ‘the overwhelming proportion of the support given at Level 1 was 
secular in nature’.    
44 See also the submissions of the claimant’s counsel in Hender (ch 9, n 39) at [4.64]-[4.75] as to 
why the ethos exception should not apply in that case.   
45 Sheridan (ch 9, n 38) [2.8]. 
46 ibid [2.9]-[2.13]. 
47 In 1999 the then Director issued a report on Prospects’ Christian employment policy, observing, 
‘I am concerned that what amounts to a passive erosion of our Christian Employment Policy is 
taking place, which has already significantly reduced the proportion of Christian staff in our total 
workforce.  The dilemmas are not simple ones as I hope I have illustrated.  There are some 
historical undertakings to which we are already committed: bidding for contracts will inevitably 
sometimes bring us into the sphere of TUPE regulations and the pressures to recruit sufficient 
staff to keep a service running are very real ones.  Nevertheless, it would be salutary for us to 
thinking through carefully the longer-term implications of our current staffing situation.’ ibid [2.9]. 
48 ibid [4.1.26] (per abstract of witness evidence contained within Prospects’ written submissions). 
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Although, in Prospects’ subjective opinion, it was ‘a Christian organisation, 
established to work out its faith in the service it provides’,49 the ET was quick to 
prefer the objective assessment of Prospects’ ethos carried out by counsel for Mr 
Sheridan, where spirituality was only one of six principles guiding its work.50  The 
ET also readily accepted the submissions of Sheridan’s counsel that relevant 
‘context’ for the purposes of determining whether Christianity was an 
occupational requirement included the fact the organisation was largely staffed 
by non-Christians:51 an unusual use of ‘context’ to deny a claim on the 
exception.  The employment by Prospects in the past of staff who were not 
Christians was further treated by the ET as evidence that Christianity was not 
required to maintain Prospects’ ethos, without due attention being paid to the 
genuine reasons for these recruitments put forward by Prospects.52  The ET also 
accepted the failure of Prospects to dismiss its non-Christian staff as evidence of 
a lack of occupational requirement.53  Little weight was given to the explanation 
given by Prospects that to dismiss the staff in these circumstances would be 
contrary to their Christian values.54  Perhaps of most concern was the 
concurrence of the ET with the submissions by counsel for Mr Sheridan, which 
trivialised the role of ‘Mission’ and ‘prayer’ in Prospects.  Likening them to a 
preference for staff to be ‘happy and relaxed’, counsel for Mr Sheridan asserted 
forcefully that these could never be occupational requirements.55      
Admittedly, Prospects had changed in character over the years.  Its homes in the 
late 70s and early 80s ‘resembled small Christian communities with all Christian 
staff’ who were encouraged to see work as, ‘a Christian calling or vocation’.56 By 
the time of the ET hearing, direct service provision prevailed over mainstream 
                                         
49 ibid [4.1.16]. 
50 ibid [4.2.10]-[4.2.12].   
51 ibid [4.2.15].  See also submissions of the claimant’s counsel in Hender (ch 9, n 39) [4.56], [4.60] 
and [4.61] (with which the ET agreed [4.76]). 
52 Sheridan (ch 9, n 38) [4.2.19].   
53 ibid [4.2.20].   
54 ibid [2.20]. 
55 ibid [4.2.17].  It was recorded in the ET judgment in Hender (ch 9, n 39) that Prospects had 
argued that prayer and the fact Christian staff were ‘called’ to work was important to the 
‘mission’ purpose of the organisation.  Counsel for the claimant (with whom, it would appear, the 
ET agreed) argued in response that the ‘motivation for performing work cannot form part of an 
occupational requirement’.  See Hender (ch 9, n 39) [4.36]-[4.37], [4.47], [4.53], [4.76].     
56 Sheridan (ch 9, n 38) [2.6].  
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Christian ministry, significant numbers of service users and staff were not 
Christian, the organisation was highly regulated and in receipt of local authority 
funding.57  These facts and the lack of evidence to support the application of 
Christianity as an occupational requirement in the particular posts were 
undoubtedly relevant to the ET’s assessment.  Still, the wholesale adoption by 
the ET of the submissions by Mr Sheridan’s counsel, referred to above, 
nonetheless indicates a rather dismissive attitude towards Prospects’ continuing 
endeavour to, ‘maintain its corporate and core ethos’58 whilst responding to the 
pressures of growth.   
 Muhammed v The Leprosy Mission (ET) 
In Muhammed v The Leprosy Mission (‘Muhammed’),59 Mr Muhammed, who was a 
Muslim, complained that the Leprosy Mission had unlawfully discriminated 
against him on grounds of religion by requiring applicants for the role of Finance 
Administrator to be Christian.  Applying the ethos exception, the ET found that 
Christianity was a genuine occupational requirement for the role.60  Although the 
ET did not expressly refer to freedom of association, the reasons it gave for its 
decision nevertheless indicate that it had a good understanding of the interest of 
the Leprosy Mission in maintaining its ethos.  In its findings of fact, the ET 
observed that all 24 of its employees were Christian and that staff believed they 
were continuing the work of Jesus Christ.61  Collective worship and prayer were 
found to be significant to the work of the organisation and to its relationships.  
The Leprosy Mission believed that, through prayer, God would assist it to fulfil 
its vision and that it had a role in supporting the Mission worldwide by acts of 
collective and individual worship to Jesus Christ for its success.62  Each working 
day started with collective prayer, gospel reading and shared reflections on the 
work of Jesus Christ and staff were expected to pray individually in response to 
requests from the Leprosy Mission’s partners.63  Prayers were also said at the 
                                         
57 ibid [2.8].  
58 ibid [2.14].  
59 Muhammed v The Leprosy Mission International ET/2303459/2009. 
60 ibid [31] 
61 ibid [6] and [9]. 
62 ibid [6] and [9]. 
63 Ibid [10]-[11]. 
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beginning and end of formal meetings, and to assist with dispute resolution 
within the workplace.64  In addition to prayer and fasting days, collective 
worship was performed in response to particular events.65  At the staff ‘away 
day’ each year, staff would reflect on the Bible and participate in individual and 
group Christian prayer.66  The ET considered that Christianity was not an 
occupational requirement having regard to the ‘nature’ of employment as 
Finance Administrator: according to the tribunal, the ‘nature’ of the 
employment referred to the ‘core requirements’ of the role, which were finance 
and administration.67  The ET was, however, prepared to accept that the 
responsibilities of the Finance Administrator, which related to the Leprosy 
Mission’s Christian ethos and to Christian prayer,68 were the employment’s 
context.69  Having regard to this context, the ET concluded that Christianity was 
an occupational requirement for the role.  According to the ET: 
A Christian belief, and in particular a belief in the biblical account of 
Jesus healing lepers, and a belief in the power of Christian prayer to 
achieve the Respondent’s goals are at the core of its work and 
activities.  Among other matters, this is manifested by the daily acts 
of Christian worship in which all members of staff participate, and 
acts of prayer in response to requests for Christian prayers from 
abroad.70      
Unlike the ET in Sheridan,71 which appeared to attach little importance to the 
role of prayer and worship, the ET in Muhammed, recognised the relational 
aspects of employment in the Leprosy Mission.  Finding that the occupational 
requirement imposed was both objectively justified and reasonably necessary, 
the ET remarked that, ‘Employing a non-Christian would have a very significant 
adverse effect on the maintenance of the Respondent’s ethos, and the sense of 
religious community cohesion in the working place.’72  Although the ET 
                                         
64 ibid [12]. 
65 Ibid [11]. 
66 ibid [12] 
67 ibid [30] 
68 Responsibilities included, to ‘represent’ the Mission’s Christian ethos and to ‘support its work 
through Christian prayer and fellowship’ ibid [15]. 
69 ibid [30]. 
70 ibid [31]. 
71 Sheridan (ch 9, n 38), 
72 ibid [33]. 
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considered the impact of the discriminatory requirement on Mr Muhammed’s job 
opportunities it did not consider whether preventing Mr Muhammed from 
applying for the post because of his religion would cause harm to his dignity.    
 Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance (ET) and 
Pemberton v Inwood (EAT) 
A review of the two reported cases on the organised religion exception reveal 
missed opportunities for the judiciary to incorporate an identity-protecting 
interpretation of freedom of association into its decisions.   In Reaney v 
Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance,73 the ET arrived at the finding that the 
position of youth minister was for the purposes of an organised religion.  The ET 
did not consider whether the role of youth minister was of similar importance as 
the role of clergy to the associative identity of the church membership.  Instead, 
the ET appears to have been heavily influenced by the statements made by 
ministers in Parliament, and by Richards J of the High Court in R (on the 
application of Amicus) v The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, on the 
types of posts within the ambit of the organised religion exception.74  Finding, 
for example, that the Diocesan Youth Officer had a key role in the ‘promotion’ 
of the church, the ET was satisfied that, ‘The Claimant would have been 
promoting religion in the way in which it has been suggested the regulations are 
meant to encompass.’75  A similar rigidity in approach is evident in the EAT 
judgment of Pemberton v Inwood.76  In Pemberton, the ET and EAT had to 
determine whether the post of chaplain for an NHS Trust was, ‘for the purposes 
of an organised religion’.  The ET and EAT did not assess whether the associative 
identity of the church membership would be impacted by the employment of a 
chaplain in an NHS Trust.  Instead, the ET was persuaded that the exception 
applied simply because, ‘it is not the nature of the organisation that is in issue 
but the purpose of the employment’ and ‘authorisation to be able to minister as 
a Church of England Priest was an essential requirement of the employment’.77  
In neither Reaney nor Pemberton did the ET consider freedom of association to 
                                         
73 Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance ET 1602844/2006.  
74 ibid [71]-[79]. 
75 ibid [102]. 
76 Pemberton v Inwood [2017] IRLR 211 (EAT).  
77 ibid [110].   
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be a principle guiding interpretation of the exception.  The preferred 
‘interpretative model’ in both cases was simply to emphasise the requirement to 
interpret the exception ‘narrowly’, as ‘a derogation from the principle of equal 
treatment’.78   
9.4 Judicial reasoning and the Canadian experience  
There is thus evidence in the cases discussed above that the importance of ethos 
or identity to a religious organisation could be better understood and that 
greater efforts could be made to consider the discriminatory impacts of an 
exercise of the exceptions.  Could an application of the identity-protecting 
understanding of freedom of association make a difference in these cases?  
Recalling that freedom of association underpins the group employment 
exceptions in the human rights legislation of several Canadian provinces,79 it may 
be instructive to consider how the Canadian judiciary might have approached 
the same cases.   
 Ethos and identity 
There is reason to believe that had the Canadian judiciary been asked to 
determine cases on the same facts as the tribunals were presented with in 
Crizzle,80 McNab81 and Sheridan,82 it would have engaged more extensively with 
the importance and relevance of group ethos or identity.  Firstly, and as 
discussed in chapter 5, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that there are 
both subjective and objective arms to the ‘bona fide occupational requirement’ 
provisions in the human rights legislation of Canada’s provinces and territories. 83  
The subjective arm requires the judiciary to enquire in the first instance as to 
exactly what was in the mind of the employer when it imposed the requirement.  
In this way, the test compels the judiciary to seek to understand matters from 
the perspective of the employer at the outset.  Only then can the judiciary 
                                         
78 Reaney (ch 9, n 73) [100]; Pemberton (ch 9, n 76) [88].   
79 See chapter 5 at 5.3. 
80 Crizzle (ch 9, n 13). 
81 McNab (ch 9, n 26). 
82 Sheridan (ch 9, n 38).   
83 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Etobicoke (Borough) [1982] 1 SCR 202, 208 (CanLII); 
(1982) 132 DLR (3d) 14. 
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assess from an objective perspective whether the criterion is reasonable and 
proportionate.  A clear approach such as this one, which addresses the matter 
initially from the subjective perspective of the employer, is likely to avoid the 
errors committed by the ET in Crizzle, when it substituted its interpretation of 
the school’s legitimate aim for the one put forward by the school. 
Secondly, the judicial reasoning in the Canadian cases of Caldwell v Stuart84 and 
Schroen v Steinbach Bible College85 is illustrative of a deeper engagement by the 
judiciary with the ethos or identity of the employer seeking to rely on the 
exceptions.  The sparse attention given to the relevance of the religious nature 
of the schools in Crizzle86 and McNab,87 for example, can be contrasted with the 
detailed attention paid to the Roman Catholic ethos of the school in Caldwell.  
In Caldwell, the Supreme Court of Canada recognised that, ‘the Catholic school 
is different from the public school’, finding that, as well as ‘the ordinary 
academic program, a religious element which determines the true nature and 
character of the institution is present in the Catholic school’.88  The evidence 
before the Board of Inquiry developed the content of this ‘religious element’ 
further, in Church documents and statements from Church witnesses.  The 
doctrinal basis of the Catholic school was acknowledged: establishment of the 
school with the purpose of, ‘formation of the whole person, including education 
in the Catholic faith’ as a means to continue Christ’s work of salvation.89  
Principles developed by the church to achieve its purpose were set out by the 
school, one of which described the Catholic school as, ‘a genuine community 
bent on imparting, over and above an academic education, all help it can to its 
numbers to adopt a Christian way of life’.90   The school also attested to the 
‘different emphasis of the Catholic school’ giving examples as to how this 
manifested itself in the school’s administration and its daily activities.91  All of 
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this evidence persuaded the Supreme Court that, ‘the religious or doctrinal 
aspect of the school lies at its very heart and colours all its activities and 
programs’.92  
The rather dismissive attitude of the ET in Sheridan93 towards the role in the 
workplace of ‘mission’ and ‘prayer’, meanwhile, can be contrasted with the 
time taken by the Board of Adjudication in Schroen94 to engage with the ethos or 
identity of the employer in that case and to understand the importance of 
relationships in the workplace.95  Although Schroen was not a case on an 
employment exception of the type referred to by Beetz J in Brossard (Town) 
v Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne)96 as being underpinned by 
freedom of association, the attention given by the Board of Adjudication to 
factors such as identity and relationships suggests its decision was nonetheless 
influenced by considerations of ‘associative rights’.  The Board of Adjudication 
in Schroen considered evidence on the founders of the college, the founding 
documents and the college policies, and heard from faculty, staff and expert 
witnesses.  It described the college as having a, ‘unique culture’, and 
acknowledged the significance of ‘community’ at the college.97  The college led 
evidence on the relational aspects of life at the college.  One expert witness 
gave evidence of the importance of community to the Mennonites, and claimed 
that the college ‘faculty and staff view themselves as a team together fulfilling 
the mission of the Bible College’.98  It was intended by the college that a 
Christian atmosphere would pervade all aspects of college life, and, as one 
witness put it, that all ‘teachers, students and staff were expected to interact 
so that a total sense of community existed to enable students to speak to their 
teachers, to an accounting clerk or to a janitor’.99  Another witness, who was a 
staff member of the college, described how staff and students would interact 
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and, ‘how the staff saw the domestic mission of their jobs as being, “my work 
was my faith – my faith was my work”’.100  Although the functional aspects of the 
role of accounting clerk were not religious in any way the engagement by the 
Board of Adjudication with the distinctive ethos of the college, and particularly 
its relational aspects, demonstrates a willingness to uncover the real needs of 
the employer in that case.   
 Discriminatory impacts 
Although the EAT in Crizzle101 and McNab102 and the ET in Sheridan103 and 
Muhammed104 was required to consider whether the discriminatory standard 
imposed was ‘proportionate’ to the achievement of a legitimate end, the 
potential harm – to dignity interests or otherwise – inflicted on the claimants in 
these cases, was not always considered.  Although the tribunal in Muhammed 
purported to take the discriminatory impact of the occupational requirement 
into consideration, it referred only to its impact on job opportunities for Mr 
Muhammed.105  In fact, Reaney106 was the only case among those reviewed above 
in which the judiciary considered evidence on the emotional harm and harm to 
dignity interests caused by the employer’s actions.  The judiciary in Reaney 
referred to dicta in Amicus107 to the effect that the organised religion exception 
did not permit enquiry by ETs on a case by case basis as to whether the 
employer’s actions were ‘proportionate’.108  This perhaps explains why the ET 
then only considered the evidence presented on the harm caused to Mr Reaney 
as relevant only to his allegation of harassment, which arose from the manner in 
which the Diocese advised of its decision not to recruit him.109     
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Although the principle of freedom of association underpins the Canadian 
approach to the group employment exceptions and it might be expected, 
therefore, that the Canadian judiciary would have regard for its qualified nature 
and consider in each case, any harm which an exercise would inflict on equality 
interests, there is evidence of insufficient attention being paid to discriminatory 
impacts in some of the Canadian decisions.  The Board of Adjudication in 
Schroen,110 for example, did not give any consideration to the harm experienced 
by the Mormon accounting clerk when the Bible College retracted her offer of 
employment after learning of her religious affiliation.  Neither was consideration 
given by the court in Ontario Human Rights Commission v Heintz111 to the 
discriminatory impact on the support worker asked to choose between having a 
same-sex relationship and her job.112  The lack of any judicial consideration of 
discriminatory impacts is most evident, however, in the Canadian cases 
concerning denominational schools.  Once satisfied that a school has a religious 
ethos, the judiciary seems to accept with little question that a religious 
conformance requirement on the teaching staff is justified.113  Insufficient 
consideration is given to any injury inflicted on the party discriminated against, 
or to whether there are less discriminatory alternatives available.114 
9.5 Conclusion 
The identity-protecting analysis of freedom of association could, I have argued, 
explain the hierarchy of protection provided by the three distinct bases of 
employment exceptions in Britain, and could be used to interpret them in their 
                                         
110 Schroen (ch 9, n 85).  
111 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Christian Horizons 2010 ONSC 2015 (CanLII), (2010) 102 
OR (3d) 267. 
112 Although, note the Board of Inquiry in Parks v Christian Horizons (1991) 16 CHRR D/40, 1991 
Carswell Ont 6678 [55]-[60] (WL Intl) recognised the harm inflicted on staff by the employer’s 
inconsistent approach to staff relationships, and concluded that the subjective arm of the 
Etobicoke test was not satisfied where the employer acts inconsistently.     
113 For example, see Caldwell (ch 9, n 9); Kearley v Pentecostal Assemblies Board of Education 
(1994) 19 CHRR D/473, 1994 CarswellNfld 519 (WL Intl) (Nfld Bd of Inquiry); Casagrande v 
Hinton Roman Catholic Separate School District No 155 1987 CarswellAlta 89 (WL Intl) (Alberta 
Court of Queen's Bench); Central Alberta Association of Municipal and  School Employees and 
Wild Rose School Division No 66 (1998) 55 CLAS 435, 1998 CarswellAlta 2061 (WL Intl) 
(Alberta Arbitration); Walsh v Nefoundland (Treasury Bd) (1988) 53 DLR (4th) 161, (1988) 39 
CRR 188, 1988 CarswellNfld 211 (WL Intl) (NLSCTD).   
114 See dissenting opinion of Sheila J Greckol in Central Alberta Association of Municipal and 
School Employees and Wild Rose School Division No 66 (ch 9, n 113).    
9 Applying freedom of association to the employment exceptions 238 
current form.  To date, as an analysis of reported case law on the exceptions 
reveals, the judiciary has been more influenced by a perceived need to interpret 
the exceptions narrowly as derogations from the equal treatment principle, than 
by considerations of associative rights or interests.  It is perhaps as a 
consequence of this, I have argued, that the importance to religious 
organisations of their ethos or identity is not as apparent in the British decisions 
as in the decisions of the Canadian judiciary, which has embraced the principle 
of freedom of association in the context of group employment exceptions.  
There was further suggestion in the reported case law of a lack of engagement 
by the judiciary with discriminatory impacts.  A similar lack of consideration for 
the harm in discriminatory job criteria, meanwhile, was indicated in some of the 
Canadian decisions.    
An approach to interpretation of the employment exceptions which encourages 
engagement with both the ethos or identity of the employer and the 
discriminatory impacts of any proposed requirement is to be preferred.  I will 
conclude in the final chapter that such an approach could be based on freedom 
of association, and, further, that this could lead to improvements in decision-
making on the exceptions. 
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10 Towards a principled approach to interpretation 
of the employment exceptions  
10.1 The case for a principled approach to the 
employment exceptions 
The reported decline in religiosity of the British public and the greater weight 
given to individual human rights and equality in policy discourse and legislation 
has provided the context for considering the potential conflict engaged by the 
employment exceptions between religious autonomy and the rights of the 
individual to equality.  The aim of this thesis has been to consider how these 
exceptions can best be understood and interpreted.  Notwithstanding the 
debates in Parliament on their application and the scope which they allow for 
differing judicial interpretations, the volume of academic literature and 
reported case law on the exceptions since their implementation has been 
modest.  Not only was the enquiry therefore important, so too was it timely in 
light of the recent recommendation of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (‘EHRC’) that the framework of the employment exceptions in the 
Equality Act (the ‘EA’) should not be changed and the EHRC’s commitment to 
consider providing assistance or intervening in any case in relation to the 
application of the exceptions in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 and the 
School Standards and Framework Act 1998.1    
As a prelude to considering their nature and scope, the employment exceptions 
were located in their wider theoretical context, with particular attention paid to 
the influence of prevailing norms in society.  I argued that the continuing 
influence of the religious group in the political and social spheres, most 
particularly illustrated by incidents of establishment in Scotland and England and 
by the role of the religious group in the provision of education and social 
welfare, ought now be considered in light of the ever increasing dominance of 
equality and human rights discourses, and the claimed decline in ‘religiosity’ of 
the British public.2  I argued further that the human dignity and autonomy 
rationale for the right to religious freedom offered a modern interpretation of 
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the special status of the religious group, which was consistent with the increased 
focus on individual interests and the individual in certain aspects of law and 
culture today.3   
Against this background, the nature and scope of the employment exceptions 
were examined and the argument made that they were riddled with ambiguity 
and uncertainty.4  A comparative examination of the model of exceptions and 
exemptions in the USA called particular attention to the narrow parameters in 
which the employment exceptions can be exercised, the potential for differing 
judicial interpretations of their scope, and the underdeveloped nature of the 
jurisprudence.5  The paucity of precedent on the employment exceptions was 
recognised as a surprising trend.6  Paradoxically, the uncertainty as to the scope 
and application of the employment exceptions was identified as both a reason 
for, and a consequence of, the lack of case law on their terms.7   
Ambiguities in the employment exceptions were also heightened, I argued, by a 
divergence in understanding among policy makers as to the relative significance 
of job function, context and organisational ethos in the engagement of the 
exceptions.8  The lack of appreciation by some UK policy makers of the 
importance to religious employers of the wider context in which work is carried 
out, including the organisational ethos, was highlighted and then underlined by 
an analysis of the greater regard had by the Canadian judiciary to the purpose or 
mission of the employer, its ethos and the context in which work is performed, 
when interpreting the employment exceptions in Canada’s provinces.9  
Ambiguity in the scope and application of the employment exceptions is 
problematic for the rule of law, generating legal uncertainty and risking 
inconsistency in judicial decision making. For that reason, I argued that it was 
important that clear principle be discerned to guide the judiciary and other 
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actors in their interpretation of the statutory provisions.10  Whereas the US and 
Canadian exemptions and exceptions which were tailored for the religious 
employer were shown to be underpinned by, respectively, principles of church / 
state relations and freedom of association,11 I argued that a patchwork of factors 
had shaped and influenced the introduction of the employment exceptions in 
Great Britain: norms of equality and human rights, the historic importance of 
denominational schooling and establishment; church and doctrinal autonomy; 
and a fair measure of political compromise and concession.12  Consequently, I 
contended that no single, clear principle has, so far, been recognised as 
underpinning their existence and interpretation.   
In the search for possible principle to guide future development of the 
employment exceptions, a stakeholder view was sought.13  Qualitative interviews 
with employers who had a religious or faith ethos revealed mixed opinion on the 
employment exceptions: some participants considered the exceptions were too 
narrow and/or ambiguous, whilst others reported no difficulties with them.14  
More significantly the interviews provided experiences ‘on the ground’ in answer 
to the question, how and why might religious ethos impact on employment 
practices and relationships?  Through this, an insight was gained into the 
associative life of a religious or faith ethos workplace.  The importance of 
employees for the maintenance of an employer’s ethos was revealed in several 
participants’ accounts, as was the importance of a religious or faith work ethos 
for the employees’ own personal experiences of religion or faith.15  
Organisational purpose (missionary, for example), the perceived need for 
worship in the workplace and staff relationships16 were also found to be 
important to some participants’ reliance on the employment exceptions.   
In light of these findings, I argued that, in the future, it could be both helpful 
and possible within the existing framework, to apply the principle of freedom of 
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association to interpretation of the employment exceptions.17  Not only is this 
called for by the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECtHR’), it (together 
with freedom of religion) could offer a principled justification for the 
employment exceptions and a useful context for their interpretation.  I argued 
for a particular understanding of freedom of association which regards the 
employment exceptions as offering a vehicle through which employers may 
discriminate in order to preserve their ethos for the benefit of the members of a 
group defined by their religion, provided always that this does not 
disproportionately infringe the rights and interests of others.  An examination of 
the relevant jurisprudence, however, suggested that ‘associative’ rights or 
interests had not been particularly influential in past decisions on the 
employment exceptions.18  The significance of employer ethos and identity was, 
I argued, underdeveloped in the jurisprudence and little regard was paid to the 
discriminatory impacts of an exercise of the exceptions.   
Drawing on the analysis in previous chapters, I will conclude in this final chapter 
that the identity-protecting understanding of freedom of association argued for 
could, as an interpretive tool, assist the judiciary to improve its reasoning and 
reach fair and balanced decisions on the employment exceptions.  A purposive 
approach to the exceptions which regards them as derogations from the equality 
principle justified by fundamental human rights could encourage the judiciary to 
adopt an internal perspective of employers’ needs and assess claims on the 
exceptions in the context of the interests protected by rights of association.  
Recognition that the rationale for the derogations derives from a qualified right 
could lead, moreover, to the judiciary engaging more fully than it has done in 
the past with assessing and balancing discriminatory impacts.  I will argue finally 
that the concept of ‘accommodation’ developed in the Canadian jurisprudence 
on the bona fide occupational requirement (‘BFOQ’) could assist with balancing 
rights of religious association and equality rights by requiring less discriminatory 
alternatives to be properly explored.     
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10.2 A rights-based rationale for derogations from the 
equality principle 
To date, the judiciary has regarded the employment exceptions as limited 
derogations from the equality principle.19  The historical background to their 
implementation offers an explanation for this interpretation in preference to 
one which would understand the exceptions as deriving from positive religious or 
associative rights.20  Although not all of the exceptions were introduced to 
implement European measures,21 they must be interpreted, where possible, in a 
manner which is consistent with the equality laws of the European Union (the 
‘EU’).  This interpretive obligation compels the judiciary to regard the 
exceptions as strictly defined derogations from the equality principle.   
For so long as the UK remains a member of the EU, the judiciary must therefore 
continue to interpret the exceptions as limited derogations from the equality 
principle.  Although the UK may be able to depart from this interpretation after 
it has left the EU, it is surely preferable that the judiciary continues, even then, 
to treat the exceptions as strictly defined derogations to ensure that equality is 
afforded sufficient protection.22  There is, however, a risk that understanding 
the exceptions solely as limited derogations from the equality principle fails to 
offer much assistance with how they should be interpreted.  Advocating for a 
‘narrow’ interpretation of the exceptions, moreover, may detract from 
interpreting them in a manner that is true to their meaning and purpose.  Beetz 
J in Brossard (Town) v Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne),23 
articulates this point neatly in the context of the group employment exception 
of the Quebec Charter, when he says: 
To say that the very nature of the second branch of s.20 lends itself to 
one of either a restrictive or liberal interpretation oversimplifies the 
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provision and is not, in my view particularly helpful in discovering its 
meaning.24  
Unrestrained by any concern to interpret the exception in a ‘restrictive or 
liberal’ fashion, the court in Brossard was able to give the words of the 
legislative provision their ‘ordinary meaning’25 in the context of the underlying 
principle of freedom of association.   
Thus, whilst the employment exceptions in Britain should continue to be 
regarded as limited derogations from the equality principle, it is nonetheless 
important that recognition is also afforded to the rationale for the derogations.   
I have argued in this thesis in favour of a rationale for the derogations based on 
fundamental human rights of religious association.  The benefits of a purposive 
approach to interpretation of the exceptions that regards them as limited 
derogations from the equality principle which are justified by human rights will 
now be explored.      
 A purposive interpretation  
Canadian case law is illustrative of a purposive approach on the part of the 
judiciary to interpretation of employment exceptions.  It is common for the 
judiciary to articulate early in its judgments that it understands the rationale of 
the group employment exceptions to lie with freedom of association.  In 
Caldwell v Stuart,26 for example, the Supreme Court, tasked with interpreting 
the group employment exception in the Human Rights Code of British Columbia, 
identified its roots in freedom of association at the outset of its deliberations.  
MacIntyre J of the Supreme Court cited with approval dicta from the Court of 
Appeal hearing in the same case:  
This is the only section in the Act that specifically preserves the right 
to associate.  Without it the denominational schools that have always 
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been accepted as a right of each denomination in a free society, 
would be eliminated.27   
These dicta were also cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Brossard,28 a 
case on the group employment exception in the Quebec Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  Beetz J in Brossard concluded that the employment exception in 
Quebec’s Charter ‘was designed to promote the fundamental right of individuals 
to freely associate in groups for the purpose of expressing particular views or 
engaging in particular pursuits’.29  This was fundamental to the court’s decision 
that the town could not rely on the exception to defend its operation of an anti-
nepotism employment policy: the town did not promote the interests of a group 
identified by a protected characteristic and did not discriminate to promote the 
free association of members of such a group.30  The Supreme Court in Brossard 
observed that freedom of association was also the principle underlying the group 
employment exceptions in certain other Canadian provinces.31  Its dicta, 
therefore, have been cited with approval in several subsequent cases on the 
employment exceptions.32   
Importantly, in basing its group employment exceptions in freedom of 
association, the Canadian judiciary openly recognises that the exceptions confer 
rights.  The rights-based nature of the exceptions is emphasised in each of the 
judgments.  The parties in Caldwell were described by the Supreme Court, for 
example, as each asserting a, ‘clear legal right’.33  The Board of Inquiry in Parks 
v Christian Horizons, meanwhile, referred to the Ontario Human Rights Code as 
creating, ‘two sets of equal but competing individual and group rights’.34  The 
Board of Adjudication in Schroen expressed a similar sentiment when it 
observed, in a case on the bona fide occupational requirement provision in the 
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Manitoba Human Rights Code, that the case ‘involves the rights of one religious 
group and the religious freedom of an individual’.35   
There are two relevant consequences of regarding the employment exceptions 
as ‘rights-conferring’.  Firstly, this invites an interpretation of the exceptions in 
light of the interests they protect, which is a more meaningful guideline than an 
instruction to interpret them ‘narrowly’.  MacIntyre J in Caldwell made this 
observation in respect of the group employment exception in British Columbia’s 
Human Rights Code:   
It is therefore my opinion that the courts should not in construing s.22 
consider it merely as a limiting section deserving of a narrow 
construction.  This section, while indeed imposing a limitation on 
rights in cases where it applies, also confers and protects rights.36 
It is a second and related consequence of the recognition that the employment 
exceptions confer rights, that an ‘internal’ perspective of the needs and 
interests of the religious employer is invited.  Iain Benson has considered the 
religious employer exemptions in Canada and South Africa and has argued for an 
approach which he refers to as ‘seeing through the associational lens’ or ‘the 
use of the oculus’.37  According to Benson, it is necessary ‘to imagine life 
through other people’s eyes and come to offer respect for their vision, their 
difference and their way of seeing’.38  If the exceptions are interpreted as rights-
conferring (rather than, solely as derogations from the equality principle), there 
may be a greater incentive to properly understand the real interests that they 
protect and, particularly, the relationships in a religious group between its 
ethos, its members and its employees.     
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 Context: ethos, members and employees 
Whereas the judicial understanding of the relationships among ethos, members 
and employees in a religious group is underdeveloped in the context of the 
employment exceptions in Britain, there is evidence that the application of 
freedom of association to group employment exceptions in certain Canadian 
provinces assists the judiciary to better recognise the intricacies of these bonds.  
This recognition offers an important context in which to balance the right to 
associate with the right to be free from discrimination.   
There is evidence, firstly, of the Canadian judiciary having particular regard to 
the task of identifying the membership interests served by the employing entity.  
Indeed, the judiciary in several of the Canadian provinces is compelled to 
undertake this enquiry by the statutory language of the group employment 
exception applicable in its jurisdiction.  The employment exception in Ontario’s 
Human Rights Code, for example, will only apply where, ‘a religious … institution 
or organisation … is primarily engaged in serving the interests of persons 
identified by their … creed’.39  In Caldwell v Stuart, the Supreme Court accepted 
the finding of the Board of Enquiry that ‘the persons interested are not just the 
pupils in the School, but are the members of the Catholic faith who have created 
the School and who support it’.40  In Parks v Christian Horizons, the Board of 
Inquiry found that the interests which were served by Christian Horizons 
included, ‘the Evangelical Christian interests of its founding and present 
executive personnel and membership’,41 a finding which was largely followed by 
the court in Ontario Human Rights Commission v Heintz.42  Even in Schroen v 
Steinbach Bible College, which concerned a claim under the general BFOQ 
provision in the Manitoba Human Rights Code rather than a group employment 
exception of the type which the Supreme Court of Canada has held protects 
freedom of association, the Board of Adjudication heard evidence of the ties the 
college had with Mennonite church groups, which owned the college, and 
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supported it financially, and on the impact of the college’s employment 
practices on the ‘support and confidence’ of this constituency.43   
Identifying the membership interests served by the employing entity at the 
outset is useful in providing the relevant context in which to interpret the 
employment exceptions.  Importantly, understanding in whose interests the 
employers act, adds vital substance to their claims to maintain a particular 
ethos.  One consequence of this is that job roles could be more confidently 
related to the ethos of the organisation.  So, in Caldwell, for example, the 
Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that a requirement of religious 
conformance on teaching staff was justified because the right to denominational 
schooling, enjoyed by the members of the Catholic community served by the 
school entailed the right to, ‘preserve the religious basis’, of the school.44  In 
Schroen, the Adjudicator was clear that consideration of the specific job duties 
of the accounting clerk was insufficient.  Instead, as he put it, ‘consideration 
must be given to allow a religious group to achieve its religious objectives’ and 
this required reflection as to the manner in which the role, ‘relates to the 
overall functioning in the institution’.45  
A focus on the membership interests served by the employing entity can also 
assist with setting the parameters within which the employment exceptions are 
to operate: discrimination must be necessary for protection of these interests.  
The decision of the court in Heintz is illustrative.  The court found that the 
interests served by Christian Horizons were those of the founders, members and 
employees, in living out their Christian faith and performing their Christian 
ministry.  It was in that context that the tribunal assessed the argument by 
Christian Horizons that religious conformance was necessary in the role of 
support worker.  Finding that the, ‘Christian environment’ in the homes 
comprised prayer, hymn singing and Bible reading,46 and that there was no 
attempt to instil in the residents Evangelical beliefs or lifestyle, the court held 
that the imposition of a religious conformance requirement was not justified.  
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Put another way, the imposition of the religious conformance requirement was 
unnecessary for protection of the interests of the members in performing their 
Christian ministry.  The Christian culture in the homes, maintained by staff 
through participation in prayer, hymn signing and Bible reading adequately 
served these interests.          
10.3 A qualified right 
 Discriminatory impacts 
The failure of the British judiciary to assess the impacts of discrimination is not 
limited to cases on the employment exceptions.47  Indeed, it has been said that, 
‘It is nearly impossible to find a UK employment discrimination decision where 
the impact of the discrimination is measured or weighted at all.’48  The historical 
influence of the equalities jurisprudence from the EU might explain this, at least 
in part.  Whereas jurisprudence from the ECtHR has been found to regard 
discriminatory impacts, including the ‘experiences of the claimant’ and  
‘societal costs’49 as important in determining whether discriminatory conduct is 
proportionate,50 EU equalities jurisprudence, by comparison, requires that the 
discriminatory conduct is ‘necessary’ pursuant to a ‘real need’.51  Although the 
British judiciary has more recently been obliged under the Human Rights Act 
1998 to have regard for ECtHR jurisprudence, the judiciary has been criticised 
for its reluctance to consider the impacts of discrimination and to weigh these in 
the balance with competing rights and interests.52 
An approach to the employment exceptions which regards their rationale as 
based in fundamental human rights of religious association could encourage the 
judiciary to focus on the discriminatory impacts of a proposed measure and pay 
                                         
47 For comment on the little regard paid to discriminatory impacts in cases on the employment 
exceptions see chapter 9 at 9.4.2. 
48 Aaron Baker, 'Proportionality and Employment Discrimination in the UK' (2008) 37 ILJ 305, 311.   
49 ibid 320.   
50 ibid 317-21. 
51 Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607, [36]; see Baker (ch 
10, n 48) 306-10 in which Baker argues that the UK courts often do not follow EU jurisprudence 
in discrimination cases.  But now see Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 2012 UKSC 
15, 2012 ICR 74 and comment in chapter 3 at n 64). 
52 Baker (ch 10, n 48) 321-23.  
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greater regard to Strasbourg’s approach to balancing competing interests.  
Freedom of association (like freedom of religion), after all, is not absolute.  
Article 11 of the ECHR provides that freedom of association can be limited, if 
prescribed by law and necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.  When an employer exercises their derivative right to religious 
association, those most often infringed are freedom of religion and equality 
rights.     
There have been many justifications offered for the limits imposed by anti-
discrimination laws on freedom of association, including social engineering, 
perfectionist-paternalism, and legal moralism.53  Discrimination can inflict on 
individuals, ‘major physical, emotional, psychological and social harm’,54 and in 
cases of sexual orientation discrimination, the harm can be particularly severe.  
Counsel for the claimant in Reaney v Diocese of Hereford submitted before the 
employment tribunal (the ‘ET’) that the purpose of the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 was, in part, to, ‘remove and approach 
the concealment of sexual orientation which is corrosive of integrity’.55  He 
referred the ET to a South African case in which the court approved comments 
made by the ECtHR on the ‘often serious psychological harm’ suffered by 
homosexual victims of discrimination.56  The Supreme Court of Canada similarly 
asserted in Vriend v Alberta57 that, ‘The potential harm to the dignity and 
perceived worth of gay and lesbian individuals constitutes a particularly cruel 
form of discrimination.’58  There is evidence of this harm in the South African 
case of Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente, Moreleta Park,59 
which concerned a claim of sexual orientation discrimination brought by a music 
                                         
53 See discussion in Larry Alexander, 'What is Freedom of Association, and What is its Denial?' 
(2008) 25 Social Philosophy and Policy 1, 15-20.    
54 Greg Walsh, 'The Right to Equality and the Employment Decisions of Religious Schools' (2014) 
16 The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 107, 127.   
55 Reaney (ch 10, n 19) [84].    
56 ibid [84] referring to The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, South African Human 
Rights Commission v The Minister of Justice, The Minister of Safety and Security, and The 
Attorney General of the Eitwatersrand [1998] ZACC 15, [23] (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa). 
57 Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493 (CanLII), 156 DLR (4th) 385 (cited to SCR). 
58 ibid [102].  Also referred to by Counsel for the Claimant in Reaney (ch 10, n 19) [84].    
59 Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente, Moreleta Park 2009 (4) SA 510 (T) (Equality 
Court of South Africa). 
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teacher for an academy run by the Dutch Reformed Church.  When the academy 
discovered the teacher was involved in a homosexual relationship, it terminated 
his contract.  The impact on the teacher’s emotional, psychological and financial 
well-being was reportedly particularly grave: he became depressed and had to 
sell his house and his piano.60  There must also be appreciation of the financial 
harm suffered by individuals who are subject to discrimination because 
excluding individuals from employment opportunities because of protected 
characteristics results in inequality of opportunity for economic advancement.61   
Perhaps most importantly, though, equality laws protect individuals against the 
harm caused to their dignity interests when subjected to discrimination on 
grounds of a protected characteristic.62  A person’s interest in his own sense of 
self-worth can undoubtedly be affected by unlawful discrimination, but so too 
can the wider public view of that person’s worth.63  For this reason, one United 
States Supreme Court judge has referred to discrimination as causing a, 
‘stigmatizing injury’.64  Obtaining and retaining employment is a significant 
contributor to feelings of self-worth, and therefore discrimination in 
employment can have a substantial adverse effect on dignity interests.  The 
impact of discrimination on dignity interests, however, can be even more 
profound, as one South African critic has said: 
Employment is of course connected to a person’s sense of dignity and 
thus losing one’s job on discriminatory grounds may indeed cause a 
crisis of self-worth.  Yet, the dignity claim goes beyond this: it is 
about the exclusion of individuals from the community in question on 
the basis of a central element of their identity, and the stigma that 
this causes.  It involves fundamentally a failure to treat individuals as 
ends in themselves.  It involves reducing individuals to a particular 
                                         
60 Ibid [25], [33].  See also, Patrick Lenta, 'Taking Diversity Seriously: Religious Associations and 
Work-Related Discrimination' (2009) 126 SALJ 827, 838 and 852.    
61 White considers that, ‘Individuals have an economic opportunity interest in not being excluded 
specifically from … goods-conferring associations.’ Stuart White, 'Freedom of Association and 
the Right to Exclude' (1997) 5 The Journal of Political Philosophy 373, 383.     
62 See discussion in ibid 384-85 on the dignity interest infringed by exclusion on categorical 
grounds.   
63 ibid 384.  
64 Justice Brennan J in Roberts v United States Jaycees 468 US 609 (1984) at 625, discussed in 
White (ch 10, n 61) 384.   
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characteristic and taking decisions that have a detrimental impact 
upon them simply because of this characteristic.65  
The dignity interests affected, moreover, are not restricted to those of the 
individual who is the subject of the discriminatory act.  Rather, all those in the 
community to which the individual belongs can suffer from the knowledge that 
the state has permitted rejection of an individual because of a protected 
characteristic, which they all share.66   
It is noteworthy that dignity could be the basis both for freedom of religious 
association and for the right to non-discrimination because of protected 
characteristics.  Some have even argued that dignity itself could be useful in 
determining the outcome in cases where these rights compete.67  Though the 
concept of human dignity is certainly beneficial to a deeper understanding of 
equality law and human rights, it is doubtful that ‘dignity’ is a robust enough 
concept to provide much assistance to the judiciary in balancing competing 
interests.68  Though some have argued that general principles ought to guide 
mediation of the conflict between freedom of association, on the one hand, and 
the right to equality of opportunity, on the other69 there is no basis in the 
European Convention on Human Rights for any hierarchical ordering of freedom 
of association and rights to equality.  A case-by-case approach is required to 
assess the relative strength of each claim in the conflict, and the facts of each 
case must inform a comparison of the claim to equality with the claim to 
associate freely.70   
                                         
65 David Bilchitz, 'Should Religious Associations Be Allowed to Discriminate?' (2011) 27 SAJHR 
219, 233.       
66 Walsh (ch 10, n 54) 129.   
67 Gay Moon and Robin Allen, 'Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to equality?' 
[2006] EHRLR 610    
68 See discussion in Walsh (ch 10, n 54) 131-32 and Walsh’s reference to dicta of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in R v Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483, [21]-[22] (CanLII), 294 DLR (4th) 1 that, ‘human 
dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that … cannot only become confusing and difficult to 
apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden on equality claimants, rather than the 
philosophical enhancement it was intended to be’.  
69 For example, Rawls has argued that basic liberties (like freedom of association) should always 
be prioritised over equality of opportunity.  See discussion in Peter De Marneffe, 'Rights, 
Reasons and Freedom of Association' in Amy Gutmann (ed), Freedom of Association 
(Princeton University Press 1998) 149.   
70 Peter De Marneffe argues against general principles to guide the approach in ibid 149-56.  He 
concludes that, ‘whether it is permissible or impermissible for the government to interfere with a 
liberty for reasons of equality depends not upon the category of liberty it falls within, but upon 
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 Proportionality as a means of balancing 
Of course, at present, only the religious ethos exception and the OR exception 
incorporate an express proportionality test that the judiciary can use to assess 
the relative strength of the claim to associate freely with the claim to equality 
on a case-by-case basis.  Proportionality is entirely absent from the faith schools 
exception and there is dubiety over whether proportionality is implicitly 
incorporated into the organised religion exception.71  Proportionality provides a 
mechanism for decision-makers and the judiciary to consider the discriminatory 
impact of a proposed measure and to ask whether an alternative with less of a 
discriminatory impact would suffice to achieve the employer’s purpose.72  The 
requirement to act proportionately in the circumstances of each case ensures 
that due respect is afforded to all competing interests in the particular contexts 
in which they arise.  Proportionality is an essential component for affording the 
dignity interests of all affected parties sufficient weight.   
It was observed in chapter 3 that arguments have been made that the lack of 
any express stipulation that discriminatory requirements must be proportionate 
renders the organised religion exception and the faith schools exception 
incompatible with Council Directive 78/2000.73  In light of these persuasive 
arguments and the benefits of a facility allowing the judiciary to balance the 
right to associate with the right to be free from discrimination on a case-by-case 
basis, the UK Government should amend the faith schools exception and the 
organised religion exception.  Amending the organised religion exception and the 
faith schools exception to include an explicit requirement on the employer to 
act proportionately would provide greater scope for freedom of association to 
guide interpretation of the exceptions by offering a more flexible and nuanced 
mechanism to balance competing rights.   
                                         
the relative weight of this reason of equality and the reasons against interference.  We should 
resolve conflicts between freedom of association and equality or opportunity not by considering 
general principles, then, but by considering the details of each case.’ ibid 156.   
71 See chapter 3 at 3.3.3. 
72 For comment on the doctrine of proportionality, competing interests, and the range of factors 
which may be relevant in balancing religious freedom with other rights and freedoms, see Lucy 
Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (OUP 2016) 65-96. 
73 See chapter 3 at 3.3.5.      
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 Accommodation and the search for less discriminatory 
 alternatives 
It has been argued above that a full understanding of the freedom of association 
basis of the employment exceptions ought to recognise the qualified nature of 
this right and seek an appropriate balance with the rights and interests adversely 
impacted by its exercise.74  There is a concept of ‘accommodation’, developed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of British Columbia (Public Service 
Employee relations Commission) v B.C.G.E.U75 (hereafter, referred to as 
Meiorin) which could usefully be incorporated into decision-making to assist 
relevant parties achieve this important balance.76   
Meiorin was not a case on an employment exception, but rather a case on the 
BFOQ provision in British Columbia’s human rights legislation.77  The Supreme 
Court of Canada held in Meiorin that there was a three-step test to decide 
whether a prima facie discriminatory standard was a BFOQ.  Firstly, the 
employer has to demonstrate a rational connection between the purpose of the 
standard and performance of the job.  Secondly, the employer must show that it 
adopted the standard in the honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to 
fulfil a legitimate work-related purpose.  Thirdly, it must show that the standard 
was reasonably necessary for that purpose.  To establish that the standard was 
‘reasonably necessary’ it must be demonstrated that it was impossible to 
accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant 
                                         
74 See above at 10.3.1 and 10.3.2. 
75 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGEU [1999] 3 SCR 3 
(CanLII), (1999) 176 DLR (4th) 1 (Meiorin cited to SCR). 
76 For an argument in favour of incorporating proportionality and the Meiorin principle of 
accommodation into the BFOQ analysis in cases (including those pertaining to discrimination in 
employment by religious schools) see Hilary MG Paterson, ‘The Justifiability of Biblically Based 
Discrimination: Can Private Christian Schools Legally Refuse to Employ Gay Teachers’ (2001) 
59 U Toronto Fac LRev 59. 
77 For a helpful summary of the development of Canadian jurisprudence on the BFOQ in Canada, 
see Alvin Esau, '"Islands of Exclusivity": Religious Organisations and Employment 
Discrimination' (1999-2000) 33 UBC LRev 719, 781-93.   
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without imposing undue hardship on the employer.78  The third step of the 
Meiorin test, therefore, incorporates a norm of ‘accommodation’.79   
The Supreme Court in Meiorin proposed a list of questions to assist the judiciary 
to determine whether an employer has satisfied their duty to accommodate to 
the point of undue hardship.  These questions included whether the employer 
investigated alternative approaches and whether there was a way to perform the 
job, which was not as discriminatory, but which still achieved the employer’s 
legitimate purpose.80  The ‘financial cost of the possible method of 
accommodation’, the ‘relative interchangeability of the workforce and 
facilities’, and ‘the prospect of substantial interference with the rights of other 
employees’ were also among the factors which the Supreme Court considered 
might be relevant to an assessment of efforts to accommodate.81  In addition to 
the procedure followed by the employer to consider accommodation, the 
‘substantive content’ of ‘either a more accommodating standard which was 
offered or alternatively the employer’s reasons for not offering any such 
standard’, was to be scrutinised.82  The following words of McLachlin J of the 
Supreme Court capture effectively the duty of the judiciary to engage with the 
issue of accommodation when interpreting the BFOQ:  
Courts and tribunals should be sensitive to the various ways in which 
individual capabilities may be accommodated.  Apart from individual 
testing to determine whether the person has the aptitude or 
qualification that is necessary to perform the work, the possibility 
that there may be different ways to perform the job while still 
accomplishing the employer’s legitimate work-related purpose should 
be considered in appropriate cases.  The skills, capabilities and 
                                         
78 ibid [54].  The Meiorin decision was also significant for removing the distinction between direct 
and indirect discrimination and creating a unified approach to defending discrimination based on 
the BFOR.    
79 Esau describes the decision as creating what he termed ‘an accommodationist BFOR test’ in 
Esau (ch 10, n 77) 786.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Meiorin, the obligation to 
‘accommodate’ to the point of undue hardship had, to a degree, been incorporated in to some of 
the provinces’ legislative provisions on the bona fide occupational requirement (see Yukon, 
Ontario, Manitoba), as well as in the federal human rights code.  The Canadian Human Rights 
Act, for example, provided at section 15(2) that an otherwise discriminatory practice will not 
amount to a bona fide occupational requirement unless it is established that accommodation of 
the needs of an individual or a class of individuals affected would impose undue hardship on the 
employer.  See Meiorin (ch 10, n 75) [52].  
80 Meiorin (ch 10, n 75) [65].  
81 ibid [63].   
82 ibid [66].   
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potential contributions of the individual claimant and others like him 
or her must be respected as much as possible.  Employers, courts and 
tribunals should be innovative yet practical when considering how this 
may best be done in particular circumstances.83    
The Supreme Court’s decision in Meiorin requires the employer to do more than 
simply ask whether it is possible to accommodate an individual in any particular 
scenario: it requires, rather, that accommodation is built into the standard 
itself.84  At the heart of the Meiorin ratio, therefore, is, ‘the core value of 
inclusiveness’.85  ‘Inclusiveness’ as a value is not inconsistent with a freedom of 
association underpinning of the employment exceptions.86  This is because a full 
understanding of the freedom of association basis of the group rights protected 
by the employment exceptions ought to recognise the qualified nature of these 
rights and seek an appropriate balance with the rights and freedoms adversely 
impacted by their exercise.  By incorporating considerations of ‘accommodation’ 
into the BFOQ provision, factors relevant to achieving this balance are placed at 
the forefront of the minds of employers and the judiciary.     
The Canadian case of Smith v Knights of Columbus87 illustrates how the 
requirement to consider ‘accommodation’ could help to foster an environment 
in which there is more regard for the dignity interests of those affected by 
discrimination.88  In Smith the complainants alleged that they had been 
discriminated against because of their sexual orientation when the Knights of 
Columbus (a Catholic men’s organisation) retracted its offer to rent a hall to 
them when it discovered they intended to use it for a reception following their 
same-sex marriage.  The tribunal held that the Knights had failed to establish a 
bona fide and reasonable justification defence to the discrimination because 
they had not accommodated the complainants to the point of undue hardship.  
                                         
83 ibid [64].  
84 ibid [55].  See also, Canadian Human Rights Commission, ‘Bona Fide Occupational 
Requirements and Bona Fide Justifications under the Canadian Human Rights Act: The 
Implications of Meiorin and Grismer’ (Minister of Public Works and Government Services, March 
2007) 1 <https://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/eng/content/bona-fide-occupational-requirements-and-
bona-fide-justifications-under-canadian-human-rights> accessed 28 December 2017.     
85 Esau (ch 10, n 77) 793.   
86 Esau argues the contrary.  Observing that Meiorin is not based ‘on the acceptance of 
exclusionary practices as an associational group right’ Esau argues that the ‘message’ of 
inclusiveness ‘is in stark conflict with the culture of the islands of exclusivity’.  ibid.    
87 Smith v Knights of Columbus 2005 BCHRT 544 (WL Intl), 55 CHRR 10 (cited to BCHRT).   
88 See also Eadie v Riverbend Bed and Breakfast 2012 BCHRT 247 (WL Intl), 74 CHRR 410. 
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According to the tribunal, although the Knights could have declined to rent the 
hall ‘because of their core religious beliefs’, they were compelled, ‘to consider 
the effect their actions would have on the complainants’89 and they, ‘could have 
taken additional steps that would have recognized the inherent dignity of the 
complainants and their right to be free from discrimination’.90  These steps 
included, ‘meeting with the complainants to explain the situation, formally 
apologizing, immediately offering to reimburse the complainants for any 
expenses they had incurred and, perhaps offering assistance in finding another 
solution’.91      
If the British judiciary was to build this concept of ‘accommodation’ into its 
interpretation of proportionality in the employment exceptions, it would need to 
consider the adverse impacts of an employer’s actions on the affected employee 
or applicant and whether the employer took steps to avoid or mitigate these.  
This would render it more likely that due respect would be afforded to the 
dignity interests of the individual affected by the discrimination.  It is important 
to recognise that considering ‘accommodation’ as part of the proportionality 
enquiry would not necessarily create a more stringent test for defending 
discrimination.  It is recalled that ‘accommodation’ in the Canadian 
jurisprudence is only required to the point of ‘undue hardship’.  It would be for 
the British judiciary to set the bar for ‘undue hardship’.  Given the freedom of 
religious association underpinning of the employment exceptions argued for, the 
British judiciary ought to look particularly to ECtHR jurisprudence for guidance 
in this task.92  The real benefit of incorporating the ‘accommodation’ ideal, 
therefore, lies not in the creation of a stricter test for defending discrimination, 
but rather in encouraging the judiciary (and employers) to focus on 
discriminatory impacts and alternatives.  
                                         
89 Smith (ch 10, n 87) [120].  
90 ibid [123].   
91 ibid [124].   
92 For comment on the ECtHR approach to balancing religious autonomy with individual rights, see 
Ian Leigh, ‘Balancing Religious Autonomy and Other Human Rights under the Convention’ 
(2012) 1 OJLR 109, 120-24.      
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10.4 Conclusion  
In the past, the legislature in the UK has recognised freedom of religious 
association as only one of a number of influences on the employment 
exceptions.  The principal conclusion of this thesis was that there is significant 
merit in treating freedom of religious association as the primary basis for the 
employment exceptions.  The principle of freedom of association, in particular, 
could assist the judiciary to navigate, on a principled footing, the ambiguities in 
scope and application of the exceptions.  It could invite, moreover, greater 
attention to be paid to the real interests affected by an exercise of the 
exceptions.   
Understanding freedom of religious association as the primary basis for the 
exceptions could focus the minds of decision-makers on the individuals (or 
members) whose associative interests an exercise of the exceptions is intended 
to protect and encourage a purposive interpretation which regards the 
exceptions as protecting the associative identity of those individuals.  Canadian 
jurisprudence has been used to illustrate that a purposive interpretation of the 
exceptions, which treats them as derogations from the equality principle that 
are justified by fundamental human rights, could encourage the judiciary to 
have greater regard than it has had previously, for the ethos of the employer, 
and how this interacts with the relationships the employer has with its 
employees and the members it serves.  The importance of ethos in a religious 
workplace should not be understated, as the findings of the empirical study 
show.   
Regarding freedom of religious association as the primary basis for the 
exceptions is also an important reminder that they derive from qualified rights.  
Regarding the rationale for the employment exceptions as rooted in qualified 
rights could encourage the judiciary to engage more fully than it has in the past 
with the discriminatory impacts of an exercise of the employment exceptions 
and any less discriminatory alternatives which might be available.  Extending 
proportionality to the organised religion and faith schools exceptions and 
considering ‘accommodation’, I have argued, could facilitate this engagement, 
and assist the judiciary to balance the dignity interests on both sides.  In 
summary, I have argued that regarding freedom of religious association as the 
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primary basis for the employment exceptions could help the judiciary to take 
into account the intricacies of the interests protected and affected by their 
exercise. 
Understanding freedom of religious association to be the primary basis of the 
employment exceptions could thus have a significant impact on the manner in 
which the judiciary interprets its cases.  It invites the judiciary to take a new 
perspective in its deliberations.  It is a perspective which regards the 
derogations from the EU equality principle as justified by fundamental human 
rights.  It puts ECtHR jurisprudence at the forefront and compels the judiciary to 
embrace Strasbourg’s approach to balancing competing rights with its attendant 
regard for discriminatory impacts.  It asks the judiciary in its deliberations to be 
respectful and tolerant of differing needs but also to be inquisitive of the 
context in which they arise and the personal and societal interests which may be 
impacted if these needs are catered for.  Ultimately, it offers the judiciary the 
flexibility and principled guidance to produce fair and well-reasoned decisions.    
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